A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative by Carmody, Chios
Canada-United States Law Journal 
Volume 43 Issue 1 Article 6 
2019 
A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative 
Chios Carmody 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj 
 Part of the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chios Carmody, A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative, 43 Can.-U.S. L.J. 148 
(2019) 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol43/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law Journal by an 
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
 A GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE 
WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE 
Chios Carmody† 
ABSTRACT: This Guide presents an overview of the cap-and-trade system of carbon emission 
trading created and adhered to under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The Guide is divided 
into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of a cap-and-trade system of emission 
permits. Chapter 2 explains the constitutional background to cap-and-trade schemes in the 
United States and Canada. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the linked system and a summary 
of its principal features in each WCI cap-and-trade partner jurisdiction (California, Québec, 
Ontario). Chapter 4 explains how emission allowances are traded under the WCI and includes 
the results of a survey undertaken of emissions trading market participants. Chapter 5 provides 
some concluding observations with respect to WCI cap-and-trade.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose 
This is a Guide to the legal framework for carbon emissions trading under the 
cap-and-trade system created and adhered to under the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI). This Guide has three aims. First, provide an overview of the WCI cap-and-
trade system for emissions trading by users of the system, potential industry 
participants, state, provincial, and municipal governments, academic institutions 
and members of civil society. Second, to foster learning among domestic and 
international actors interested in North America’s collective response to climate 
change and highlight one attempt to combat climate change through a subnational 
cap-and-trade system on the continent. During the course of research for this 
Guide, in 2018, the province of Ontario linked its WCI-inspired cap-and-trade 
system with that of California and Québec and six months later delinked its system, 
eventually terminating its participation altogether and announcing its intention to 
withdraw from the WCI. Accordingly, a third purpose of this Guide is to serve as 
an account of Ontario’s short-lived cap-and-trade system and its brief experience 
with linkage. 
1.2 Executive Summary 
Cap-and-trade systems have been written about extensively, often from the 
perspective of public participants in the system, that is, the governments involved. 
By contrast the focus in this Guide is on private behavior, that is, the private actors 
– cap-and-trade market experts, cap-and-trade participant entities, and cap-and-
trade offset project developers and advisors – that are directly engaged in 
emissions trading, that advise such actors, or that develop cap-and-trade offset 
projects. The research focuses on this topic because it is less studied and because 
it appears to be pivotal in debate about the pros and cons of emissions trading. 
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At the outset we were interested in determining whether private actors believe 
that emissions trading under the WCI is an efficient, market-based response to 
climate change. Our general conclusions based on a very limited survey of private 
actors is that they do concur in this belief. The two-step approach to regulatory 
harmonization of emissions allowance markets pursued under the WCI – involving 
separate phases of 1) program design and 2) linkage – is useful in allowing 
jurisdictions to accommodate certain necessary political realities in establishing 
emission trading markets. At the same time, the research reveals that linkage under 
the WCI does not involve “plug-and-play” (i.e. unthinking transposition of cap-
and-trade regulation from one jurisdiction to another). Instead, the introduction of 
a cap-and-trade scheme in a jurisdiction requires indigenous commitment and an 
authentic investment of administrative resources as well as difficult political 
choices. Later, in the linkage phase, a common platform and continuing dialogue 
between jurisdiction partners is necessary. Dialogue evidences how harmonization 
and linkage are not static but rather dynamic and adaptive processes. The market(s) 
created out of this process are also dynamic and require continuing intervention to 
regulate and discipline. 
Our specific findings with respect to private behavior are that: 
1. Participants agree that WCI cap-and-trade is cost-effective and efficient. 
WCI cap-and-trade allows entities to achieve environmental goals more 
efficiently. 
2.Currently, the market for carbon allowances under the WCI is small and 
highly technical. It is dominated by a few major players, with the market for carbon 
allowances being little understood beyond them. The technicality of the market 
demands specialization, yet specialization limits participation to those who can 
afford to do so. 
3. The acquisition by Ontario market participants of some CAD $2.8 billion 
worth of allowances in 2017-2018 at a time of free allowance distribution in the 
province suggests that eligible participants were using the emissions trading 
market under the WCI to hedge (i.e. to limit their exposure to future emission price 
increases). 
4. The possibility of excessive banking of emission credits and the threat of 
market domination and manipulation in future cannot be discounted. Both of these 
potential developments raise serious issues about the equity of the emissions 
trading system and could make the public in WCI jurisdictions skeptical about the 
use of market-based mechanisms to combat climate change in years to come. In 
response to these concerns, regulators may consider developing a Code of Conduct 
for WCI market participants and others going forward. 
5. the survey conducted as part of this research involved only a very small set 
of market participants. We contacted 61 participants. Only four agreed to respond. 
The survey questions and results are contained in Chapter 4.8. We surmise that 
events during the course of the research may have depressed sample size. 
Consequently, the conclusions put forward here merit confirmation in a wider 
sampling of market participants and others. 
These findings lead us to conclude that the vital thread running through the 
successful emission trading system is trust and fairness. There must be trust and 
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fairness if emission trading schemes are to continue to function as intended. 
However, those values can only be instilled if allowances are equitably allotted, if 
ethical standards are adhered to in all phases of market operation, if continuing 
efforts are made a transparency, and if public can be made to see tangible evidence 
of fair and efficient markets contributing to climate change goals.   
1.3 How this Guide Works 
This Guide is divided into five chapters. This Introduction (Chapter 1) 
provides readers with an overview of a cap-and-trade system of emission permits, 
including how cap-and-trade systems work, a comparison of cap-and-trade 
systems versus a carbon tax, and comparative experience with cap-and-trade 
systems in the European Union (EU) and China. 
Chapter 2 explains the constitutional background to cap-and-trade schemes 
in the United States and Canada. It also provides a factual background to cap-and-
trade legislation in three North American subnational jurisdictions (California, 
Québec, Ontario), a description of the effort to harmonize cap-and-trade 
legislation in each jurisdiction, and an overview of the framework for doing so 
under the Western Climate Initiative and its corporate form, the Western Climate 
Initiative, Inc. The chapter then examines the linkage of cap-and-trade systems in 
California and Québec in 2014 and the addition (and subsequent withdrawal) of 
Ontario to/from the link in 2018. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the linked system and a summary of its 
principal features in each WCI cap-and-trade partner jurisdiction. The summary 
includes the legislative basis for the cap-and-trade system in each partner 
jurisdiction, the cap, compliance periods, emissions attribution, allowance 
distribution, flexibility, the registration of participants, reporting, verification and 
monitoring, and enforcement. 
Chapter 4 explains how emission allowances are traded under the WCI. It 
explains how emissions trading occurs in the WCI by means of auctions, reserve 
sales and the secondary market, as well as issues of pricing and taxation. The 
chapter also contains a summary of comments culled from a survey of market 
participants, regulators and members of civil society as to the effectiveness of the 
WCI cap-and-trade system. 
Chapter 5 provides some concluding observations with respect to WCI cap-
and-trade. 
1.4 Addressing Climate Change 
1.4.1 Background 
Climate change is defined as “a change in the statistical distribution of weather 
patterns when that change lasts for an extended period of time”.1 Climate change 
is thought to be caused by a number of factors including biodegradation, variations 
in solar radiation and seismic and volcanic activity. In recent decades, consensus 
opinion has centered on human activity through carbon emissions of greenhouse 
 
 1 Joshua Busby, Comment: Warming World, 97, FOREIGN AFF. (2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/warming-world. 
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gases (GHG) as a primary cause of continuing climate change, often termed 
“global warming”.2 One leading school of thought maintains that without 
immediate action to address climate change and global warming, the earth could 
experience massive loss of vegetation, species habitat and biodiversity. In turn, 
these changes could trigger massive flows of human migration, competition for 
remaining resources and geopolitical instability.3 
Both the United States and Canada have historically played leading roles in 
efforts at a global level to address climate change and have cooperated actively 
together in the field of international environmental protection.4 Both countries are 
signatories to numerous international environmental agreements and subscribe to 
globally endorsed environmental principles.5 Both countries have also signed the 
2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change6 negotiated within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change7 in which they commit to setting 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for GHG emission reductions. The 
U.S. initially set an NDC to reduce its emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 
 
 2 “ . . . there is a strong, credible body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research, 
documenting that climate is changing and that these changes are in large part caused by human 
activities NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
AMERICAS CLIMATE CHOICES: PANEL ON ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2010) at 
1. 
 3 “Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting 
changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive 
and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems” (italics added); “A large fraction of species 
faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, 
especially as climate change interacts with other stressors”: United Nations Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS(2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_
SPM.pdf. at 8, 13. 
 4 Close U.S.-Canada environmental cooperation stems from the fact of a shared border. 
The U.S.-Canada border includes four of the five Great Lakes, many rivers and lakes, major 
airsheds, and migratory routes for wildlife species. In addition, there are many U.S. Native 
American Tribes and Canadian First Nations residents whose culture spans the border. The U.S. 
EPA notes that the two federal governments have implemented over 40 international agreements 
for the management and protection of environmental quality and ecosystems in the border area 
and there are over 100 additional such agreements between U.S. states and Canadian provinces. 
The two countries also share policies, programs, and goals to prevent and control pollution and 
to ensure sound policies and practices to protect and restore the many shared ecosystems. 
Historic bilateral environmental initiatives include the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1940, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. 
 5 Among these principles are those identified in Agenda 21: Programme of Action for 
Sustainable Development; the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN, 1992, 
UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992); and the Statement of Principles for the 
Sustainable Management of Forests, UN, 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III). These were 
adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992. 
 6 Paris Agreement, Dec. 13, 2015, U.N Registration No. 54113. 
 7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Sept. 8, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 
107. 
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2025.8 Canada set an NDC to reduce emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 
2030.9 
In 2017, the U.S. announced that it would cease participation in the Paris 
Agreement and withdraw from the agreement at the earliest possible withdrawal 
date, likely in late 2020/early 2021. The announcement was prompted by concern 
over the Paris Agreement’s impact on U.S. businesses and workers as well as the 
perception that the treaty would not solve climate change and did not impose 
uniform obligations on all countries. 
Action on climate change at the federal level in both countries has been 
paralleled by actions at the subnational level by states, provinces, municipalities, 
and indigenous groups. In California a history of intensive resource extraction, 
rapid urbanization and the loss of wildlife habitat prompted the state government 
to act promptly in the 1960s to stem environmental degradation. In 1965 California 
became the first U.S. jurisdiction to regulate vehicle exhaust.10 Two years later, 
the newly formed California Air Resources Board (CARB) set the U.S.’s first air 
quality standards.11 In subsequent decades these initiatives were accompanied a 
number of other efforts to protect the environment, making California an 
acknowledged worldwide leader in environmental standard-setting.12 
In pursuit of its environmental goals, in 2007, California – along with Arizona, 
New Mexico, Oregon and Washington State – created the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI) to evaluate and implement ways to reduce their states’ GHG 
emissions and achieve related co-benefits. The WCI was expanded in 2008 to 
include two more U.S. states (Montana, Utah) and four Canadian provinces 
(British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Québec). Together the 11 jurisdictions 
developed a Design document, released in 2010, that furnishes a template for a 
comprehensive strategy to reduce regional GHG emissions. The 2010 Design 
document foresaw the creation of cap-and-trade mechanisms on a jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction basis, followed by the possibility of jurisdictional linkage. 
The jurisdictions involved in the WCI are all subnational jurisdictions, 
meaning that, as a formal matter, they have no international personality, and 
conversely, no ability to conclude binding agreements under international law. As 
a result, three WCI jurisdictions (British Columbia, California, Québec) created 
the Western Climate Initiative Inc., a non-profit corporation established under 
Delaware law, in 2011 to provide technical and scientific advisory services to U.S. 
states and Canadian provinces in the development and implementation of GHG 
 
 8 Han Chen, THE ROAD FROM PARIS: THE UNITED STATES PROGRESS TOWARD ITS CLIMATE 
PLEDGE (2017), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/paris-climate-conference-US-IB.pdf. 
 9 Canada, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS: PROGRESS TOWARDS 
CANADA’S GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTION TARGET, 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cesindicators/progress-towards-
canada-greenhouse-gas-reduction-target/2019/progress-towards-ghg-emissions-target-en.pdf 
(last visited 2018). 
 10 Charles W Schmidt, “Environment: California Out in Front” (2007) 115:3 Environmental 
Health Perspectives at A146 [Schmidt 2007]. 
 11 For total suspended particulates, photochemical oxidants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
dioxide, and other pollutants, see: Ellyn Adrienne Hershman, “California Legislation on Air 
Containment Emissions from Stationary Sources” (1970) 58:6 Cal L Rev 1474 at 1486-1488. 
 12 Schmidt 2007, supra note 10, at A146. 
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emissions trading programs. Subsequently, with WCI input, two WCI jurisdictions 
– California and Québec – developed their own cap-and-trade programs in close 
alignment, a development which allowed them to fully link their programs with 
each other in 2014.13 Ontario joined the link in early 2018. It subsequently 
withdrew six months later. 
1.4.2 Cap-and-Trade Basics 
For some time it has been known that GHG emissions are a large contributor 
to climate change, and conversely, that reducing GHG emissions can be a 
significant factor in mitigating the effects of climate change. For this reason, a 
number of advocates have promoted the idea of a cap-and-trade system for GHG 
emission credits.14 
Cap-and-trade is a market-based approach to regulating and reducing GHG 
emissions and mitigating climate change.15 Each covered emitter is assigned a 
specific emission limit, which it can meet by the receipt of emission allowances, 
offset activities, market purchases, or any combination of these. The total 
emissions of all emitters is subject to a ‘cap’, which under a cap-and-trade program 
sets a numeric ceiling on GHG emissions in a given jurisdiction while providing 
emissions allowances to participating entities in a quantity consistent with the 
cap.16 Over time the cap is gradually lowered, giving GHG emitters an incentive 
to reduce emissions through the establishment of a market-based price on GHG 
emissions measured per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tonne/CO2e).17 By 
means of an established emissions trading market, emitters are able to buy or sell 
additional allowances with other cap-and-trade participants.18 The market provides 
an incentive to participants to reduce GHG emissions while affording businesses 
flexibility in terms of how they meet the cap in a given compliance period.19 
 
 13 Both California and Québec’s cap-and-trade programs began operating within their 
respective jurisdictions in 2013 after requiring reporting in 2012. For California background 
information, see,: OVERVIEW OF ARB Emissions Trading Program, (2015), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf.. For Québec 
background information, see,: Ministry of Sustainable Development, the Environment and the 
Fight Against Climate Change, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: QUÉBEC CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION ALLOWANCES (C&T), 
http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/historical-
overview.pdf. 
 14 For early experience with cap-and-trade programs in the U.S., see,: ADP Ellerman, L 
Joskow & D Harrison, Jr, Emissions Trading in the U.S. (2003). Emissions Trading in the U.S. 
– Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for Greenhouse Gasses, Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change (2013) (prepared by A. D. Ellerman et al.) 
 15 Selina Lee-Andersen, CLIMATE CHANGE ESSENTIALS: NAVIGATING CARBON PRICING 
MECHANISMS AND GUIDE TO CANADIAN FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
(2018), https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/climate-change-essentials-navigating-
carbon-pricing-mechanisms-and-guide-canadian-federal-and-provincial-regulatory-framework 
(last visited 2018). 
 16 Shaun Fluker & Salimah Janmohamed, “Who Regulates Trading in the Carbon Market?” 
(2014) 26:83 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice at 6. 
 17 Lee-Andersen 2018, supra note 15, at 15. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
9
Carmody: A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2019
 A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI 157 
The principal innovation of a cap-and-trade program is its use of the power of 
the market to achieve environmental goals. Traditionally, environmental 
regulation has taken place by “command-and-control” methods in which 
governments establish environmental standards, permit certain behavior, assign 
liability and penalties for noncompliance, and give regulators wide powers to 
authorize or prohibit activities or pollution. While these methods have made 
progress in reducing pollution, “command-and-control” approaches have been 
criticized for not achieving various legislative mandates and deadlines in a timely 
manner and for being economically inefficient and difficult to enforce.20 By 
comparison, in the case of cap-and-trade programs, governments create the 
programs but allow market forces a degree of involvement in promoting 
“efficient” pollution and the attainment of environmental targets. In this way, 
freedom and flexibility are introduced in the regulatory scheme. 
An additional benefit of a cap-and-trade system is that the sale of allowances 
by governments generates funds that are typically reinvested in pollution 
abatement and clean technology. In many instances funds are also devoted to 
related innovation and job creation. Consequently, cap-and-trade helps to promote 
community goals of economic growth at the same time as it generates a cleaner, 
more sustainable environment. 
1.4.3 Cap-and-Trade versus Carbon Tax 
Governments often weigh two policy instruments to price carbon in their 
efforts to combat climate change: 
 
1) a carbon tax 
2) a cap-and-trade scheme. 
 
Both a carbon tax and cap-and-trade are market-based instruments designed 
to internalize the cost of negative environmental effects. However, they display 
some important differences. 
In the case of a carbon tax the policy tool is a tax – a fiscal increment – that 
increases the price of inputs requiring the use of fossil fuels. The aim of a carbon 
tax is to discourage fossil fuel emissions. By raising prices and effectively 
decreasing demand for those commodities, the tax creates an incentive to reduce 
fossil fuel use and stimulates demand for energy-efficient products. The tax rate 
must be set at an optimal level. If the tax is too low, fossil fuel users may continue 
to pollute despite the cost of the tax. If the tax is too high, fossil fuel users may 
suffer significant economic losses which could have wider economic 
repercussions. 
A carbon tax is often described as a ‘simpler’ method for GHG reduction than 
cap-and-trade because the legal relationship put in place by the tax exists only 
between the government and the taxpayer. A carbon tax is therefore faster and 
simpler to implement since government can take advantage of existing 
administrative frameworks of tax collection. Businesses will know beforehand the 
costs of the tax that they are expected to pay. 
 
 20 F. P. SULLIVAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 2-3, 22ND ED. (2014). 
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With a cap-and-trade program, by comparison, the policy tool at work is a 
limit on emissions. The limit is combined with the possibility of participants 
trading emission allowances among themselves to achieve some ‘optimal’ level of 
pollution. In the process, both a regulator and a market for trading emissions must 
be created. 
A cap-and-trade program provides certainty to achieve GHG reduction goals 
because it enforces a cap of emissions. Nevertheless, there can be uncertainty as 
to the amount of cost of the scheme depending on the spot price for emission 
credits in the market. In some jurisdictions like California cost uncertainty is 
mitigated with a hybrid cap-and-trade system featuring both a price floor and a 
‘soft’ price ceiling. These indicators serve as benchmarks that allow entities 
subject to the cap-and-trade regulation to buy allowances so they can cover their 
emissions within certain specified costs. Contemporary cap-and-trade systems also 
possess features like the borrowing and banking of credits as well as extended 
compliance periods that can allow greater fine-tuning by participants and 
regulators of their activities over time. 
1.4.4 Criticisms of Cap-and-Trade 
Both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs are questioned by those who 
believe that there is little demonstrable link between human activity and climate 
change. However, cap-and-trade programs come under particular scrutiny for the 
following reasons: 
Complexity 
Cap-and-trade programs are criticized due to their relative complexity. A cap-
and-trade program will require the establishment of baselines for emission 
reduction targets and the distribution of allowances.21 Developing the legislative 
and administrative framework for the system can be time-consuming.22 Effort is 
also required to create the necessary regulations and to initiate an emissions trading 
market.23 
Cost Uncertainty 
Because cap-and-trade programs establish a ‘cap’ – or limit – on emissions, 
there is a theoretic guarantee that the desired reductions in emissions will follow. 
This guarantee is referred to as “benefit certainty”.24 However, critics of cap-and-
trade emphasize that benefit certainty comes at a cost, specifically that of cost 
uncertainty.25 When compared to programs that set penalties for emissions, 
systems that create a free market and emissions caps have relatively less control 
 
 21 Reuven Avi-Yonah & David Uhlmann, “Combating Global Climate Change: Why a 
Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap-and-trade” (2009) 28:1 Stan 
Envtl LJ 3 at 6 [Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann 2009]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 David Suzuki Foundation, CARBON TAX OR CAP-AND-TRADE? (2017), 
https://davidsuzuki.org/what-you-can-do/carbon-tax-cap-trade/. 
 24 JOSEPH R MASON, THE ECONOMIC POLICY RISKS OF CAP-AND-TRADE MARKETS FOR 
CARBON EMISSIONS  (2009) The U.S. Climate Task Force, 
www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=bf03807a-ad55-cf29-d45f-
4568be4a735b. 
 25 Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann 2009, supra note 21, at 42-44. 
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over the overall cost of the system to the economy, individual polluters, and trade. 
If caps are lowered without a corresponding lowering of the price of allowances, 
the cost of compliance with a cap-and-trade program could be a burden to 
participants in the program. Standard emissions reductions pursued over time 
could either inflate the overall cost of the scheme or generate political pressure to 
raise the emissions cap, or both. 
Limited Experience 
Cap-and-trade programs regulating GHG emissions are relatively new 
compared to other regulatory schemes. Critics of cap-and-trade therefore claim 
that there is insufficient evidence for the effectiveness of such programs. Even 
those who recognize that some cap-and-trade programs have been successful in 
the past are skeptical about extrapolating from this experience to draw conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of cap-and-trade programs generally.26 However, some 
commentators have suggested that there is no room for further delay in 
implementing cap-and-trade systems given the targeted effectiveness they offer in 
reducing GHG and the pressing need to protect local and global environments.27 
Reduced Incentives to Adopt Sustainable Practices 
One criticism of cap-and-trade programs is that they do not encourage 
research or the deployment of new sustainable technologies.28 Since the cost of 
emitting GHG under a cap-and-trade program is unpredictable, participants may 
be less inclined to invest in developing more sustainable means of conducting their 
activities in parallel with the program. It has also been suggested that cap-and-
trade programs do not send a clear message to polluters that GHG emissions are 
costly, both for polluters and for society in general.29 Instead, it is sometimes 
suggested that cap-and-trade programs send the message that pollution is 
permissible so long as one pays for it. The conceptual difference between a penalty 
for pollution and a price for a right to pollute discourages polluters that can 
otherwise afford to pay for allowances (and arguably emit the most) so that they 
can continue acting in unsustainable ways.30 
Potential Abuse 
The inherent complexity of cap-and-trade programs and the lack of incentives 
to otherwise reduce emissions can render a cap-and-trade program prone to 
potential abuse.31 Depending on how emissions are accounted for, emission 
allowances can be distributed in an inequitable manner. For example, major 
polluters which can afford to purchase emission allocations may receive and hold 
a disproportionate amount of allowances and may use political influence to acquire 
allowances at low or no cost.32 Further, if the regulatory mechanism is prone to 
 
 26 Id. at 6. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Robert Stavins, “A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change” 
(2008) 32 Harv Envtl L Rev 293 at 299 [Stavins 2008]. 
 29 Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann 2009, supra note 21, at 43. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Stavins 2008, supra note 28, at 319-320. 
 32 Id. 
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favoritism, then polluters may be able to improperly influence the allocation of 
allowances.33 
Market manipulation is another concern. The reliance of cap-and-trade 
programs on market trading means that market actors may attempt to ‘stack’ the 
market by intervening in certain ways or at certain times for undue benefit. This 
concern points to the need for elaborate frameworks of reporting, verification and 
monitoring, together with enforcement procedures, as part of cap-and-trade 
programs to ensure that markets remain fair for all participants. 
1.5 A Brief History of Cap-and-Trade 
1.5.1 The EPA Acid Rain Program 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Acid Rain Program was 
the first national cap-and-trade program established in the United States and 
remains in existence today.34 The Program’s goal is to reduce emissions of sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) – the primary sources of acid rain – 
generated by the energy sector. 
Under the Program the EPA places a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions by power 
plants and allocates emission allowances based on historic fuel consumption and 
emission rates specific to each power plant.35 Allowances can be bought, banked, 
or sold on the emissions market in the U.S. energy sector sources (which must 
participate) and other private organizations (whose participation is voluntary) 
active in the market.36 
Under the Program each power plant monitors its emissions using an approved 
monitoring method and reports its emissions on a quarterly basis to the EPA, which 
tracks the data.37 The EPA regulates compliance and assigns penalties for 
noncompliance.38 
The Acid Rain Program has been highly successful. Between 1990 and 2015, 
sulfur dioxide and nitric oxide emissions were reduced by 89% and 76% 
respectively.39 A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology notes that the 
Program’s positive environmental outcomes are attributable to “the more 
fundamental characteristics of the program, namely, a flexible, decentralized, 
property rights system.”40 
1.5.2 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established among 
several U.S. states in 2005 and held its first emissions auction in 2008. The 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 United States Environmental Protection Agency, ACID RAIN PROGRAM EPA (2018), 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Denny A. Ellerman, Are Cap-and-Trade Programs more Environmentally Effective than 
Conventional Regulation?, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 48, 50 
(Jody Freeman & Charles D Kolstad eds., 2006) 
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initiative’s current participants are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.41 The 
Program has enjoyed considerable success to date and by 2020 aims to reduce 
carbon emissions of covered industries by 45% from 2005 base levels.42 Each 
participating state has a further jurisdiction-specific goal of reducing emissions by 
an additional 30% by 2030.43 
The RGGI currently regulates fossil fuel power plants with a capacity of 25 
MW or more.44 Any power plant operating at or above this capacity must obtain 
allowances for its CO2 emissions in participating jurisdictions. RGGI-
administered auctions of emissions allowances take place four times yearly.45 To 
ensure that the auctions run smoothly, a ‘price floor’ is maintained and a ‘cost 
containment reserve’ is triggered if the trading price exceeds specified levels.46 
The RGGI establishes three-year compliance periods.47 At the end of each 
period, covered entities must submit one allowance for each ton of carbon 
generated during the three-year period. Participants are allowed to bank 
allowances for future use and may meet up to 3.3% of their compliance obligations 
by purchasing offsets.48 
Proceeds from auctions held under the RGGI are returned to states and 
invested in consumer and environmental programs related to energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, direct energy bill assistance, and other GHG reduction 
initiatives.49 
1.6 Comparative Experience 
Cap-and-trade systems are not unique to North America. Currently, 45 
national and 25 subnational jurisdictions have policies that use carbon pricing in 
the form of either carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes.50 The following is a 
 
 41 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, ELEMENTS OF RGGI [Herenafter, ELEMENTS OF 
RGGI] http://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 A carbon offset is a credit for greenhouse gas reductions achieved by one party that can 
be purchased and used to compensate (offset) the emissions of another party. See, David Suzuki 
Foundation, CARBON OFFSETS (2017), https://davidsuzuki.org/what-you-can-do/carbon-
offsets/.. 
 49 Elements of RGGI, supra note 41. As mentioned, proceeds from the auction are 
distributed to the states to invest in consumer benefit programs. Each state is allocated a number 
of allowances to be auctioned by RGGI. The proceeds that are returned to them after auction are 
based on the number of allowances each state sold at a particular auction. A sample RGGI 
auction report shows how state proceeds have been distributed based on the allowances each 
state sold. See, RGGI Inc., AUCTION 39 STATE PROCEEDS AND ALLOWANCES, 
https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Auction-Materials/39/
Auction_39_State_Proceeds_and_Allowances.pdf. 
 50 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018, (2018), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29687/9781464812927.pdf.. 
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survey of comparative experience with cap-and-trade systems in the European 
Union (EU) and China. 
1.6.1 The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) began in 2005 and currently 
regulates the world’s largest carbon market.51 It operates in the 28 EU member 
states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.52 In total, approximately 45% 
of the EU’s GHG emissions are covered by the EU ETS.53 
The EU ETS applies to some 11,000 installations in the power generation, 
manufacturing industry and airline sectors.54 The scheme aims to reduce carbon 
dioxide, nitrous oxide (N20) and perfluorocarbon (PFCs) emissions, with 
emissions of these types in 2030 projected to be 43% lower than in 2005.55 
The EU ETS has operated in three phases. In Phase One (2005-2007) of the 
program the scheme did not generate the expected reduction in emissions because 
the number of allowances, which was based on the estimated needs of emitters, 
was excessive.56 As a result, the price of allowances fell to zero in 2007.57 In Phase 
Two (2008-2012) an economic downturn in Europe depressed emissions as well 
as the demand for allowances.58 Currently, in Phase Three (2013-2020) major 
reforms have been carried out. An EU-wide cap on emissions amounting to a 
reduction of 1.74% per year has been introduced and there has been a progressive 
shift towards the auctioning of allowances in place of cost-free allocation.59 These 
reforms have meant that businesses have had to buy an increasing proportion of 
their allowances through auctions. 
The legislative framework of the EU ETS for Phase Four (2020-2030) has 
been revised to harmonize the system with the EU’s 2030 climate and energy 
policy framework and to support the EU’s contribution to the 2015 Paris 
Agreement. The revision focuses on strengthening the EU ETS by increasing the 
pace of annual reductions in allowances to 2.2% as of 2021 and associated 
reduction mechanisms; continuing the free allocation of allowances in a manner 
that is focused and reflects technological progress; and providing interim help to 
industry to transition to a low carbon future through a number of funding 
mechanisms.60 
1.6.2 China 
China’s explosive economic growth in the last few decades has taken a 
substantial toll on its environment, particularly in major Chinese cities where air 
 
 51 European Union, EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM (EU ETS) CLIMATE ACTION - 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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and water pollution are a significant problem. China is now the world’s largest 
GHG emitter.61 
China’s Nationally Determined Contribution to the 2015 Paris Agreement 
contains a commitment to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 at the latest, lowering the 
carbon intensity of GDP by 60%–65% below 2005 levels by 2030, increasing the 
share of non-fossil energy carriers of the total primary energy supply to around 
20% by that time, and increasing its forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic meters 
compared to 2005 levels.62 In connection with these reductions China announced 
in 2017 the launching of a national cap-and-trade system involving six of its largest 
carbon-emitting industrial sectors, beginning with coal-fired power generation.63 
This announcement follows the success of earlier pilot municipal cap-and-
trade programs in Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Tianjin, which have now been folded into the national system.64 The 
eight municipal pilot programs, which ran from 2013-2017, allowed for the trading 
of 40.24 million metric tonnes of carbon and saw a reduction of 38.6% in carbon 
intensity.65 These municipal programs only permitted allowances and offsets to be 
traded on local emissions exchanges.66 Localization meant that there were eight 
different carbon prices depending on the specific pilot. Although there were policy 
differences between the pilots due to the diversity of China’s industrial 
development, all of the schemes have been successful in subjecting companies 
within their territorial limits to annual MRV (Monitoring, Reporting, Verification) 
processes. Compliance with the pilot programs is regarded as fairly successful, 
although this view is tempered by reports of possible over-allocation of allowances 
by municipal officials designed to ward off industrial opposition to the pilots.67 
 
 61 PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, CHINA NOW NO. 1 IN CO2 
EMISSIONS; USA IN SECOND POSITION, https://www.pbl.nl/en/
dossiers/Climatechange/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition. 
 62 NDC Registry, China’s NDC (9 March 2016), online: 
<www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx>. 
 63 International Carbon Action Partnership, China (9 March 2018), online: 
<icapcarbonaction.com/en/publications>. 
 64 Adam Wentworth, CHINA HAS ALREADY HIT ITS 2020 TARGET TO CUT CARBON EMISSIONS 
CLIMATE ACTION (2018), http://www.climateaction.org/news/china-has-already-hit-its-2020-
target-to-cut-carbon-emissions.. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Jeff Swartz [International Emissions Trading Association] CHINA’S NATIONAL EMISSIONS 
TRADING SYSTEM: IMPLICATION FOR CARBON MARKET AND TRADE (2016), 
https://www.ieta.org/resources/China/Chinas_National_ETS_Implications_for_Carbon_Marke
ts_and_Trade_ICTSD_March2016_Jeff_Swartz.pdf. 
 67 “It hence comes as no surprise that compliance rates in pilot carbon markets, where local 
authorities tended to over allocate allowances to ease off industrial opposition, were high”: 
Patrick Bayer, Cap Setting and Strict Compliance Enforcement Will be Critical for Chinese 
Emissions Trading Scheme, EUROPENOW (2018), 
https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/06/04/cap-setting-and-strict-compliance-
enforcement-will-be-critical-for-chinese-emissions-trading-scheme/.. 
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China formally launched its own national emissions trading market in 
December 2017.68 In the first phase of the national program only coal-fired power 
generation was covered. Nevertheless, it is believed that this limited coverage will 
still have major climate benefits since China’s power sector generates 65% of its 
electricity from coal and accounts for more than 3.5 gigatonnes of carbon 
emissions annually.69 The cap introduced is almost twice as intense as that under 
the EU ETS.70 Due to the novelty of the program, little further information is 
available at present. 
CHAPTER 2: NORTH AMERICA AND THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE 
This Chapter explains the background to the WCI cap-and-trade program in 
the United States and Canada. It also provides the background to cap-and-trade 
legislation in three North American subnational jurisdictions – California, Québec 
and Ontario – and an overview of the framework for harmonizing such legislation 
under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Western Climate Initiative, 
Inc. (WCI, Inc.). The chapter then examines the linkage of cap-and-trade programs 
in California and Québec in 2014 and the addition and withdrawal of Ontario from 
the link in 2018. 
During the course of preparing this Guide, many conditions pertaining to cap-
and-trade programming under the WCI were in a state of flux. The conditions were 
brought about by a confluence of domestic and international events. It is therefore 
necessary to examine several issues as background to fully understand the 
operation of cap-and-trade under the WCI. 
The withdrawal of Ontario from its link with California and Québec’s cap-
and-trade programs in July 2018 occurred late in the preparation of this Guide. The 
Guide is therefore drafted, generally speaking, with references to Ontario’s 
participation phrased in the past tense. Any mentions of its participation in the 
present tense should be understood as referencing conditions prevailing only until 
the date of Ontario’s cancellation of its cap-and- trade program on July 3, 2018 
although some limited information has been included to update this Guide to the 
end of 2018. 
2.1 The Background to Cap-and-Trade in North America 
Until July 2018 the cap-and-trade program implemented under the WCI was 
maintained by three jurisdictions that are subnational units of two countries, the 
 
 68 Environmental Defense Fund, THE PROGRESS OF CHINA’S CARBON MARKET(2018), 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/The_Progress_of_Chinas_Carbon_Market_
Development_English_Version.pdf.. 
 69 Qian Guoqiang & Huang Xiaochen, China’s National Carbon Market and the Roadmap 
Ahead(2018), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_attach&task=download&id=547. 
Found in the International Carbon Action Partnership Status Report 2018. 
 70 China undertakes its commitments on climate change in terms of emissions intensity 
instead of the absolute amount of emissions. This is because of persistent uncertainty over the 
growth of its economy and GHG emissions and the fact that official emissions data are far from 
complete: Shaozhou Qi & Si Cheng, China’s national emissions trading scheme: integrating 
cap, coverage and allocation, 18 CLIMATE POLICY45–59 (2018). 
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United States and Canada. As a result, cap-and-trade implementation and 
operation under the WCI needs to take account of certain legal and policy 
considerations prevailing in each country. 
The constitutions of the United States and Canada have little to say expressly 
on the subject of the environment. The ‘environment’ as a distinct subject of 
regulation was unknown in early constitutional thinking in both countries, 
although indigenous environmental knowledge has a long history and specific 
topics that can be assimilated into modern environmental awareness were dealt 
with and referenced in the foundational instruments, statutes and judicial opinions 
of each country.71 The constitutional framework is supplemented by the shared 
legal heritage of both countries rooted largely in the common law.72 
2.1.1 The United States 
In the United States the Constitution is the primary document governing the 
distribution of powers between the federal government and the states. Under the 
Tenth Amendment any power not delegated to the Congress is reserved to the 
states.73 At the same time, because environmental awareness evolved 
incrementally in U.S. history, different aspects of environmental protection have 
been the subject of regulation by both levels of government. Dual regulation has 
given rise to the possibility of jurisdictional overlap, competition and the need for 
coordination. 
U.S. federal environmental law applies to broad subjects of coverage such as 
natural resource development and protection and environmental aspects of air, 
water, land, chemical regulation as well as general environmental policy. “Major 
federal environmental statutes define most of the substantial compliance 
obligations in U.S. law.”74 In addition, “other components of U.S. environmental 
law supplement or complement standards established by federal environmental 
statutes”75, such as administrative regulations specifying the regulatory obligations 
of certain industries. 
 
 71 In the United States, the roots of environmental protection have been traced to 19th 
century revulsion over the despoliation of an apparently limitless wilderness: Frederick 
Anderson et al, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 1-4 (1984). For U.S. federalism 
considerations in relation to environmental protection, see,Roger Findley & Daniel Farber, 
Cases and Materials on Environmental Law, 4th ed (1985) at 169ff. In Canada “[environmental 
lawmaking] has been described as “a constitutionally abstruse matter which does not 
comfortably fit within the existing division of powers without considerable overlap and 
uncertainty”: Jamie Benedickson, Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed (2016) at 27, quoting 
from Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) (1992), 1 SCR 3. 
For historical background of environmental protection in Canada, see, Jamie Benedickson, 
Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed (2016) at 41-45. 
 72 For the U.S. common law to environmental protection background, see, Roger Findley & 
Daniel Farber, Cases and Materials on Environmental Law, 4th ed (1985) at 697 [hereinafter, 
Findley and Farber 1985]. For the Canadian common law background, see, Jamie Benedickson, 
Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed (2016) at 277. 
 73 Findley and Farber 1985, supra note 72, at 169. 
 74 Sullivan 2014, supra note 20, at 6. 
 75 Id. 
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Many federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act76 or the Clean Water Act77 
create “federal/state regulatory programs through which the states are given an 
opportunity to enact and enforce laws which meet federal criteria to achieve certain 
regulatory objectives.”78 In most instances, states have taken the opportunity to do 
so and have enacted corresponding laws and regulations at the state level.79 For 
this reason, “states are generally the primary permitting and enforcing authority in 
U.S. environmental law and are subject to federal intervention only if they do not 
enforce effectively or rigorously enough.”80 
Moreover, “[s]tates are given considerable leeway to follow state-level 
enforcement interpretations that may not be fully consistent with those applied at 
the federal level.”81 In most instances “states are not precluded from enforcing 
criteria more stringent than federal laws.”82 For this reason, “the laws and 
interpretations used to apply and enforce federal environmental laws may vary 
considerably from state to state.”83 
In addition, “many U.S. states provide their citizens and their environment 
with protection beyond that generally available under federal statutes.”84 Such 
legislation includes toxic waste minimization laws, environmental disclosure law, 
property transfer law, product stewardship laws, and laws regulating GHG 
emissions.85 For instance, “[i]n 2006 California became the first U.S. state to enact 
a comprehensive law requiring mandatory industrywide GHG reductions”.86 Other 
state-led environmental initiatives include measures to encourage recycling and 
groundwater protection laws.87 
Nevertheless, the federal government retains substantial powers within the 
U.S. federal structure that effectively limit state behavior. The Preemption Clause, 
found in Art. VI of the U.S. Constitution, provides that in a situation where the 
federal and state governments pass opposing regulations, federal regulation will 
preempt state regulation.88 Any state legislation that “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” 
has the potential to be struck down, although in recent decades the doctrine of 
 
 76 Congressional findings and declaration of purpose, 42 USC (1970) at 7401 [42 USC]. 
 77 Congressional declaration of goals and policy, 33 USC (1948) at 1251. 
 78 Sullivan 2014, supra note 20, at 6. 
 79 Id. at 6-7. 
 80 Id. at 7. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 6-7. 
 83 Id. at 7. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 According to the Supremacy Clause found in Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the Supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . ”. The 
associated doctrine of pre-emption provides that state laws that conflict with federal law are 
“without effect”: Altria Group v Good, 2008, 555 US 70. 
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“cooperative federalism” in U.S. environmental law has tended to temper such 
outcomes.89 
Another federal power with the ability to constrain state action is the federal 
government’s power in foreign relations. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. 
Constitution forbids states from entering into treaties with foreign governments.90 
This prohibition is a significant limit on states’ abilities to conclude binding 
agreements with foreign jurisdictions concerning environmental protection. 
Finally, the federal commerce power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce.91 Broad interpretation of this power by the courts means that state 
regulation must be coordinated with the federal commerce power. “It is well 
settled that a state regulation validly based on police powers does not 
impermissibly burden interstate commerce if the regulation does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt the uniformity of commerce.”92 
Still, “there have been numerous environmental cases involving the application of 
the Commerce Clause as a limit on state power.”93 
Limitations aside, in the last few decades there has also been an emphasis in 
both U.S. federal and state regulatory jurisdiction on “reinventing” environmental 
regulations and develop more effective legislative schemes. Traditional 
“command and control” systems have been widely criticized for not achieving 
various legislative mandates and deadlines quickly enough or in an efficient 
manner.94 Consequently, in recent years “the U.S. federal government has adopted 
various economic instruments, such as market-based trading programs for 
emission of air pollutants and wastewater constituents, in order to introduce more 
flexibility, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in pollution control.”95 These 
instruments operate as incentives to polluters to determine the most efficient and 
cost-effective means for achieving environmental targets, often incorporating 
“polluter pay” or “user pay” principles.96 
Many U.S. states have also tried to implement new programs “to gain more 
control over their environmental affairs and increasingly are being viewed as 
“laboratories” for the development of innovative approaches to environmental 
 
 89 Christopher B Power et al, “Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Law: Coping 
with Two Masters” (2015) 36:6 Energy & Min L Inst. The EPA website observes in relation to 
“Cooperative Federalism” that “EPA is embracing cooperative federalism and working 
collaboratively with states, local government, and tribes to implement laws that protect human 
health and the environment, rather than dictating one-size-fits-all mandates from Washington”: 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Cooperative Federalism at EPA (6 July 2018), 
online: <www.epa.gov/home/cooperative-federalism-epa>. 
 90 “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation”: “The Constitution of 
the United States”, U.S. Const. art. I § 10. 
 91 “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”: U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 92 Sullivan 2014, supra note 20, at 29. 
 93 Id. at 30. 
 94 Id. at 2-3. 
 95 Id. at 2. 
 96 Id. 
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regulation.”97 The sum of these changes has meant a more flexible and diverse 
regulatory landscape in U.S. environmental law. 
Notwithstanding this pluralism, the overarching enforcement responsibility 
for most of the U.S.’s federal environmental laws remains with the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).98 The EPA was established in 1970 to 
consolidate a variety of federal research, monitoring, standard-setting and 
enforcement activities for the purposes of environmental protection. The EPA has 
had a substantial role in the effort to abate aerial pollution over several decades. 
For instance, in 1970 the U.S. Clean Air Act was passed, regulating air emissions 
and giving the EPA the power to set air quality standards.99 Amendments to the 
Clean Air Act in 1977 and 1990 raised the standards in order to counter air-borne 
problems like acid rain and ozone depletion.100 In 1999 the EPA set new emissions 
standards for automobiles.101 In 2004 the EPA informed the governors of 31 states 
that the air pollution in their states did not meet federal health standards and 
ordered them to develop new pollution controls to clean up their air.102 Later, in 
2012 the EPA helped finalize still more stringent automobile fuel efficiency 
standards.103 
While the U.S. State Department generally retains the lead in developing and 
projecting U.S. international climate policy, the EPA has also played a major role 
in international efforts to protect the global environment. Much of this effort has 
been in relation to the aerial environment, particularly at a time of growing concern 
about ozone depletion. For example, in 1987 the U.S. was one of 24 countries to 
ratify the Montreal Protocol, an agreement to phase out production of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).104 In 1992 EPA officials participated in the U.S. 
delegation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro that brought together 150 nations to set global 
standards for protecting the earth against global warming and other environmental 
threats. Out of this effort in 1997 38 industrialized nations signed the Kyoto 
Protocol wherein they agreed to reduce their GHG emissions by about 5% over 15 
years.105 As part of this commitment the U.S., which was at that time the world’s 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Basic Information on 
Enforcement, EPA(2018), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement.. 
 99 42 USC, supra note 76, at 7401. 
 100 The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act authorized provisions related to prevention 
of significant deterioration and non-attainment areas. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air 
Act authorized programs for acid deposition control, controls for 189 toxic pollutants, 
established permit program requirements, expanded and modified provisions concerning 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, and expanded and modified EPA enforcement 
authority. 
 101 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives (10 February 2000), 40 CFR at 80, 85, and 86. 
 102 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives (17 December 2004), 40 CFR at 81. 
 103 Id. at 85, 86, and 600; Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives (7 May 2010), 49 CFR at 
531, 533, 536. 
 104 Montreal Protocol, Aug. 26, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3; 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987). The Protocol 
was concluded under the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1988, 
1513 U.N.T.S. 293 (1988). 
 105 Id. at 3(1). 
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largest GHG emitter country, agreed to reduce its emissions by 7%. However, in 
2001 the U.S. refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol due to the agreement’s limited 
coverage and the projected expense to U.S. businesses. 
Nevertheless, concern about global warming continued to grow. In 2014 the 
UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a report 
predicting dire consequences if the world’s leading economies did not start to 
reduce GHG emissions immediately.106 This forecast helped to secure the 
conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015. 
As mentioned, the Paris Agreement is an international treaty that has been 
ratified by the United States, Canada and many other countries. The Agreement 
recognizes the imperative of “an effective and progressive response” to the “urgent 
threat of climate change.” It urges countries to engage in a global effort to restrict 
the increase in the global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. 
An important premise underlying the Paris Agreement is that global warming is 
largely driven by GHG emissions. Therefore, each country is called upon to make 
a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to reduce emissions as mentioned in 
the last chapter. The U.S. NDC indicated a target of 26-28% below 2005 levels by 
2030. 
However, since the 2016 U.S. federal election the EPA has moved to change 
or end a number of U.S. climate-related policies. It has proposed repeal of the 
Clean Power Plan, which sought to regulate power-plant emissions, and has also 
announced that the agency would revisit 2022-2025 car fuel economy standards.107 
In addition, the EPA administrator has wanted to revise downward the ‘social cost 
of carbon,’ a key statistic when weighing the costs and benefits of fighting climate 
change.108 
In 2017 the U.S. also announced its withdrawal from the 2015 Paris 
Agreement at the earliest possible opportunity.109 At the same time the U.S. 
administration ordered the cessation of all implementation of the Agreement by 
the U.S., stating that compliance with the terms of the agreement could undermine 
U.S. competitiveness and jobs. Following the announcement, governors of several 
U.S. states formed the U.S. Climate Alliance to continue to promote the Paris 
Agreement’s objectives at the state level.110 As of early 2019 19 states and Puerto 
Rico were members of the Alliance. 
At the international level, concern has continued to be voiced about failure to 
achieve climate targets underpinning the Paris Agreement’s goals and NDCs. In 
 
 106 United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3. 
 107 Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car Pollution Rules 
Video, August 2, 2018. 
 108 For instance, in March 2018 it was reported that the U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has removed “climate change” and associated terminology from 
the FEMA strategic plan. 
 109 Under Paris Agreement Art. 28(1) a country may withdraw from the Agreement at any 
time after three years from the date on which the Agreement entered into force for that country. 
Under Paris Agreement Art. 28(2) the withdrawal is to take effect one year from the date of 
receipt of notice of withdrawal. The U.S. ratified the Paris Agreement in December 2016 and, 
with the appropriate notice of withdrawal, would be in a position to withdraw either in late 2020 
or early 2021. 
 110 U.S. Climate Alliance, U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, http://www.usclimatealliance.org/. >. 
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October 2018 the IPCC published a Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C 
(SR15)111 which found that meeting a 1.5C reduction target is possible but would 
require “deep emissions reductions” and “rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented 
changes in all aspects of society.”112 Similarly, in November 2018 the World 
Meteorological Organization released a report stating that 2017 atmospheric 
carbon dioxide levels reached 405 parts per million (ppm), a level not seen in the 
last three to five million years. 
2.1.2 Canada 
In Canada the Constitution Act, 1867 sets out the division of powers and 
allocates certain subjects exclusively to federal or provincial jurisdiction. 
However, within that division certain subjects of environmental significance such 
as “navigation and shipping” and “the sea coast and inland fisheries” are allocated 
to the federal government while others, like “management and sale of public 
lands” and “property and civil rights”, are allocated to the provinces. 
Judicial decisions in Canada have reaffirmed the existing constitutional 
allocation of specific subjects of environmental importance to the federal or 
provincial governments. However, the Supreme Court of Canada considers 
environmental protection to be an aggregate matter composed of separate elements 
rather than a single unitary one.113 Thus, in an environmental dispute a variety of 
matters involving federal powers, such as the licensing of toxic substances and 
criminal offenses, can arise and be intertwined with matters involving provincial 
powers, such as the regulation of local businesses and private property. This being 
the case, environmental protection cannot be allocated to one level of government 
alone but in many instances must be a shared responsibility.114 
Like in the U.S., if a conflict exists in the operation of federal and provincial 
environmental laws dealing with the same matter, then by the doctrine of 
paramountcy the federal statute will prevail if the matter can be characterized as 
falling within federal jurisdiction.115 Nevertheless, the scope of any potential 
conflict is often defined narrowly and, in the normal course, governments of both 
levels are likely to work out their differences or design laws that are capable of 
operating without apparent conflict.116 As a result, true ‘compliance dilemmas’ are 
rare.117 It may possible to comply with both federal and provincial laws by simply 
meeting the higher standard. 
 
 111 GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 ºC, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
 112 Id. 
 113 In Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport, [1992], 1 S.C.R 
3, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that “the environment is not, as such, a subject 
matter of legislation under the Constitution Act, 1867”: R v Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R 213 
(Can.) at 112, per La Forest J. Jamie Benedickson, in Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed 
(2016) at 27. 
 114 R v Crown-Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 S.C.R 401 (Can.). 
 115 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA: LOOSE-LEAF EDITION (2007). 
 116 Id at 16-4. 
 117 Id Peter Hogg notes that “[g]iven the overriding force of federal law, a wide definition of 
inconsistency will result in the defeat of provincial laws in “fields” which are “covered” by 
federal law; a narrow definition, on the other hand, will allow provincial laws to survive so long 
as they do not “expressly contradict” federal law. The wide definition is the course of judicial 
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Canadian federal and provincial authorities have also concluded agreements 
and engaged in other harmonization techniques to coordinate action and clarify 
their respective roles in relation to the environment. Some examples include 
“intergovernmental agreements under the Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act, 1999 to accept provincial regulations as equivalent and withdraw federal 
regulations, agreements for joint federal–provincial environmental assessment 
processes, and the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization.”118 
In Canada the federal Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change is the 
primary department with responsibility for the environment. Its duties generally 
encompass environmental matters within the scope of federal authority. These 
include preservation and enhancement of the natural environment (water, air and 
soil quality), renewable resources, water and boundary waters between Canada 
and the U.S., meteorology, and coordination of policies and programs on these 
subjects. The federal Ministry is also tasked with providing leadership and 
coordination to support government consultation and planning in connection with 
federal sustainable development initiatives.119 
Provincial and territorial governments have also created ministries or 
administrative departments to oversee environmental responsibilities arising 
within their jurisdictions. The wide range of environmental matters potentially 
falling within the scope of provincial jurisdiction is such that many other ministries 
that have responsibility for natural resources, energy, forests, wildlife and so forth 
may be involved in a specific issue. 
The principal piece of federal legislation over environmental matters is the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).120 CEPA entails the formulation 
of environmental quality objectives, guidelines, and codes of practice concerning 
the environment. CEPA is concerned mainly with systemic threats to the 
environment. Provincial environmental legislation varies between jurisdictions, 
but all provinces have at least one general law concerning the subject. These are 
supplemented by laws related to specific activities such as the protection of water 
resources, environmental assessment, and pesticide use. 
Both federal and provincial legislation on the environment contains broad 
powers that allow the respective level of government to prosecute polluters or 
others who break environmental laws. Nevertheless, most actions for 
environmental damage in Canada can be brought only by government authorities, 
a legacy of the perception among Canadians that the environment is a public 
 
activism in favor of central power; the narrow definition is the course of judicial restraint, 
leaving all but the irreconcilable conflicts to be resolved in the political arena. We shall see that 
Canadian courts have followed the course of restraint.” 
 118 Paul Muldoon et al, An Introduction to Environmental Law and Policy in Canada, 2nd 
ed (2015) at 41. 
 119 Canada was the first country to legislate the oversight of the performance of government 
departments against sustainable development goals. The creation of the Office of the 
Commissioner for Environment and Sustainable Development was an important step in the 
integration of sustainable development considerations into government decision-making: Jamie 
Benedickson, Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed (2016) at 52 [Benedickson 2016]. 
 120 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. c33. 
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resource.121 Generally speaking, civil suits are limited to actions for nuisance 
and/or possibly negligence when legislative standards are not met.122 
The control that governments have over environmental prosecutions in 
Canada means that there is an emphasis on uniformity and regularity in 
environmental enforcement. For instance, in a statement on CEPA compliance and 
enforcement policy in 2001, the federal government indicated that enforcement 
officials are to apply the Act “in a manner that is fair, predictable and 
consistent”.123 The same policy statement indicated that officials will aim to 
“administer the Act with an emphasis on prevention of damage to the 
environment”. For this reason the regulatory orientation is towards “environmental 
protection in the public interest”124, meaning that while penalties and remedial 
powers are applied, the general accent in enforcement is placed on the use of other 
remedial powers such as orders of restoration work.125 
Canada has also played an active role in international environmental 
protection efforts in recent decades although the degree to which it may do so is 
often constrained by provincial disagreement.126 A 2017 compendium of Canada’s 
engagement in international environmental agreements indicates Canada’s current 
engagement in 94 international environmental agreements, including 24 Canada-
U.S. agreements and 39 multilateral agreements.127 Although Canada is the only 
country to have withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, it continues to be actively 
engaged in implementing the Paris Agreement. 
In recent years the federal government has also taken action to implement its 
international commitments under the Paris Agreement in the form of the Pan-
Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.128 Such a legislative 
 
 121 In discussing penalties and remedial powers under Canadian environmental law, Jamie 
Benedickson has observed that “considerable emphasis is placed on the goal of environmental 
protection in the public interest that underpins the overall regulatory regime”: Benedickson 
2016, supra note 119, at 268. 
 122 Id. at 277-78. 
 123 See: Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement Policy for the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (March 2001) at 5. For instance, in order to support “fair, 
predictable and consistent application of legislation administered by Environment Canada, 
enforcement functions were reorganized in 2005 to establish and enforcement branch under the 
direction of the Chief Enforcement Officer”: Benedickson 2016, supra note 119, at 267. 
 124 Id. at 270. 
 125 Jamie Benedickson notes that “In addition to prosecutorial action . . . measures envisaged 
to promote compliance include education and exchange of technical information, the elaboration 
of codes of practice and guidelines, inspections, oral and written warnings, increased 
monitoring, and the use of administrative orders, recalls, ticketing, and directions, as well as 
support base proceedings to secure injunctions and civil claims for cost recovery”: Id. at 273. 
 126 Annie Chaloux et al, “Canada’s Multiple Voices Diplomacy in Climate Change 
Negotiations: A Focus on Québec” 20 International Negotiation (2015) 291 at 309. 
 127 Government of Canada, Participation in international environmental agreements (9 
November 2011), online: <www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-
change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/participation-international-
environmental-agreements.html>. 
 128 Government of Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate 
Change: Canada’s Plan to Address Climate Change and Grow the Economy (2016), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/documents/weather1/20170125-
en.pdf>. 
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framework is likely within federal jurisdiction if grounded in the federal taxation 
power or possibly the peace, order and good government (POGG) power.129 
However, there could well be a provincial dimension to such regulation, 
effectively requiring provincial agreement or participation. 
The regulation of GHG emissions therefore has the potential to introduce a 
double-layer of regulation in Canada, with both provincial governments and the 
federal government being empowered to enact relevant legislation. While the 
overlap could complicate the regulatory framework in each province, The 
Framework operates as a ‘backstop’ or minimum requirement for provincial GHG 
plans. The Framework establishes a minimum price that must be put on CO2 
emissions, establishing a starting price of $10 per tonne in 2018 and rising to $50 
per tonne by 2022.130 
Applied to jurisdictions with a cap-and-trade system, The Framework requires 
provinces to have: 
(i) a 2030 emissions-reduction target equal to or greater than Canada’s 
30% Paris Agreement reduction target; and 
(ii) a declining annual cap that corresponds, at a minimum, to the 
projected emissions reductions resulting from the average carbon price 
that year in price-based systems.131 
Prior to July 3, 2018, the cap-and-trade systems in Québec and Ontario met 
the first of these criteria, with both provinces setting targets of at least 37% below 
1990 levels by 2030.132 The second criterion requires the annual cap to decline 
such that it matches or exceeds the reduction effects of a carbon tax. Both Québec 
and Ontario projected 4-5% annual decreases in their respective caps, with exact 
numbers to be set annually based on forecasts for electricity use, transportation, 
 
 129 Bryan Schwartz has observed that a federal tax/levy is likely to be upheld on the basis 
that s. 91(3) of the Constitution accords the federal government broad powers to raise “money 
by any mode or system of taxation” and furthermore that the federal government has a history 
of legislation in the area. Schwartz also notes that factors likely to influence a reviewing court’s 
opinion in deciding a challenge of the matter is: i) the particularity of the claim (allowing the 
court to decide on one particular ground linked to the actual legislation in question and leave 
other challenging questions to be worked up by politicians or courts in other cases); ii) the fact 
that in controversial cases the Supreme Court of Canada “often prefers to avoid “winner take all 
outcomes” so that by upholding the legislation a court would avoid being seen to be obstructing 
an important political initiative by the national government; and iii) the fact that courts often 
consider the existence of an international treaty and the desirability of implementing it as a factor 
that supports a decision in favor of federal jurisdiction. Schwartz also adverts to the possibility 
of a court overturning the legislation because it in substance amounts to regulatory scheme in 
an area of provincial jurisdiction: BRYAN SCHWARTZ, LEGAL OPINION ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL CARBON PRICING BENCHMARK AND BACKSTOP PROPOSALS 
PREPARED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MANITOBA (Oct. 6, 2017), 
http://manitoba.ca/asset_library/en/climatechange/federal_carbon_pricing_benchmark_backsto
p_proposals.pdf. 
 130 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA, PAN-CANADIAN FRAMEWORK ON CLEAN 
GROWTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE Annex 1 (2016). 
 131 Id. at 50. 
 132 Id. at 67. 
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and heating fuels.133 Québec and Ontario’s schemes meet the second criteria. As 
of mid-June 2018, it was therefore not anticipated that either province would be 
affected by the backstop created by The Framework. Action by the Ontario 
government in early July 2018 altered this conclusion significantly, as outlined 
below. 
At the same time, it is important to note that The Framework does not require 
the cap-and-trade system to set a minimum trading or auction price for emissions 
so long as provincial emissions targets continue to exceed the federal target and 
provincial caps decline sufficiently each year. Furthermore, The Framework is a 
short term plan that extends only to 2022, at which time Canada’s federal 
government could enact more stringent federal rules or establish a comprehensive, 
nationwide emissions reduction scheme. 
During the fall of 2018, Canada’s federal climate policy continued to evolve. 
In October 2018, the federal government indicated that Alberta, British Columbia, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Prince 
Edward Island, Québec, and Yukon had met federal standards for pollution pricing 
either by developing their own systems or choosing to adopt the federal system.134 
At the same time, the federal government indicated that the ‘backstop’ would be 
introduced in Ontario, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan in 2019, 
with one aspect of it being focused on large CO2 emitters beginning in January 
2019 and the second aspect of it being a general fossil-fuel charge to be introduced 
in April 2019.135 The federal government emphasized that any direct proceeds 
collected from such taxes under the federal scheme would be returned to people in 
the affected provinces. Notwithstanding these efforts, a 2018 end-of-year report 
by Environment and Climate Change Canada projected that federal and provincial 
policies then in place would only deliver three-quarters of the emissions reduction 
target required under Canada’s Paris Agreement NDC.136 
2.2 State and Provinces 
The preceding section provided an overview of the background to cap-and-
trade in the U.S. and Canada. What follows is an examination of the background 
to cap-and-trade legislation in California, Québec, and Ontario as a prelude to a 
more focused examination of the WCI, the WCI Inc., and the decisions taken by 
the three jurisdictions to link their cap-and-trade programs. 
2.2.1 California 
The State of California has been an acknowledged leader in environmental 
regulation for several decades. California’s leadership in environmental legislation 
 
 133 Id. at 59. 
 134 Prime Minister of Canada, Government of Canada fighting climate change with price on 
pollution (Oct. 23, 2018). pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/10/23/government-canada-fighting-climate-
change-price-pollution. 
 135 Id. 
 136 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA, CLEAN CANADA: PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND GROWING OUR ECONOMY 13 (2018); see also Shawn McCarthy, Transit 
Funding Key to Hitting Climate Goals: McKenna, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 21, 2018, at B2. 
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has been generated and sustained by a host of factors, notably the state’s unique 
geography and severe air pollution problems. 
California was the first U.S. state to enact air pollution legislation in 1947 and 
likewise the first U.S. state to enact auto emission standards in 1965. The 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) was created in 1967 to monitor and 
address air quality issues, with the greater aim of attaining healthy air quality, 
protecting the public from exposure to toxic air contaminants, and providing 
innovative approaches to compliance with air pollution rules and regulations. 
In recent decades, CARB has worked with the public, the business sector, and 
local governments to find solutions to the state’s continuing air quality 
problems.137 In the 1980s and 1990s, CARB mandated rigorous auto emission 
standards. In addition, it adopted standards for cleaner-burning gasoline as well as 
initial standards for cleaner diesel fuel. The agency also began work to reduce 
smog-forming emissions in common household products. 
CARB standards attracted widespread interest and were eventually adopted in 
a number of other U.S. states and foreign jurisdictions. The fact that the California 
market is so large made it the de facto standard in setting environmental 
regulations for many products. All of this adherence helped to solidify the state’s 
reputation as a first-mover in the domain of environmental regulation. 
CARB’s record of success means that its relationship with the California 
Legislature is generally a respectful one. The California Legislature has given 
CARB wide berth in most of the Board’s detailed rule-making. The Legislature 
legislates, the Board regulates. At the same time, the California Legislature 
reserves to itself the power to step in to provide guidance where it believes this is 
necessary. CARB rule-making must be “consistent with legislative intent”.138 
CARB’s assertive role is, however, underpinned by an abiding consensus in favor 
of air pollution control within the state. Official documentation makes clear that 
CARB’s role and rule-making have historically attracted bipartisan support.139 
In the 2000s, CARB was given responsibility by the California Legislature for 
monitoring and reducing GHG. California Assembly Bill 32, also known as “AB 
32” and the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, established a first-in-the-
world comprehensive program of regulatory and market mechanisms to achieve 
 
 137 Some innovative vehicle emission control strategies that have led to cleaner air in 
California include: 1) the U.S.’s first tailpipe emissions standards for hydrocarbons and carbon 
monoxide (1966), oxides of nitrogen (1971), and particulate matter from diesel-fueled vehicles 
(1982); 2) catalytic converters, beginning in the 1970s, 3) on-board diagnostic, or “check 
engine” light, systems, beginning with 1988 model-year cars, 4) a Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) 
regulation (1990) that requires manufacturers to produce an increasing number of such vehicles; 
5) the U.S.’s first greenhouse gas emissions standards for cars mandated by the California 
Legislature in 2002 and approved by CARB in 2004; and 6) California’s Advanced Clean Cars 
Program (2012), which reduces both conventional “criteria” and GHG pollutant emissions from 
automobiles: History, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history. 
 138 MAC TAYLOR, CAP-AND-TRADE EXTENSION: ISSUES FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT (2017), 
lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3719/cap-trade-extension-121217.pdf [hereinafter MAC TAYLOR]. 
 139 History, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history.; 
Miriam Pawel, What Makes California Politics So Special, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2018, at SR4. 
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reductions in GHG.140 The Act set in place regulations and market mechanisms to 
lower the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.141 Pursuant to this 
mandate, CARB undertook to design implementing regulations and engaged in a 
multiyear scoping exercise that identified a cap-and-trade program as one of the 
strategies the state could adopt to reduce GHG emissions. The state’s cap-and-
trade program began in 2012 and compliance obligations under it began with 2013 
GHG emissions. 
In the current decade, California has continued to innovate. Its current range 
of programs to reduce GHG emissions address every major sector of its economy, 
including Zero Emission Vehicles, an important point of regulation given that 
transportation-related emissions continue to constitute the largest component of 
the state’s emissions. California also linked its cap-and-trade program with 
Québec’s cap-and-trade program in 2014 and Ontario’s program in 2018, 
discussed further below. In addition, California concluded a number of offset 
agreements with foreign jurisdictions. 
In 2016, the California Legislature approved Assembly Bill 398, also known 
as “AB 398”, which required an additional 40% cut in GHG emissions below 1990 
levels by 2030. The Legislature again entrusted CARB with devising the necessary 
implementing regulations to extend AB 32 but also directed that the new 
regulations meet specific design features for the period post-2020. These include: 
1) evaluating and addressing concerns relating to a large number of 
banked (i.e. pre-existing) emission allowances that might impair 
California’s ability to meet its GHG targets in future. 
2) adopting banking-of-allowance rules that discourage speculation, avoid 
financial windfalls and consider the impact on complying entities and 
market volatility 
3) establishing a “hard” price ceiling for allowances and consider various 
factors when setting that ceiling 
4) establishing two price containment points (known as “speed bumps”) 
between the allowance price floor and ceiling 
5) establishing new, lower offset limits to a maximum of 4% in 2021-
2025 and 6% in 2026-2030, with no more than half of offsets retired in 
either interval coming from projects that do not provide direct 
environmental benefits in California 
6) establishing whether an industry assistance factor of 100% for certain 
critically affected industries in the period 2021-2030 is appropriate in 
light of the trade-off between leakage risk and incentives for GHG-
emissions reductions.142 
 
 140 HEALTH & SAFETY, H.S.C. § 38500-38599 (2006). 
 141 Id. § 38550. 
 142 Assemb. B. 398 ch. 135 (Cal. 2017); MAC TAYLOR, supra note 138. 
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Despite these goals, California’s progressive policies on the environment 
present the prospect of divergence and/or conflict with U.S. federal ones. One 
recent disagreement concerns the U.S. federal air pollution waiver given to the 
state. The waiver, first granted under s. 209 of the U.S. Clean Air Act in 1969 and 
renewed over 100 times since, acknowledges the state’s severe smog problem and 
the car emissions regulations California has devised to reduce air pollution by 
allowing the state to establish more stringent standards than federal ones. Since 
that time, 13 other U.S. states have agreed to follow California’s emissions 
policies, meaning that about 40% of American cars are now covered by California 
rules.143 That number is large enough that car manufacturers generally design all 
their vehicles to meet California standards. The result is that California’s policies 
drive technological change in the transportation sector nationally and 
internationally. 
Automatic extension of the federal air pollution waiver has been questioned 
by the current U.S. administration.144 If the EPA decides to revoke California’s 
existing waiver, which covers all vehicles manufactured through 2025, the agency 
would have to argue that California has no need to regulate GHG emissions, a 
position which could likely trigger a lengthy legal battle. In May 2018, California 
and 16 other states attempted to forestall such a revocation by suing the EPA and 
seeking to block the agency from revising vehicle emissions standards.145 
Nevertheless, the consensus opinion appears to be that California’s cap-and-
trade program faces little immediate threat from the U.S. federal government since 
the cap-and-trade scheme does not regulate auto emissions and does not otherwise 
depend on federal approval.146 This view must be balanced against the fact that 
transportation – particularly automobile – emissions continue to be a major source 
of GHG in the state, inferring that any meaningful effort to significantly reduce 
GHG emissions in future will have to deal with them going forward. 
 
 143 Jacques Leslie, In the Face of a Trump Environmental Rollback, California Stands in 
Defiance, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/in-the-face-
of-trump-environmental-rollback-california-stands-in-defiance [hereinafter Jacques Leslie]. 
 144 Statements by then-EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, at his confirmation hearing in 
January 2017 suggested that California’s waiver was in jeopardy. Invited by California Sen. 
Kamala Harris to commit to upholding the waiver, Pruitt said instead that he “would not want 
to presume the outcome” of a review of the policy: JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, CALIFORNIA 
WAIVER ON TABLE, PRUITT SAYS AT SENATE HEARING (2018), 
www.law360.com/articles/1006798/calif-waiver-on-table-pruitt-says-at-senate-hearing. 
Despite later backtracking by Pruitt and his subsequent resignation, the U.S. administration has 
indicated it will continue to seek revocation: Natasha Geiling, EPA plans to end California’s 
fuel economy waiver despite Pruitt’s claims to the contrary, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 27, 2018), 
thinkprogress.org/epa-end-california-waiver-freeze-fuel-economy-standards-2020-
ea5ac66b8fed/. 
 145 Greg Gardner, California Sues EPA To Preserve Current Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards, FORBES (May 1, 2018), www.forbes.com/sites/greggardner/2018/05/01/california-
sues-epa-to-preserve-current-greenhouse-gas-emission-standards/. 
 146 Jacques Leslie, supra note 143. 
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2.2.2 Québec 
The Province of Québec is Canada’s largest province by area, comprising a 
land territory three times the size of California. The province’s majority 
Francophone heritage, its religious history, its system of civil law, and its 
relationship with indigenous people, distinguish it from other Canadian 
jurisdictions. To a notable extent, debate, discussion, and outlook in Québec differ 
from those in other regions of Canada.147 A majority of French-speaking 
Québeckers also consistently voice opinions distinct from their Canadian 
counterparts on major political, economic, and social issues. 
Profound changes in Québec society since the 1960s have given rise to a 
contemporary form of Québec nationalism. This shift has had both internal and 
external implications. Internally, it has involved a wholesale remaking of the 
province’s political, administrative, and economic infrastructure along more 
explicitly Francophone, and at times corporatist, lines.148 Externally, the province 
has attempted to assert itself with the rest of Canada and internationally as an 
independent actor. 
Part of Québec’s self-assertion has involved the province claiming jurisdiction 
abroad in its areas of its exclusive jurisdiction (the “Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine”) 
within Canadian federalism. Another part has been its pursuit of vigorous 
‘paradiplomacy’ in sectors like culture, immigration, and the environment where 
jurisdiction is justified by Québec’s unique identity or is otherwise unclear under 
Canada’s existing constitutional arrangements. The subject of climate change has 
given Québec an issue with which to shape the Canadian federal government’s 
climate policies and international positioning at the same time as it meets the 
province’s own aspirations for international personality. 
Factually, a consensus developed quickly in Québec about the threat posed by 
climate change to the province. In 1992, the Québec National Assembly 
unanimously adopted a motion declaring itself bound to the objectives and 
principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.149 
Successive climate events, including a massive flooding the Saguenay–Lac-Saint-
Jean region in 1995 and the 1998 ice storm in the Montréal area, promoted the idea 
that sustained action to address climate change was necessary. Later in 2001, 
Québec’s National Assembly unanimously adopted a motion of support for the 
Kyoto Protocol and expressed its willingness “to do its fair share” in meeting the 
 
 147 Québeckers’ sense of distinction is often described as being part of a “distinct society”, a 
term invented by Jean Lesage, Premier of Québec (1960-66), to refer to the province’s special 
collective identity. Québec remains the only province where most Canadians speak French 
rather than English and the only jurisdiction in Canada that practices civil law rather than 
common law. On November 27, 2006, Canada’s federal House of Commons voted to recognize 
the Québécois as a ‘nation’ within Canada. As only a motion of the House, the vote’s outcome 
is not considered legally binding. Advertisers have also long noted that attitudes and tastes in 
Québec are different from the “Rest of Canada”: Carole Fortin, Headspace says It knows what 
Québec Consumers want (May 16, 2013), http://marketingmag.ca/brands/what-do-Québec-
consumers-want-78693/. 
 148 JOHN DICKINSON & BRIAN YOUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF QUÉBEC 305 (2003). 
 149 Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 3. 
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Protocol’s targets.150 The provincial government eventually went so far as to 
publicly denounce Canada’s decision to withdraw from Kyoto in 2011.151 
Since that time, climate change has formed a central part of Québec’s efforts 
at ‘green paradiplomacy’. These efforts are undertaken in a number of ways.152 
First, Québec representatives have been integrated into Canadian delegations to 
intergovernmental conferences, the so-called “intra-channels”. Inclusion allows 
Québec representatives “access to the negotiating forums, press conference rooms 
and side events”.153 Second, Québec representatives have been proponents of and 
participated actively in “extra-channels”, that is, “forums and side-events held in 
parallel to [international] negotiations, and organized bilateral or multilateral 
meetings at all levels.”154 This activity has been undertaken “to develop or deepen 
partnerships, and to promote its major goal – the recognition of the role of non-
sovereign states in the regulation of global climate change.”155 A third venue for 
Québec’s climate activism has been subnational multilateral organizations such as 
the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers and 
the WCI.156 A fourth channel by which Québec’s climate goals have been 
promoted is through direct implementation of international commitments. For 
example, the province declared itself bound by the Kyoto Protocol and committed 
“to incorporate the provisions of the Protocol in its domestic law.”157 
Nevertheless, Québec has certain advantages in addressing climate change. 
Due to early development of its hydroelectric resources, the province has one of 
the lowest carbon footprints of any jurisdiction in North America. Currently, more 
than 99% of the electricity generated in Québec and nearly 50% of the total energy 
used in the province come from renewable sources, mainly hydraulic and wind 
energy.158 Such an energy profile poses challenges of its own however, since it 
means that the province has had to focus attention in recent emission reductions 
on sectors where GHG reductions are difficult to achieve. 
To fulfill goals under the Kyoto Protocol, the Québec government put forward 
its first Climate Change Action Plan covering the period 2006-2012. The Plan 
called for reversing the upward trend in emissions from transportation and 
buildings – the two major sources of emissions - in a way that would allow the 
Québec economy to improve its competitiveness overall and wean itself off fossil 
fuel dependency. The revised 2006-2012 Action Plan aimed to avoid and reduce 
Québec GHG emissions by 6% below 1990 levels by 2012, which it financed via 
 
 150 L’Assemblée nationale du Québec appuie à l’unanimité le protocole de Kyoto: 
Communiqué de presse, QUÉBEC: ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU QUÉBEC (2001), at c010410a. 
 151 Chaloux notes that “in 2006, Québec sent its Minister of the Environment to Nairobi 
(COP-12) to present the province’s dissenting voice regarding the federal government’s position 
[on the Kyoto Protocol], which it considered unsatisfactory and not audacious enough”: Annie 
Chaloux et al., Canada’s Multiple Voices Diplomacy in Climate Change Negotiations: A Focus 
on Québec, 20 INT’L NEGOT. 291, 306 (2015). 
 152 Id. at 308-312. 
 153 Id. at 308. 
 154 Id. at 309. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 310. 
 157 Id. at 310-311. 
 158 Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 3. 
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a levy on fossil fuels.159 By 2012 the province had reduced its emissions by 8% 
below 1990 levels as a result of its adherence to the Plan.160 
The Québec provincial government took additional steps to address climate 
change by joining the WCI in 2008 and began to work in close collaboration with 
WCI partner jurisdictions to develop guidelines and operating rules for a cap-and-
trade system. Cap-and-trade would later become the centerpiece of Québec’s 
2013-2020 Climate Change Action Plan which was developed with the support 
and participation of businesses, municipalities, and citizens. The 2013-2020 Plan 
also promotes investment in research and innovation, aims to raise public 
awareness about the consequences of climate change, and seeks to further lower 
the public sector’s carbon footprint. Transportation is a prime concern since that 
sector continues to be responsible for over 44% of all GHG emissions in the 
province.161 
The Québec cap-and-trade program was inaugurated in 2013. The linkage of 
Québec’s cap-and-trade program with that of California came into effect in 
January 2014, a development which allowed individual participants in the 
California or Québec cap-and-trade systems to buy and sell allowances with each 
other. In addition, allowances from either system may now be used by an emitter 
that is covered by either system to comply with regulatory obligations in the other. 
The California-Québec carbon market thus became the largest cap-and-trade 
system in North America and so far the only carbon market in the world to have 
been designed and operated by subnational governments from two different 
countries. The first joint auction involving participants from both jurisdictions 
took place in November 2014, thereby completing the integration process. 
2.2.3 Ontario 
Ontario is a province of 13.6 million people (2014) with a varied industrial 
base that in recent decades has evolved towards a service economy underpinned 
by traditional strengths in natural resources and agriculture. Rich in human capital, 
it continues to attract the majority of immigrants to Canada and is home to the 
country’s largest city, Toronto. 
In recent decades the province has struggled with the challenges of erosion of 
its historic industries and uneven economic growth. The Greater Toronto Area 
(GTA) and Ottawa have enjoyed strong growth while most of the remainder of the 
province has stagnated.162 This dual development has led to charges of a “two-
track” province.163 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 4. 
 161 Id. 
 162 BEN EISEN & JOEL EMES, THE FIVE SOLITUDES OF ONTARIO (The Fraser Institute 2016). 
 163 “Across much of Southern Ontario, cities and towns are grappling with dimmer economic 
prospects, slammed by decades of jobs lost to factory closings and their ripple effects. The 
decline has taken on renewed ferocity over the past 10 years as skyrocketing electricity prices, 
a volatile exchange rate and foreign competition have hit hard at local employers and 
surrounding communities. Some sectors, however, are thriving. Since 2000, hundreds of 
thousands of jobs have been created in such sectors as construction, real estate, finance and 
professional and technical services – a reflection of both the building boom in desirable urban 
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Ontario’s geographic location in central North America and its tie-in with the 
North American auto and steel industries mean that it is often constrained to 
achieve policy alignment with adjacent U.S. jurisdictions in order to remain 
competitive. That reality impels it to pursue interchangeability and regulatory 
harmonization with U.S. standards. 
Nevertheless, at the turn of the 21st century, there was substantial evidence of 
climate change as a growing threat to Ontario’s economy.164 At the same time, 
policy makers grappled with ways to transition the province away from a single, 
inefficient power generator-transmitter-regulator in the form of a crown 
corporation, Ontario Hydro, to a more nimble mix of energy sources while at the 
same time promoting job creation, regional development, and environmental 
goals. 
In 1998, the province passed the Energy Competition Act, 1998,165 which 
authorized the establishment of a market in electricity and reorganized the existing 
Crown monopoly, Ontario Hydro, into five separate companies.166 However, to 
prevent newly privatized companies from passing along the full cost of expensive 
infrastructure upgrades to consumers, the provincial government capped 
electricity rates until 2004 and thereafter allowed rates to rise only gradually. 
In the interim, the province focused preliminary efforts to contain climate 
change on phasing out the use of coal, a unique policy approach among North 
American jurisdictions.167 In 2001, Ontario had five coal-fired generating stations 
representing 25% of total power generation in the province. In 2003, the provincial 
government committed to the phasing out of coal generated electricity and over 
the next 11 years coal generating capacity was gradually reduced, after which it 
was eliminated completely.168 Ontario’s coal-fired plant closures remain the 
 
areas and the tech-heavy tasks that underpin the modern economy. The result is an Ontario that 
can be roughly divided into its boom and bust towns, where wealth and opportunity either pile 
up or dissipate. The fault line deepened over the past decade as 90 per cent of new jobs went to 
Toronto and Ottawa, while incomes in former industrial centres grew at anemic rates or 
declined”: Matt Lundy et al., Ontario divided: Anger, economics and the fault lines that could 
decide the election, GLOBE & MAIL (May 18, 2018), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/economy/article-ontario-divided-anger-
economics-and-the-fault-lines-that-could/. 
 164 Ontario’s Ministry of the Environment noted in its 2015 Climate Change Discussion 
Paper that “payouts from extreme weather events have more than doubled every five to 10 years 
since the 1980s, and in 2013, losses were a historic $3.2 billion as a result of floods in Alberta 
and Toronto”: MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, ONTARIO CLIMATE 
CHANGE DISCUSSION PAPER 2015 (2015), 
http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2015/012-3452.pdf at 4 
[hereinafter ONTARIO CLIMATE CHANGE PAPER 2015]. 
 165 Energy Competition Act, 1998 S.O. c 15, Schedule A (Can.). 
 166 The five companies were Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Ontario Hydro Services 
Company (renamed Hydro One), the Independent Electricity Market Operator, the Electrical 
Safety Authority, and Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation. OPG and Hydro one were 
intended to eventually operate as private businesses rather than as crown corporations. 
 167 Leah Stokes, The Politics of Renewable Energy Policies: The case of feed-in-tariffs in 
Ontario, Canada, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 490, 493 (2013) [hereinafter Leah Stokes]. 
 168 Percentage share of total power generation by source in Ontario in 2003 was Nuclear 
(42%), Gas (11%), Hydro (23%), Coal (25%). In 2014 the percentage share of total power 
generation by source was Nuclear (60%), Gas (9%), Hydro (24%), Renewables (7%). The End 
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largest GHG reduction action in Canada to date. By 2012, total GHG emissions in 
the province had decreased by 11% due to the phase-out of coal-fired electricity, 
improved energy efficiency, and the shifting composition Ontario’s economic 
base.169 
The decision to phase-out coal as a source of power generation in Ontario 
spurred a search for alternative sources of renewable energy in the province. While 
in the short-term only nuclear power would fulfill demand, policy-makers 
projected that long-term renewable sources could make up much of the gap. After 
several years of policy experimentation Ontario enacted a feed-in tariff (FIT) 
program in 2009 as part of its Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA), 
the first, large-scale FIT program in North America. The program offered 
enhanced government support for wind, solar/photovoltaic, bioenergy, and 
hydropower.170 The province also encouraged a move to a community power 
generation model that “would deploy more renewable energy more quickly” as it 
had in Europe.171 
In the first phase of GEGEA the government offered wind energy and 
hydropower contracts in response to requests for proposals. However, in a second 
phase, while the government concluded supply contracts with manufacturers who 
promised “green jobs”, opposition to GEGEA began to grow. Some opposition 
came from citizens protesting against the siting of wind turbines.172 Another source 
of opposition were groups concerned about the FIT price schedule, which appeared 
too generous. In addition, in 2010 the provincial government had to contend with 
a complaint about the FIT program’s domestic content requirements in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The challenge was successful, an outcome which 
made Ontario’s FIT program appear protectionist.173 
To allay these concerns, the provincial government was forced to make 
changes. In 2009, the government lowered the tariff paid for photovoltaic 
production of electricity, but only for small producers. It also announced a 
moratorium on offshore wind projects in early 2011.174 These changes, in addition 
to the fact that the promised “green jobs” did not fully materialize, left the 
 
of Coal, ONTARIO (July 16, 2018), www.ontario.ca/page/end-coal. The CA-QC-ON Linkage 
Discussion Paper noted that “Since 2003, Ontario has significantly reduced GHG emissions 
through its coal reduction plan and legislation. From 2005 to 2015, GHG emissions in Ontario’s 
electricity sector decreased by approximately 87%. Ontario’s early action on coal power 
generation demonstrates strong leadership in reducing GHGs.” Partly based on this the CA-QC-
ON Linkage Discussion Paper concluded that “Ontario’s program is at least as stringent as the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program.” See: CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, CALIFORNIA AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD (2017), www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm. 
 169 The End of Coal, ONTARIO (July 16, 2018), www.ontario.ca/page/end-coal. 
 170 Leah Stokes, supra note 167, at 492. 
 171 Id. at 493. 
 172 The provincial government was caught unawares when it streamlined the approval 
process for wind generation, transmission lines, and other infrastructure and later faced criticism 
that this change was “undemocratic”. Id. at 495. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
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ensemble of measures contained in Ontario’s “Green Shift” under GEGEA 
looking disappointing.175 
Despite these setbacks, Ontario’s provincial government pursued discussions 
with members of civil society on how to deal with climate change in a more broad-
based fashion.176 With the Ontario government’s release of its first Climate 
Change Action Plan in June 2016, the province introduced a number of new 
policies and programs to reduce GHG emissions from buildings, waste, 
transportation, and land use, much as California had done several years before.177 
An important component of its approach was to put a cap and a price on the 
province’s GHG emissions through a WCI-compatible cap-and-trade program that 
entered into force in the province in January 2017. Under that program some 147 
major emitters were granted free emission allowances. 
Because long-term predictability of carbon policy is so important, Ontario 
took the opportunity in late 2016 to announce its cap on future GHG emissions for 
every year until 2030.178 The Ontario cap was projected to decline about 4% each 
year to 2020 and then approximately 2.9% each year afterwards to 2030. The 
provincial goal was for GHG emissions to decrease 15% below what they were in 
1990 by 2020, 37% below the 1990 level by 2030, and 80% below the 1990 level 
by 2050.179 These decreases were roughly consistent with those projected in 
California and Québec. 
In January 2018, Ontario’s carbon market was fully linked with California and 
Québec through the WCI. Ontario emitters were able to buy and sell allowances 
and Ontario-issued allowances that were fully fungible with those issued in those 
jurisdictions. During 2017-2018 emitters purchased some $2.8 billion worth of 
Ontario-issued allowances, in addition to those allocated by means of free 
distribution.180 
Nevertheless, concerns continued to be expressed about the cap-and-trade 
program from several sources, including the provincial auditor general181, the 
 
 175 Shawn McCarthy, Green Shift to Green Slump, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 4, 2018, at B1. 
 176 ONTARIO CLIMATE CHANGE PAPER 2015, supra note 164. 
 177 Chapter 2: Policies and Programs Since the Climate Change Action Plan in Ontario 
Environmental Commissioner, in ANNUAL GREENHOUSE GAS PROGRESS REPORT 2017: FROM 
PLAN TO PROGRESS, 46-79 (2017). 
 178 These caps were set out in section 54 of O Reg 144/16 under the Climate Change 
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, S.O. c 7 (Can.). 
 179 Ontario had legislatively enshrined its major GHG targets in s. 6(1) of the Climate Change 
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, S.O. c 7 (Can.). 
 180 Shawn McCarthy, California, Québec Close Carbon Market to Ontario, GLOBE & MAIL, 
June 18, 2018, at B1. 
 181 The provincial Auditor General, Bonnie Lysyk, indicated in November 2016 that 
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program would not result in the target of 18.7MT of GHG reductions 
being met. At that time, she also noted several concerns related top cap-and-trade and linkage 
with California and Québec. Among them were 1) that the Ontario Ministry of the Environment 
and Climate Change has not inspected approximately 80% of approved Ontario GHG emitters, 
2) that there could be double reporting of GHG emissions between the WCI jurisdictions, and 
3) that Ontario participants would be contributing financially to the cap-and-trade program but 
not necessarily be contributing to any actual GHG emission reductions. The Auditor General 
also expressed concern that, in the decision to adopt a cap-and-trade, consideration was not given 
to alternatives that would produce the same GHG emission reductions at significantly lower 
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province’s environmental commissioner182 and the political opposition, suggesting 
that there was no strong consensus concerning the need to prioritize GHG emission 
reduction by means of cap-and-trade, as had happened in California and Québec. 
In June 2018, a provincial election in Ontario led to an abrupt change in 
government and provincial policy. The new government announced the province’s 
withdrawal from WCI cap-and-trade. In connection with the cancellation, 758 
solar and wind projects in the province were terminated.183 Provincial legislation 
provided limited compensation.184 However, the new provincial government 
indicated that it was committed to developing a new plan to address climate change 
in fall 2018.185 
In July 2018 the Ontario government announced its decision to join 
Saskatchewan in a reference question challenging the constitutionality of the 
federal government’s Pan-Canadian Framework posed to the Saskatchewan Court 
 
cost. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 165-190 (2016), 
www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/annualreports/arreports/en16/v1_302en16.pdf. 
 182 Since 2008 Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner has issued an annual review on the 
province’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions to the Ontario Legislature. In several such reviews 
the Commissioner has been highly critical of government action, leaving the impression of 
government action as inadequate. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2018), eco.on.ca/our-reports/climate-change/. 
 183 The cancellation also reportedly had an unsettling effect on investment in the province. 
Shawn MacCarthy, Cancellation of German-owned Ontario wind project prompts warning from 
Berlin, GLOBE & MAIL (July 23, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-
cancellation-of-german-owned-ontario-wind-project-prompts-warning-from/. 
 184 Section 8 of the Cap-and-trade Cancellation Act, 2018 (Bill 4) provides for compensation, 
but Art. 8(4) specifies no compensation to a list of key participants, and Arts. 9-10 otherwise 
prohibit compensation than by means of the act and deprive most potential claimants of any 
cause of action against the provincial government for the cancellation. Dennis Mahony et al., 
Ontario Government Introduces Bill Repealing Cap-and-trade (Torys Insights Publication 
2018), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2018/07/ontario-government-introduces-
bill-repealing-cap-and-trade. It is also curious that the Ontario government decided to halt 
emissions trading and withdraw from the WCI but left intact the little-known Ontario Emissions 
Trading Code. The Code, together with Ontario Regulation 397/01, facilitates the reduction of 
emissions that create smog and acid rain through industry caps and incentives that reward 
innovation and voluntary action. See https://www.oetr.on.ca/oetr/faq/faq.jsp#8. 
 185 For an overview of policy options for the Ontario provincial government see Globe 
Editorial: Ontario’s Carbon Tax Conundrum, GLOBE & MAIL, July 26, 2018, at A10. See also 
Shawn McCarthy, Ontario government to introduce GHG-emission-reduction plan, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ontario-government-to-
introduce-ghg-emission-reduction-plan/. 
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of Appeal.186 Later, the new government also announced a decision to pose its own 
reference question challenging the framework to the Ontario Court of Appeal.187 
In November 2018, the Ontario government announced it would create 
emission regulations for industrial emitters, support business investment in 
environmental innovation and clean technology, and mandate an increase in 
ethanol content for gasoline sold in the province to 15% from 10 per cent by 
2025.188 At the same time, it confirmed that it aimed to reduce provincial GHG 
emissions by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, the same target adopted by 
the federal government for the country under Canada’s Paris Agreement NDC. 
Federal authorities responded that the more relaxed approach of the new Ontario 
government, which would depend on adoption of new technology and investment 
in rapid transit, would increase the margin of uncertainty in Canada’s attempt to 
meet its Paris Agreement NDC goal.189 
2.3 The WCI Cap-and-Trade System 
2.3.1 The Western Climate Initiative 
The WCI is self-described as “a collaboration of independent jurisdictions 
working together to identify, evaluate, and implement emissions trading policies 
to tackle climate change at a regional level.”190 As mentioned, the WCI was 
founded in 2007 by five U.S. states seeking to develop a regional target for 
reducing GHG emissions, participate in a multi-state registry to track and manage 
regional GHG emissions, and develop a market-based program to fulfill emissions 
targets. It was not entirely new, building instead on involvement with two other 
similar initiatives as well as the accrued experience of several early emissions 
 
 186 Canada’s provincial governments, under their respective Constitutional Questions Acts, 
are able to submit questions for advisory opinions to their provincial Superior Courts or Court 
of Appeal. In the reference originally posed in April 2018 the Saskatchewan government asks 
the Court following question: “The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act was introduced into 
Parliament on March 28, 2018 as Part 5 of Bill C-74. If enacted, will this Act be unconstitutional 
in whole or in part?” Once the provincial Court of Appeal has given its decision on the reference 
question, the government or other parties to the reference have the right under the Supreme 
Court Act to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. This same right is not 
available to federal or state governments in U.S. law. Under the ‘Case or Controversy’ Clause 
of Art. III of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions 
in which no actual issue exists but an opinion is sought. 
 187 Justin Giovanetti, Ontario Targets Federal Carbon Tax with Second Legal Challenge, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 4, 2018, at A1. 
 188 Shawn McCarthy & Laura Stone, Ontario to Scale Back Climate Targets, GLOBE & MAIL, 
Nov. 29, 2018. 
 189 Shawn McCarthy, Transit Funding Key to Hitting Climate Goals: McKenna, GLOBE & 
MAIL, Dec. 21, 2018, at B2. 
 190 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, www.westernclimateinitiative.org. 
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trading programs in the U.S..191 Since its founding, two other states and four 
Canadian provinces have become involved.192 
From an organizational perspective, the WCI can be classified as an 
intergovernmental entity.193 Its founding document is a simple agreement among 
five governors.194 It accords the WCI no legal identity since its members have not 
constituted the initiative as an independent legal entity under any system of law. 
WCI decision-making powers are exercised by the government representatives of 
partner jurisdictions. The WCI can take decisions, but decision-making is only 
possible where the decision in question enjoys the unanimous approval of all 
members. Otherwise, the WCI seeks to promote collaboration among jurisdictions 
and is in no way superior to them. 
Because the WCI’s membership is composed of subnational jurisdictions that 
lack personality under international law, they are therefore themselves powerless 
to create the WCI as an independent entity under international law. This reality 
presents the issue of the legal form by which the WCI’s work is to be 
accomplished. 
2.3.2 The Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.) 
To provide a legal form for WCI’s work, several WCI jurisdictions created 
the Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.) in 2011 as a non-profit corporation 
under Delaware law and headquartered in Sacramento. California. WCI, Inc.’s 
purpose is to provide administrative and technical services to support 
implementation of state and provincial GHG emissions trading programs. Its main 
activities are to develop a compliance tracking system that monitors allowances 
and offsets certificates, administers allowance auctions, and conducts market 
monitoring of allowance trading. 
WCI, Inc. is structured as a corporation. WCI Inc. by-laws provide for the 
appointment of voting and non-voting directors to the WCI, Inc. Board of 
 
 191 The early EPA programs included four cap-and-trade programs related by the common 
objective of providing sources with flexibility to comply with traditional source specific 
command and control standards while maintaining environmental objectives focused primarily 
on local air quality. These included netting of emissions, and offsets, bubbles and banking. ADP 
Ellerman, L Joskow & D Harrison, Jr, Emissions Trading in the U.S. (2003). The WCI built on 
existing GHG reduction efforts in the individual states as well as two existing regional efforts. 
In 2003, California, Oregon and Washington created the West Coast Global Warming Initiative, 
and in 2006, Arizona and New Mexico launched the Southwest Climate Change Initiative. 
History, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE (2013), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history. 
 192 Id. The WCI began in February 2007 when the Governors of Arizona, California, New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington signed an agreement directing their respective states to 
develop a regional target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. During 2007 and 2008, the 
Premiers of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec, and the Governors of Montana 
and Utah joined the original five states in committing to tackle climate change at a regional 
level. 
 193 HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (4th ed. 
2003). 
 194 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, WESTERN REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION INITIATIVE, (Feb. 
26, 2007), www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/WCI-Governors-
Agreement. For background to the Agreement see Press Release, Five Western Governors 
Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement (Feb. 26, 2018). 
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Directors, recognize participating jurisdictions (currently California, Nova Scotia, 
Ontario, and Québec), the need for regular meetings, quorum, voting rules, and so 
forth. Both voting and non-voting directors are appointed by participating 
jurisdictions. In 2018, WCI, Inc.’s annual budget was about USD $4.6 million, 
most of which was earned through the provision of services. Participating 
jurisdictions contract with WCI, Inc. for those services. 
WCI, Inc. currently performs a number of functions. Since 2011, it and its 
participating jurisdictions have worked with SRA International, Inc. (SRA) to 
develop and support the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service 
(CITSS). CITSS provides accounts for market participants to hold and retire 
compliance instruments and to record transactions of compliance instruments with 
other account holders. The WCI, Inc. Help Desk provides multi-jurisdictional 
telephone and online customer assistance for CITSS users. WCI, Inc. also supports 
participating jurisdictions in the execution of coordinated auctions of GHG 
emission allowances as well as the execution of jurisdictions’ reserve sales.195 In 
connection with this, it also provides financial administrative services, which 
includes evaluation of bid guarantees and conduct of settlement.196 In addition, 
WCI, Inc. supports participating jurisdictions by contracting for analyses that 
support market monitoring and by performing certain cash flow functions. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from a survey of these functions is that 
WCI, Inc. mainly provides administrative and technical support. It does not 
constitute a supra-jurisdictional authority. Indeed, as will be seen, partner 
jurisdictions insist on the inviolability of their sovereignty vis-a-vis WCI 
arrangements. Jurisdictions participate in cap-and-trade under the WCI on a purely 
voluntary “best efforts” basis, with the tacit prospect of suspension/withdrawal of 
linkage should non-compliance with basic requirements persist. 
2.4 Harmonization 
The functions of WCI and WCI, Inc. are clearly aimed at facilitating 
harmonization. Harmonization has been defined as “the process of making 
different regulations, principles, domestic laws and government policies 
substantially or effectively the same or similar.”197 
Today, harmonization assumes a number of different forms. One approach 
involves the introduction of a common standard where jurisdictions base their 
standards on an exact reproduction of the standard or approximated by more 
loosely ‘basing’ local requirements on international, foreign, or generic ones. A 
 
 195 In 2013, WCI, Inc. contracted with Markit Group Ltd. to build on Markit’s previous work 
with CARB and develop and implement the auction and reserve sale platform to support auctions 
and reserve sales among linked programs in California and Québec. The contract with Markit 
was amended to provide auction and reserve sale services through December 31, 2016. In June 
2016, the Board approved a new contract with Markit over the period of June 15, 2016-January 
31, 2021. 
 196 WCI, Inc. released a request for expression of interest (REI) in February 2016 to procure 
financial administrative services. The result of this procurement was a contract through the end 
of January 2021 with Deutsche Bank. 
 197 Graham Mayeda, Developing Disharmony? The SPS and TBT Agreements and the Impact 
of Harmonization on Developing Countries, 7 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 737, 740 (2004). 
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second approach offers greater flexibility to participants by using a ‘mutual 
recognition’ approach, that is, an approach to standard-setting which allows 
jurisdictions to accept each other’s rules in pursuit of certain recognized regulatory 
goals.198 The focus in mutual recognition is on different rules achieving a 
jurisdiction’s regulatory goal. A third approach to harmonization is an 
‘equivalence’ approach, that is, a process by which a jurisdiction recognizes that 
its regulatory goals may be fulfilled by the use of different kinds of measures.199 
The chief difference between mutual recognition and equivalence is that the 
former is bilateral or multilateral (that is, jurisdictions recognize each other’s 
processes for achieving regulatory goals) whereas the latter is unilateral (that is, a 
jurisdiction agrees to recognize another entity’s processes for achieving its 
regulatory goals even though it may not have any equivalent processes of its 
own).200 
Among the WCI’s key achievements regarding harmonization to date are two 
documents: the 2008 Design Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-and-
Trade Program201 and the 2010 Design for the WCI Regional Program.202 The two 
documents cover a wide range of topics pertaining to the design and 
implementation of cap-and-trade programs. Nevertheless, an underlying goal in 
both documents is linkage, that is, the interconnection and integration of cap-and-
trade programs in different jurisdictions in order to benefit from scaling. The 
process of harmonization under the WCI culminates in the mutual recognition of 
compliance instruments (i.e. emission certificates) issued by different 
jurisdictions. They become ‘fungible’ – or interchangeable – from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. 
At the same time, harmonization imposes certain requirements, among these 
being uniformity, consistency, and trust. A jurisdiction will not engage in 
harmonization efforts unless it can be reasonably sure that another jurisdiction’s 
standards are either the same as its own or achieve similar (or the same) regulatory 
goals.203 A degree of uniformity is necessary because it is the essence of what 
harmonization involves. Consistency is essential to ensure harmonization is 
maintained from one moment to the next. The trust required for harmonization is 
more usually generated among jurisdictions with similar backgrounds and levels 
 
 198 HUMBERTO ZÚÑIGA SCHRODER, HARMONIZATION, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS IN WTO LAW 97 (2011) [hereinafter SCHRODER 2011]. 
 199 FRODE VEGGELAND & CHRISTEL ELVESTAD, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN 
TRADE ARRANGEMENTS: RELEVANCE FOR THE WTO AND THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 
COMMISSION (2004). 
 200 SCHRODER 2011, supra note 198, at 97. 
 201 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI REGIONAL CAP-
AND-TRADE PROGRAM (Sept. 23, 2008), 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/design-
recommendations/Design-Recommendations-for-the-WCI-Regional-Cap-and-Trade-Program/ 
[hereinafter 2008 WCI Recommendations]. 
 202 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI REGIONAL PROGRAM (July 27, 
2010), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/program-
design. 
 203 SCHRODER 2011, supra note 198, at 97. 
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of economic development. Even here, however, commentators have observed how 
progress on harmonization can be exceedingly slow.204 
Because the qualities necessary for the deep harmonization that WCI 
arrangements are ultimately premised upon – including trust – must be built, 
harmonization under WCI arrangements is achieved in two successive phases: 
 
1) program design 
2) linkage. 
 
In the program design phase, the basic features of a cap-and-trade program are 
identified and examined. Once approved, they are put in place and allowed to 
operate. Subsequently, when a program has had an opportunity to prove itself, 
linkage can be considered. As mentioned, the linkage phase involves the 
interconnection and integration of different programs. 
A ‘bottoms-up’ approach to developing cap-and-trade programs on a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis might appear cumbersome and inefficient, except 
that this two-step mode of harmonization was adopted in the 2008 Design 
Recommendations and the 2010 Design for the WCI Regional Program in 
recognition of the fact that creating a successful cap-and-trade program requires 
difficult – often very detailed – political choices that can only be made at a 
jurisdiction-specific level. Once these choices have been implemented and a 
jurisdiction’s program is up-and-running, different cap-and-trade programs can be 
linked through a process of harmonization. The point to appreciate, therefore, is 
that cap-and-trade programs in different WCI jurisdictions have come together 
relatively quickly and seamlessly because of this two-stage method of 
harmonization. 
2.4.1 Program Design 
The 2008 Design Recommendations and the 2010 Design for the WCI 
Regional Program serve slightly different purposes, although an incremental 
progression can be observed from one document to the next. The 2008 
Recommendations embody the results of a consultative exercise involving 
“extensive stakeholder input”. They take a form – recommendations – that are 
traditionally made to governments.205 Specific design elements were identified and 
the ultimate design recommendations summarized. Each recommendation was 
discussed “in light of stakeholder input, the balancing required between disparate 
stakeholder positions, and in light of the experience of other cap-and-trade 
programs, economic analysis, and expert opinion.”206 
In the 2008 Recommendations, stakeholders referred to the requirement to 
achieve the “broadest possible coverage of sources and omissions” under the cap-
and-trade program. Breadth of coverage was dictated by 1) the need to provide 
greater certainty that economy wide emission reductions would be achieved, 2) the 
 
 204 Id. at 149-150. 
 205 Christoph Schreuer, Recommendations and the Traditional Sources of International Law, 
20 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 103 (1977). 
 206 2008 WCI Recommendations, supra note 201. 
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need to reduce compliance costs by covering a broad set of emissions sources with 
diverse emission opportunities, 3) creating a level playing field for all fuels, 4) 
ensuring that carbon was priced throughout the economy and 5) creating a more 
robust GHG trading market.207 
Many stakeholders also stressed the importance of having reliable 
measurement, monitoring, and reporting protocols. There was also much 
discussion of the need to cover different fuel sources, particularly transport fuels, 
as well as the need for progressive coverage extension to ensure economy-wide 
reduction goals could be achieved. Thus, the opinion was expressed that “if 
transportation fuels were omitted from coverage, then they would enjoy a 
competitive advantage over electricity as vehicle fuel, since electricity would be 
covered by the program.”208 It was repeatedly emphasized and recommended that 
“it is important to internalize the cost of carbon throughout the economy and to 
ensure a level playing field across all fuels.”209 
At the same time, for ease of administrative convenience, it was recommended 
that cap-and-trade programming would apply to entities with an emission limit of 
25,000MT CO2, then projected to cover 90% of emissions. 
In terms of the cap – the central regulatory element in a cap-and-trade program 
– the 2008 Recommendations described the cap to be “[a jurisdiction’s] best 
estimate of expected actual emissions based on population growth, economic 
growth, voluntary and mandatory emission reductions, and other factors such as 
reporting data.”210 In connection with this, the Recommendations went on to 
specify an initial compliance period starting in 2012 and expanded coverage of 
transport fuel, residential commercial, and industrial fuels in the second 
compliance period starting in 2015. 
In several respects the 2008 Recommendations presaged future concerns. For 
instance, they indicated a fear of over-allocating allowances211, double-counting 
of emissions credits212, and the need to take into account “the special or unique 
circumstances of each state and province.”213 In this vein, on the most sensitive 
issue – the allocation of allowances – the 2008 Recommendations note that 
“generally, allowance distribution will be done independently by each WCI 
Partner jurisdiction.”214 
The 2008 Recommendations also covered a number of other key topics. These 
included a regional auction platform, the introduction of a reserve price, early 
reduction credits, banking, offsets, and allowances from other cap-and-trade 
jurisdictions, monitoring and measurement, and enforcement. Thus, with respect 
to offsets, WCI partners were urged to have a “rigorous”215 offset program and, in 
conjunction with other partners, to “establish standards and processes for issuing 
 
 207 Id. at 18. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 19. 
 210 Id. at 27. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 30. 
 213 Id. at 31. 
 214 Id. at 32. 
 215 Id. at 37. 
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offset credits”, excepting such credits from other mechanisms and jurisdictions. It 
was also recommended that a cap of no more than 49% be the maximum use of 
total emissions reductions from offsets.216 With respect to reporting (i.e. 
measurement and monitoring), it was recommended that the monitoring of six 
standard GHGs be undertaken and that this monitoring be done by means of third-
party verification. It was foreseen that certain data would “be made available to all 
WCI partner jurisdictions for review and consideration for possible expansion of 
the cap-and-trade program.”217 And with respect to enforcement, the design 
Recommendation was that “if a covered entity . . . does not have sufficient 
allowances at the end of a compliance period, the entity . . . shall be required to 
surrender three allowances for every excess metric ton of CO2 to the jurisdiction 
to which they have the compliance obligation within three months of the end of 
each compliance period.”218 Additionally, partner jurisdictions might establish 
additional penalties, “including civil and criminal penalties for intentional 
violations of program requirements.” The 2008 Recommendations observed that 
“such penalties provide an additional level of deterrence to ensure that the financial 
incentives associated with the cap-and-trade program are not abused and to 
increase confidence in the integrity of the market in the value of an allowance.”219 
The 2008 Recommendations did not foresee the creation of any supra-national 
authority to oversee the operation of the WCI program. Instead, an entity would 
be “designed to help the WCI Part jurisdictions achieve the necessary 
coordination.” The jurisdictions themselves would retain “regulatory authority and 
enforcement responsibilities”.220 
Importantly, however, the 2008 Recommendations recognize that there would 
be benefits to cap-and-trade systems that are not fully represented in economic 
modelling. These included heterogeneity221, diffuse behavioral change222, the 
inducement of innovation223, and inherent errors in direct regulation cost 
estimates.224 
 
 216 Id. at 38. 
 217 Id. at 48. 
 218 Id. at 46. 
 219 Id. at 47. 
 220 Id. 
 221 The WCI 2008 Recommendations note that “[i]n direct regulation, all facilities in an 
industry are required to achieve a given level of performance or emission reduction. Modeling 
tools typically represent the industry as a single “model facility” . . . In reality, industry is 
actually heterogenous with different facilities facing different costs for reducing emissions.” Id. 
at 62. 
 222 The WCI 2008 Recommendations note that “[t]he price signal from a market program 
such as cap-and-trade will create consumer price behaviour throughout the economy that is 
diffuse and not necessarily captured by existing modelling tools.” Id. 
 223 The WCI 2008 Recommendations note that “[t]he price signal from a market program 
such as cap-and-trade will induce technological innovation in a way that is not adequately 
included in models.” Id. 
 224 The WCI 2008 Recommendations note that “[w]hen direct regulations are promulgated, 
the costs of complying with the regulations will likely be estimated incorrectly, either too high 
or too low. . . . Market programs such as cap-and-trade do not suffer from this problem, as the 
market starts out who should do what to achieve the total emission reduction needed.” Id. 
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In addition to specific program recommendations, certain program design 
principles for a cap-and-trade program were identified in the 2008 
Recommendations. These principles included the following characteristics to 
ensure that a program: 
• is equitable and administratively simple 
• maximizes total benefits in jurisdictions 
• requires all reductions to be real, verifiable, additional, 
enforceable, and permanent 
• stimulates investment 
• covers as many sources as is practical 
• provides appropriate recognition and incentives for early 
emissions reductions 
• assures transparent and robust accounting 
• minimizes the potential for leakage 
• facilitates linkage to similarly rigorous regional and 
international GHG markets and programs and encourages other 
jurisdictions to join. 
The 2008 Recommendations were evidently put together with the grand goal 
of a regional, linked program in mind. There are a number of references to 
“regional” caps and targets, the coordination of action and across jurisdictions, and 
other elements of an integrated system.225 This ‘top-down’ approach was evidently 
problematic and has yet to eventuate. 
The 2008 Recommendations were followed two years later by the 2010 
Design for the WCI Regional Program document, which represents a step forward 
but also step back. It goes somewhat beyond the 2008 Recommendations in that it 
lays out the outline of a jurisdiction-specific cap-and-trade program in general 
terms. That generality is a function of the need to strike a balance between 
outlining a framework and the avoidance of dictating particulars. In the process of 
 
 225 It is to be recalled that the 2008 Recommendations were formally denominated “Design 
Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-and-Trade Program” and that there are repeated 
references to a regional system throughout the document (e.g. the description of the program as 
“this ambitious effort to design a regional, market-based approach for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.” Id. at 3). The effort to globalize the scheme in order to avoid double-counting of 
emission credits is also evident in the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, Art. 1(c) which 
references the purpose of “develop[ing] and implement[ing] an accounting mechanism that 
provides for a transparent and data-driven calculation that attributes to each Party its portion of 
the total greenhouse gas emission reduction achieved jointly by the Parties’ linked cap-and-trade 
programs, the results of which will be used to avoid double claiming of emission reductions by 
the Parties.” CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (2017), 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm. 
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implementation there would also be a need to recognize a degree of pluralism. For 
example, the 2010 Design document observes that: 
. . . variations in jurisdictional authorities, regulatory procedures and 
administrative requirements inevitably lead to differences in the manner 
in which rules are written. Consequently, the Detailed Design was 
prepared with the understanding and expectations in each jurisdiction’s 
rule language may vary . . . The intent, however, is that even with 
differences in language or approach, the ability to implement the core 
program design in a compatible manner across jurisdictions is preserved, 
so that the integrity of the regional effort is assured.226 
The 2010 Design document noted that cap-and-trade would harness the power 
of the market to achieve environmental goals, encourage emission reductions 
throughout the economy and advance certain core policies and programs such as 
energy efficiency, the encouragement of renewable energy sources, tackling 
transportation emissions, and establishing performance benchmarks, that would 
help to speed the transition to a clean energy economy.227 
The 2010 Design document went on to outline the fundamentals of a cap-and-
trade program but shied away from describing the program as a “regional” one. 
Instead, it simply acknowledged that: 
. . . a broad geographic scope will also reduce overall compliance costs 
and can help mitigate leakage risks. A large carbon market across a 
diverse set of emission sources provides a wider range of reduction 
opportunities. There are multiple paths for achieving the broad 
geographic and economy-wide coverage that is preferred for a cap-and-
trade program. The WCI Partner jurisdictions also recognize alternative 
schedules for implementation can be accommodated and will continue to 
encourage additional jurisdictions to join the program . . .228 
The 2010 Design document identifies the core of a cap-and-trade program as 
reliance on high-quality emissions data from rigorous reporting. It is upon this 
basis that caps can be established. The 2010 Design document specified that in 
order to minimize the reporting burden for emitters, WCI partner requirements 
should be harmonized with U.S. EPA regulations and made equivalent to a 
Canadian version of the reporting requirements. There was also a need identified 
by the 2010 Design document to develop reporting protocols for certain emission 
sources that did not then have them.229 
The need for uniformity is stressed in the need to ensure that “each jurisdiction 
develop its allowance budget in the same manner to ensure consistency and 
 
 226 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI REGIONAL PROGRAM: DESIGN 
SUMMARY 5 (2010), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-
program/program-design. 
 227 Id. at 1-2. 
 228 Id. at 6. 
 229 Id. at 7. 
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transparency through the program.”230 Additionally, the 2010 Design document 
recommends “a common limit on the use of offset certificates be applied 
uniformly.”231 From these basic premises the 2010 Design document went on to 
recommend that “each Partner’s 2012 allowance budget for emitters covered in 
2012 be the best estimate of actual emissions anticipated in 2012”232, essentially a 
recognition of the need to establish a starting point of ‘business as usual’. The 2010 
Design recommendations went on to note that after a first emissions period the 
projected program would be “designed to expand to cover providers of 
transportation fuels and residential and commercial fuels.”233 
At the same time, there would be a need in any cap-and-trade program 
establishing a cap to make allowances for flexibilities. Here, once again, the need 
to accommodate early reductions and offset certificates from other jurisdictions 
was mentioned. The 49% limit on the use of offset certificates and other approved 
instruments mentioned in the 2008 Recommendations was repeated.234 This led 
into a general discussion in the 2010 Design document of the need to enhance 
compliance flexibility and program adaptability to manage compliance costs. 
Adaptability would be required because “combinations of circumstances could 
result in compliance cost increases that may impact consumers or industry 
competitiveness and increase emissions leakage risk.”235 For this reason, the 2010 
Design document referred to the need to establish allowance reserves “from which 
emission allowances could be released under high-price conditions”236, borrowing 
of allowances from one compliance period to the next might be permitted, and 
“special purpose allowance pools or other mechanisms could be created that target 
localized conditions that affect compliance costs locally.”237 Taken together, 
“[w]hen combined with an auction floor price . . . these mechanisms would help 
create boundaries on the range of allowance prices . . . ”.238 
Two other areas of flexibility mentioned in the 2010 Design document were 
first, the need to maintain competitiveness of covered industries by a process of 
‘benchmarking’239 and the distribution of free allowances, and second, the need to 
address ‘leakage risk’, or in other words, the incentive for covered emitters to leave 
a jurisdiction to avoid or evade program compliance costs. 
The 2010 Design document detailed that “The interconnected nature of the 
North American electricity grid creates the potential for leakage, and existing 
practices see considerable quantities of electricity transacted among jurisdictions.” 
However, the need “[t]o maintain a level playing field and a consistent price for 
 
 230 Id. at 8. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 11. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 12. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Benchmarking is described in the 2010 Design document as “an approach for promoting 
efficiency by evaluating GHG emissions performance among similar facilities or operations in 
an industrial sector” and then using this as “a basis for distributing allowances to industrial 
facilities covered by the [cap-and-trade] program.” Id. at 14. 
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carbon, the emissions associated with imports of electricity are included in WCI 
Partner jurisdiction emissions.”240 In such situations possibilities for over- (or 
under-) counting of emissions meant that a common point of regulation needed to 
be adopted, which the 2010 Design document recommended as being “the First 
Jurisdictional Deliverer (FJD), which is the first entity that delivers electricity over 
which the consuming WCI Partner jurisdiction has regulatory authority.”241 
A further issue dealt with in the 2010 Design document was the design of 
offsets. Given that there had been much experience with offset design by that 
point, the 2010 Design document simply recommended that offset projects 
approved by WCI partner jurisdictions would meet criteria described in certain 
final recommendations on the subject issued by a WCI working group tasked with 
devising standards on the matter. Although a number of protocols already existed 
in other cap-and-trade systems at the time the 2010 Design document further noted 
that WCI partners were “continuing to establish key protocol components for each 
priority project type.”242 
The 2010 Design document noted as well that “[t]he WCI Partner jurisdictions 
plan to auction emission allowances in a regionally coordinated manner to ensure 
fairness and transparency, maximize efficiency, and ensure consistent application 
of state and provincial laws.”243 This would require coordinated auction format, 
timing, and frequency, a standard reserve price, the creation of emission ‘vintages’ 
to further regulate sales, lot sizes, the regulation of guarantees, information sharing 
and transparency, mitigation of market manipulation, and a number of associated 
criteria that would have to be worked out.244 
A final concern in the 2010 Design document is the need to ensure “a well-
functioning market”.245 This subject included “specific policies to ensure fair and 
equal access to the market, transparent operations and timely public disclosure of 
critical information to maintain public confidence, and a market free of 
manipulation so that prices reflect supply and demand conditions.”246 The 2010 
Design document therefore recommended that partner jurisdictions maintain 
primary responsibility for the auction and cash markets and that the appropriate 
jurisdiction-specific authorities (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 
the U.S.; the provincial regulatory authorities in each Canadian province) be 
primarily responsible for oversight of the derivatives market as it related to 
emissions allowances. 
As mentioned above, the 2008 Recommendations and 2010 Design documents 
became a common platform on which the basis of cap-and-trade programs would 
be built in each WCI partner jurisdiction. In California and Québec, such programs 
began in 2013 and linkage occurred at the beginning of 2014. In Ontario, the cap-
and-trade program began in 2017 and linkage with California and Québec was 
 
 240 Id. at 15. 
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 242 Id. at 17. 
 243 Id. at 18. 
 244 Id. at 18-19. 
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 246 Id. 
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achieved at the beginning of 2018, followed by Ontario’s withdrawal six months 
later. 
2.4.2 Linkage 
Linkage is a subject that is mentioned in both the 2008 Recommendations and the 
2010 Design for the WCI Regional Program but not fully detailed. The 
justification given for the phenomenon of linkage of cap-and-trade programs is 
that linkage allows: 
1) the incorporation of more opportunities to reduce GHG emissions, 
thereby improving a program’s cost-effectiveness while achieving greater 
reductions in emissions; 
2) reducing the risk of emissions leakage and maintaining competitiveness 
between actors subject to the same emissions rules 
3) improving market liquidity, reducing volatility and the likelihood of 
market manipulation 
4) sharing of administrative functions, thereby reducing the costs of 
program operation and enhancing consistency across jurisdictions.247 
The 2008 Recommendations are particularly noteworthy for the way that they 
identify elements that must be harmonized in linking in contrast to those that may 
be harmonized in such a scheme. Thus, the 2008 Recommendations note that: 
. . . some elements of a multi-jurisdictional cap program . . . must be the 
same between implementing jurisdictions.; these include certain elements 
of measurement and reporting of emissions, the schedule for distributing 
allowances to covered entities or facilities, compliance and reconciliation 
periods, the use of banking and/or borrowing, the acceptance of offsets 
and allowances from other trading programs, and compliance and 
enforcement.248 
By contrast, the 2008 Recommendations identify the following features as not 
requiring harmonization: 
Other elements of a multi-jurisdictional cap-and-trade program did not 
need to be the same across implementing jurisdictions: it is not critical 
that the states and provinces allocate allowances within their jurisdictions 
in the same manner in jurisdictions may include varying levels of auction 
in their allowance distribution.249 
Harmonization under the WCI therefore depends upon a combination of 
elements, both harmonized and non-harmonized. The exact combination will 
 
 247 Id. at 22. 
 248 2008 WCI Recommendations, supra note 201 at 52. 
 249 Id. 
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differ depending on the jurisdictions involved. A review of experience in each 
linkage achieved under WCI is instructive. 
2.4.2.1 California-Québec Linkage (2014) 
By virtue of Assembly Bill 32, California’s Legislative Assembly directed 
CARB to maintain California’s leadership in climate change mitigation by 
developing integrated and cost-effective regional, national, and international GHG 
reduction programs. The idea of linking California’s cap-and-trade system with 
Québec’s was to be a keystone in that effort. No other formal connection 
maintained by the state to date is nearly as ambitious. 
Following the release of the WCI 2010 Design document both California and 
Québec adopted and implemented cap-and-trade programs based on it. In 
California’s case, the program was enshrined in CARB’s original cap-and-trade 
regulation. Similarly, Québec amended its Environmental Quality Act to provide 
for an in-province cap-and-trade program. The fact that both programs were 
developed from the same template and prepared about the same time meant that 
harmonization could proceed, even if the two jurisdictions sit at opposite ends of 
North America and are in no sense “regional”. 
At the same time, Québec government documents are clear that even at that 
stage – and with the prior benefit of the 2008 Recommendations and the 2010 
Design document – harmonization with California’s program required substantial 
staff coordination and alignment due to legal and linguistic differences: 
 . . . the two systems operated in two very different linguistic and legal 
environments. French being the official language of Québec, the Québec 
regulation respecting its cap-and-trade system was drafted in that 
language under the Province’s civil code; while California’s 
corresponding regulation was written in English according to common 
law principles. This meant that every word, expression, sentence, article 
and legal terminology in the regulations, once translated, also had to be 
scrutinized to achieve agreement on its conceptual and practical 
meaning.250 
In addition, different approaches had been taken to implementation, meaning 
that a sophisticated approach had to be adopted to the question of what needed to 
be aligned versus that which did not. The same Québec government document 
details that “in agreeing on a similar phrasing for the matching provisions in each 
other’s regulations, both sides had to reconcile two different legal approaches to 
achieve harmonization. And last, the two systems were operating under different 
broader sets of environmental regulations and public consultation processes, and 
those had to be respected.”251 
The specific approach to harmonization pursued by the two jurisdictions in 
linking involved the identification of three specific categories of measures: 
 
 
 250 Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 6. 
 251 Id. 
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1. Those provisions that, for the full linking to occur, had to be identical: 
for example, the provisions regarding the joint auction of allowances and 
the purchase and holding limits that protect against market manipulation. 
In addition, since allowances are only created in electronic form, all 
transfers of allowances between systems had to take place within a 
common registry. The rules governing such transfers also had to be 
identical. 
2. Those provisions that, for the full linking to occur, had to produce 
similar outcomes but did not need to be identical: for example, the 
provisions regarding measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) that 
are needed to make sure that a ton of GHG emitted and verified in a 
partner jurisdiction equals a ton of GHG emitted and verified everywhere 
within the partnership; 
3. Those provisions that could still be different from one another without 
impacting the linking process: for instance, California’s regulation 
contains provisions recognizing GHG emission reductions from a 
voluntary offset program that had started several years before its cap-and-
trade system became operational, while Québec’s regulation includes 
provisions recognizing GHG mitigation efforts made voluntarily by 
industry prior to the implementation of its cap-and-trade system.252 
In California, certain statutory requirements require the state’s Governor to 
certify any program to which California is proposed to link before that linkage 
may take place.253 The certification involves an assessment by CARB of whether 
or not the linked program satisfies four requirements: 
1) the jurisdiction has adopted program requirements for GHG reductions, 
including, but not limited to, requirements for offsets, that are equivalent 
to or stricter than those required by the California program; 
2) under the proposed link, California must be able to enforce its program 
against any entity subject to the regulation and against any entity located 
within the linking jurisdiction; 
3) the proposed linkage provides for enforcement of program 
requirements that are equivalent to or stricter than California’s; 
4) the proposed link cannot impose any significant liability on the state 
for any failure associated with the link.254 
In the California assessment of readiness for linkage, three general questions 
were articulated to guide the process. They were: 
 
 252 Id. 
 253 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894(f)-(g) (The Governor is also to consider advice from the 
Attorney-General of California within the 45-day timeframe allowed for this review). 
 254 Id. 
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1) whether the procedures and systems used to implement the program 
were compatible and ensure integrity of the program, 
2) whether the procedures and systems that need to be conducted jointly 
for linkage were well-defined and in place to support linking, and 
3) whether the two jurisdictions have in place procedures to work 
collaboratively and constructively to maintain harmonization. 
In practical terms, the assessment was organized to examine three main topics 
corresponding to the three main groupings of the program activities examined. 
These pertained to 1) readiness to coordinate programs, 2) readiness to enable 
cross-jurisdictional transfer of compliance instruments, and 3) readiness to join the 
auction of emission allowances. 
In terms of coordinating the linked programs, the focus was on procedures that 
both jurisdictions had in place to work collaboratively throughout the 
implementation of their respective programs. In particular, the focus at this stage 
was on whether the two jurisdictions had in place a process for review and public 
input regarding any changes proposed to a linked jurisdictions program, including 
changes or additions to offset protocols. 
In terms of cross-jurisdictional transfer of compliance instruments, the focus 
was on the program elements that affected the compliance instruments themselves, 
which consequently fed into the environmental integrity of each jurisdiction’s 
program. These activities broadly covered the cap-and-trade program including 
management of the mandatory emissions reporting process and data; issuing and 
tracking emission allowances; issuing and tracking offset credits; operating the 
CITSS; registration of participants in the CITSS; monitoring and evaluating 
instrument transfers in the CITSS; and examining transactions that underlie the 
instrument transfers in the CITSS and that occur in related markets. 
In terms of joint auctions, the focus was on the program elements required for 
California and Québec to hold joint auctions of emissions allowances. This 
involved examination of the auction platform, including financial services, auction 
procedures performed in each jurisdiction such as approval of auction applicants, 
and auction procedures performed jointly by the two jurisdictions — such as 
review and acceptance of the report prepared by the independent market monitor. 
To assess readiness for coordination of the two programs, California and 
Québec staff focused on putting in place a linkage agreement that would define 
the manner in which the two jurisdictions would manage their relationship going 
forward. This became the California-Québec Linkage Agreement (hereinafter 
‘CA-QC Linkage Agreement’).255 For this purpose, program elements were 
identified. In addition, several joint procedures were noted that were needed to 
 
 255 Agreement between the California Air Resources Board and the Government of Québec 
concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (2013), 
www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documentation-en.htm#regulations [hereinafter 
CA-QC Linkage Agreement]. 
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support linked activities.256 These were then assessed against criteria of 
completeness, management control, accuracy, security and auditability.257 
The application of these criteria was facilitated by the fact that many of the 
program procedures involved working through the CITSS, a single mechanism 
with exactly the same procedures for all participants. California and Québec had 
worked together for several years to specify the functionality and security built 
into the CITSS. The Governor’s review “found that the two jurisdictions conduct 
many processes in essentially identical ways”.258 
In addition, the Linkage Readiness Report noted that California and Québec 
had each adopted regulations for their respective mandatory GHG emissions 
reporting and cap-and-trade programs: “Through extensive consultations between 
the jurisdictions, the regulations have been harmonized in all respects necessary to 
ensure that they are compatible and ready for linking. Each jurisdiction included 
in its regulations and the ability to link with the other, including specifying that 
compliance instruments from the linked program can be used for compliance and 
allowing for the joint auctioning of emission allowances.”259 The Linkage 
Readiness Report went on to note that “it is anticipated that the jurisdictions will 
continue to make adjustments during the implementation of their programs that 
will affect program operations. To ensure that the California and Québec programs 
remain harmonized, the jurisdictions must work together to identify and address 
implementation issues as they arise. Collaboration is also required to ensure that 
both programs enforce their respective requirements in a consistent manner. 
Harmonized enforcement helps ensure that the same high standards of compliance 
are maintained throughout the two programs.”260 
The Linkage Readiness Report’s observations on this point are important 
given that they envisage adaptive behavior as part of harmonization. Jurisdictions 
do not harmonize at one point in time, but across time. Hence the need for a 
common approach to enforcement and system integrity. For this reason, Art. 4 of 
the CA-QC Linking Agreement ultimately provided the following: 
To support the objective of harmonization and integration of the 
programs, any proposed changes or additions to those programs shall be 
discussed between the Parties. The Parties acknowledge that sufficient 
time is required to enable effective public review and comment . . . The 
Parties shall consult regarding changes that may affect the harmonization 
 
 256 Id. at 8. 
 257 Completeness: do the procedures and processes cover the full set of activities needed to 
implement that element of the program? Are all regulatory requirements met? Management 
control: do the procedures provide effective management control? Are roles, responsibilities, 
and approvals clearly defined? Is the responsibility for key activities properly divided? 
Accuracy: do the procedures ensure data accuracy through validation and multiple levels of 
review? Security: do the procedures protect confidential and market sensitive information? 
Auditability: do the procedures include an audit trail for all decisions and actions? 
 258 State of California Air Resources Board, Linkage Readiness Report at 9 (2013), 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/arb_linkage_readiness_report.pdf [hereinafter CA-QC 
Linkage Readiness Report]. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 10. 
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and integration process or have other impacts on either Party. Each Party’s 
public process for making program changes must be respected.261 
The Linkage Readiness Report also noted that “Staff-level collaboration is an 
important aspect of achieving and maintaining the harmonization and integration 
of the programs.”262 Three working groups – Tracking System, Auction and 
Monitoring and the Management Working Group – demonstrate the ability to 
maintain the harmonization of their respective programs. Additional working 
groups could be formed to address specific needs. The Linkage Readiness Report 
noted that “The track record of successful working group collaboration, combined 
with the commitments from both California and Québec embodied in the [CA-QC 
Linking Agreement], demonstrates the readiness to continue to collaborate 
effectively following linkage of the two programs.”263 
A second general area of concern in the California-Québec linkage process 
was the exchange of compliance instruments, a key focus of mutual recognition. 
In this respect CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report observed that “The primary 
operational aspect of linking the California and Québec programs is that 
compliance instruments issued by California can be used to comply with the 
Québec program, and compliance instruments issued by Québec can be used for 
compliance in California.”264 Here the demand was for complete 
interchangeability, or ‘fungibility’. Fungibility was assessed in two respects: 1) the 
status of the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS) and 2) the 
efficacy of compliance instrument issuance. 
The CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report notes that the status of the CITSS was 
reviewed to evaluate whether the system was prepared to enable transfers among 
participants in the two programs. It was foreseen that CITSS would be used to 1) 
register entities participating in the California and Québec programs, 2) track 
ownership of compliance instruments, 3) enable and record compliance instrument 
transfers, 4) facilitate the submission of compliance instruments as required for 
compliance, and 5) support market oversight by providing access to account and 
transfer data.265 The CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report observed that both the 
California and Québec programs perform the same steps within the CITSS to: 
 
 261 An example of this respect for jurisdictional rule-making is provided as follows: “In 
addition to the demonstrated working relationship between California and Québec, Québec has 
an established public process for adopting regulations, analogous to those in California. The 
Québec requirements presented in the Québec Regulations Act, include that any proposed 
regulation or regulatory amendment be published in the Québec Gazette, followed by a public 
comment period. Section 124 of the Québec Environment Act requires that the public comment 
period be 60 days, and also requires that the Minister consider all the written comments 
received.” Importantly, the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report noted that “This Québec process 
provides an opportunity for California stakeholders to comment directly on any proposed 
changes to the Québec regulations. Additionally, any concerns can be raised with California 
staff during the process, will also be consulting with Québec staff regarding proposed program 
changes.” Id. at 15. 
 262 Id. at 11. 
 263 Id. at 13. 
 264 Id. at 17. 
 265 Id. at 17-18. 
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• issue and transfer allowances into the jurisdictions’ accounts 
• transfer allowances from jurisdiction accounts to participants’ 
accounts 
• transfer allowances from jurisdiction accounts to the auction holding 
account 
• transfer allowances from the auction holding account to successful 
auction bidders’ accounts 
• retire allowances from participants’ compliance accounts. 
For each of these functions, the CITSS was designed to require that 
individuals authorized to initiate these functions (i.e. transfers) were separate from 
the individuals authorized to approve the completion of the functions. 
Consequently, no single individual would be capable of performing all of these 
functions. In this respect the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report found that, “In all 
cases, the California and Québec procedures [for CITSS functions] were found to 
be equivalent. For example, in addition to the CITSS audit trail of activities, both 
programs include paper-based checklists and workflow forms for these CITSS 
actions, each of which must be signed by senior managers before action is taken. 
These forms are retained in a secure location for each program, providing an 
independent audit trail of the work that underlies the action and the management 
approval that was provided.”266 
On the issue of ensuring equivalent efficacy of compliance instrument 
issuance, the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report observed that “the stringency of 
the two programs was evaluated and found to be consistent. This finding means 
that the number of emission allowances being issued by each program, and the 
number and type of offset credits that can be used in each program, result in similar 
program stringency.”267 At the same time, in the CA-QC Linkage Readiness 
Report, CARB staff recommended the introduction of transfer summaries – that 
is, the obligation to provide a summary report to the other jurisdiction that shows 
the purpose of the transfer, the total number of allowances that will be transferred, 
and the sources of the allowances. Such a summary report would enable each 
jurisdiction to provide an added check on the other’s proposed transfer. In addition, 
a CITSS monthly balance would be reconciled to ensure that the total of 
allowances traded matched records of what had been issued and what had been put 
into circulation.268 
The CA-QC Linkage Agreement concluded in 2013 embodies many of the 
points covered in the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report, confirming that the 
arrangement between them was to be purely intergovernmental rather than 
supranational. For instance, it notes the following: 
 
 266 Id. at19. 
 267 Id. at 18. 
 268 Id. at 20. 
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the Parties further recognize that the present Agreement does not, will not 
and cannot be interpreted to restrict, limit or otherwise prevail over each 
Party’s sovereign right and authority to adopt, maintain, modify or repeal 
any of their respective program regulations.269 
In specific textual terms the CA-QC Linkage Agreement mandated that the 
parties “shall consult each other regularly and constructively” and that “the 
procedural requirements of each Party shall be respected” (Art. 3). It also provided 
for ongoing regulatory harmonization with respect to their respective GHG 
emission reduction programs and that “[i]n the case where a difference between 
certain elements of the Parties’ programs is identified, the Parties shall determine 
if such elements need to be harmonized for the proper functioning and integration 
of the programs.” (Art. 4). Offsets should have the “essential qualities of being 
real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable”. At the same 
time, parties “may consider making changes to their respective offset protocols, 
adding additional offset protocols, or changing procedures for issuing offset 
credits.” However, to support harmonization and integration “proposed changes or 
additions [to offsets] shall be discussed between the Parties.” (Art. 5). The CA-QC 
Linkage Agreement also expressly provided for mutual recognition of compliance 
instruments. However, it noted obligations of notification and respect for voiding 
actions undertaken by each jurisdiction where it was determined “that a 
compliance instrument that it has issued should not have been issued or must be 
voided”. (Art. 6). In addition, the CA-QC Linkage Agreement identified the 
trading of compliance instruments (Art. 7), joint auctions (Art. 8), a common 
program registry and auction platforms (Art. 9) and the need for the two 
jurisdictions to work cooperatively to supervise and enforce their respective 
programs (Art. 10). 
The CA-QC Linkage Agreement also provided for the creation of a 
Consultation Committee composed of one representative from each jurisdiction 
(Art. 12). The Committee was described as “monitor[ing] the implementation of 
all measures that are required for the effective harmonization and integration of 
the Parties’ [programs]”, reporting the results of the CA-QC Linkage Agreement 
annually and “address[ing] any other issues at the request of the Parties.” Among 
these is serving as the ultimate stage for the resolution of any differences among 
the parties.270 
 
 269 Id. at 1. Article 13 of the Agreement also noted that “This Agreement does not modify 
any existing laws and regulations, nor may any of its provisions be interpreted as amending any 
agreement or provision of an agreement entered into or to be entered into by either Party.” 
 270 CA-QC Linkage Agreement Article 18 entitled “Resolution of Differences” noted that 
the parties “shall resolve differences by using and building on established working relationships, 
including enabling staff to work jointly through workgroups to develop proposed harmonized 
and integrated approaches for consideration by each Party.” If approaches for resolving 
differences that are acceptable to the Parties cannot be developed in a timely manner through 
staff workgroups, the Parties shall constructively engage through the Consultation Committee, 
and if needed with additional officials of the Parties, or their designees. The Parties endeavor to 
resolve differences in a timely manner, so that the harmonization and integration of the programs 
can be maintained.” 
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2.4.2.2 California-Québec-Ontario Linkage (2018) 
As the preceding section suggests, the California-Québec-Ontario Linkage of 
2018 arose out of a rich background of regulatory harmonization. The Province of 
Ontario had a long history of collaborating with California and Québec regarding 
their respective cap-and-trade program regulations as well as associated regulatory 
changes. California, Québec, and Ontario were among the eleven jurisdictions that 
collaborated in the development of the WCI’s 2008 Recommendations and 2010 
Design document. All three jurisdictions were well aware of the regulatory actions 
that followed in each jurisdiction to give shape and form to these. In addition, the 
Ontario cap-and-trade program was designed with advice and support from 
California and Québec. Likewise, Ontario, together with Québec, had participated 
in regulatory discussions with CARB when California’s cap-and-trade program 
was revised in 2016 following the passage of Assembly Bill 398. At that time, it 
was noted that “the constructive engagement of the jurisdictions [was] 
instrumental for ensuring that key aspects of all three programs will continue to 
align.”271 
There were clear benefits projected from Ontario’s inclusion in the link. 
Although the three jurisdictions are not “regional”, they constitute the three largest 
jurisdictions (by population size) involved in WCI. Ontario’s entry would result in 
the extension of coverage to approximately 150 new entities. It could be expected 
that, consistent with considerations of economic theory underlying cap-and-trade 
design, the inclusion of Ontario would materially expand the market for emission 
allowance trading at the same time. 
Certain drawbacks could be foreseen as well. The ‘trilateralization’ of the 
California-Québec relationship to include Ontario would necessarily render 
harmonization more complex. A further partner would have to be consulted. 
Another set of program priorities and objectives would have to be accommodated. 
The extension of the link to another jurisdiction raised the possibility of a more 
complicated relationship among the partner jurisdictions and the need to address 
this complexity through a certain ‘genericization’, or ‘objectivization’, of the 
overall arrangement. This step would be reflected in the ultimate shape of the CA-
QC-ON Linkage Agreement. 
Once again, requirements of California law triggered the need for a review by 
CARB of Ontario’s program prior to certification of linkage readiness, as had 
happened in the case of Québec in 2013. The first finding required by California 
Government Code section 12894 subd. (f) focused on the strength of the proposed 
linking partner’s program. The linked program needed to be “equivalent to or 
stricter than” that of California. To determine equivalence, CARB examined the 
jurisdiction’s emission reduction goal, the role of cap-and-trade in achieving the 
jurisdiction’s reduction goal, and the rules and requirements incorporated in 
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program legislation. 
 
 271 California Air Resources Board, CA-QC-ON Linkage Readiness Report at 11 (2017), 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm [hereinafter CA-QC-ON Linkage 
Readiness Report]. 
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First, on the subject of Ontario’s reduction goal, CARB staff noted that 
Ontario’s 2020 goal was to reduce emissions to 15% below 1990 levels by 2020, 
which is more stringent than California’s goal (to reduce emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020). At the same time, staff noted that both California and Ontario’s 
reduction goals were codified in legislation. CARB staff also noted that while 
Ontario’s per capita emissions (17.65 Mt) were higher than California’s (14.48 
Mt) in 1990, Ontario had succeeded in lowering its per capita emissions as of 2014 
to 12.43 Mt per capital, mostly through the phase-out of coal generation in 
electricity production, mentioned above. Casting a somewhat wider eye at 
Ontario’s reduction goals in decades to come, CARB staff noted that Ontario’s 
goals were very similar or equivalent to those of California.272 
Second, on the role of the cap-and-trade program in achieving Ontario’s 
reduction goal, CARB staff noted that like California, Ontario supported “the 
attainment of their emission reduction goals in concert with other programs.”273 In 
addition, the amount of emission allowances in both the California and Ontario 
programs in the period 2017-2020 was developed using the same methodology 
originally recommended by WCI. For this reason, California and Ontario were 
deemed to have “equivalent roles in each jurisdiction’s overall emissions reduction 
program.”274 
Third, with respect to the rules and requirements incorporated in Ontario’s 
cap-and-trade program legislation, it was noted that “[d]ue to extensive 
collaboration as California and Ontario participated in WCI, the two Cap-and-
Trade Programs share many identical features.”275 These include identical verified 
emission reporting requirements, program coverage of the same GHG, 
government control of emission allowances, compliance instrument surrender, 
anti-fraud provisions, holding limitations, and limited offsets subject to detailed 
protocols. However, some minor differences were noted. For instance, Ontario 
(and Québec) covered all seven GHG in their cap-and-trade programs whereas 
California had opted to regulate certain high global warming potential (GWP) 
gases by direct regulation.276 Likewise, on the subject of reserve sales, covered 
participants in California could have no allowances whereas in Ontario reserve 
sales were limited to participants unable to obtain allowances, a requirement 
California’s program did not include.277 Finally, with respect to offset invalidation, 
CARB staff noted that Ontario’s legislation provided recourse against the offset 
developer. “If the offset developer is unable to replace the invalidated offsets, 
Ontario will withdraw replacement offsets from a buffer account”278 containing 
3% of the offset project’s allowances. In California, by contrast, the law employed 
 
 272 California Discussion of Findings Required by Government Code section 12894 at 4-5 
(2017), www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm. 
 273 Id. at 5. 
 274 Id. at 6. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. at 7. 
 277 Id. at 8. 
 278 Id. at 10. 
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a different strategy: “If the offset had been used for compliance, the party that 
surrendered the offset credits is required to obtain and surrender replacements.”279 
From all of the above, CARB staff was able to conclude that “the 
harmonization of the program regulations results in equivalency in the two 
programs’ environmental integrity, compliance requirements, and market 
rules.”280 
On three other mandated bases, linkage with Ontario was held to meet 
California criteria. Thus, it was determined that “[l]inkage with Ontario will not 
impede California’s ability to enforce its regulations to the maximum 
constitutionally-permissible extent.”281 It was also determined that Ontario had 
equivalent or stricter enforcement tools then California.282 Finally, linkage with 
Ontario did not impose liability on California. Out of this set of determinations, 
CARB staff concluded that “[t]he foregoing comparison of California and 
Ontario’s emissions trading programs provides support for making the four 
findings” required under California Government Code section 12894(f).283 
A close examination of differences in the CA-QC-ON Linkage Readiness 
Report versus that of the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report concluded four years 
before also reveals little change. The texts differ only in minor respects.284 Much 
of the template for linkage appears to have been set. The general impression is one 
of an extension of mutual recognition of compliance instruments as opposed to 
their wholesale modification. 
Where differences become more pronounced is in the scheme of the Linkage 
Agreement. Under the provisions of the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, 
California and Québec agreed to terminate their 2013 Agreement and to substitute 
a new one in its place. This change demonstrates an important weakness of the 
original CA-QC Linkage Agreement. Although a third-party provision had been 
included in that agreement, its ‘contractual’ structure made it highly peculiar to 
the parties involved and required amendment each time a third party joined.285 This 
shortcoming made the original cumbersome and unwieldly to modify. 
To overcome that difficulty, the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement projected a 
more permanent arrangement. In essence, third party jurisdictions were invited to 
 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 11-13. 
 283 Id. 
 284 For example, the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement appears to be slightly more 
sovereignty-conscious in the sense that its recitals note that “the present Agreement does not, 
will not and cannot be interpreted to restrict, limit or otherwise prevail over relevant national 
obligations of each Party”. In addition, it mentions the aim of “develop[ing] and implement[ing] 
an accounting mechanism that provides for a transparent and data-driven calculation that 
attributes to each Party its portion of the total greenhouse gas emission reduction achieved 
jointly by the Parties’ linked cap-and-trade programs”: CA-QC-ON Linkage Readiness Report, 
supra note 271, at art. 1(c)). 
 285 “Recognizing that the Parties welcome effective, timely, and meaningful action to reduce 
GHG emissions by states, provinces and territories, this Agreement may be amended to include 
additional parties that have adopted programs that are harmonized with each of the Parties’ 
programs”: Id. at art. 17. 
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join a concrete agreement rather than fundamentally renegotiate its terms. Article 
20 of the new agreement contains an accession clause in the following terms: 
Recognizing that the Parties welcome effective, timely, and meaningful 
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by other jurisdictions, a 
candidate Party may be added as a Party to the Agreement if the candidate 
Party has adopted a program that is harmonized and can be integrated with 
each of the Parties’ programs, if all of the Parties to the Agreement agree 
to add the candidate Party by signing an Accession Amending Agreement 
and then the candidate Party agrees to become a party to the Agreement 
by signing an Instrument of Accession. 
To do so, the legal procedures required by each Party must be respected. 
The CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement also contains a standard form of an 
Accession Amending Agreement and an Instrument of Accession that can be 
found in Annex 2 and Annex 3, respectively. The Agreement adds that “Once the 
Parties have signed an Accession Amending Agreement, the candidate Party shall 
sign an Instrument of Accession.” This standardization is welcome in the sense 
that it provides a more regular template for accession in future. 
CHAPTER 3: WCI CAP-AND-TRADE: OVERVIEW AND CAP 
The preceding chapter examined the legal and policy background to WCI cap-
and-trade. In this chapter, a closer look is taken at specific components of the 
system on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. It examines 12 subjects: system 
overview, legislation, the cap, compliance periods, emissions attribution, 
emissions allocation, flexibility, registration, reporting, verification, monitoring 
and enforcement. 
3.1 System Overview 
The Western Climate Initiative cap-and-trade functions as a “system”, that is, 
an assembly of elements operating together to achieve a common purpose.286 In 
the case of WCI cap-and-trade, the purpose is to reduce GHG emissions while 
providing a mix of incentives to foster technologic innovation. The exact 
requirements to implement the system differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Consequently, before examining specific components of the system, it is useful to 
gain some idea of how the system works overall. 
Perhaps the most innovative and salient aspect of a cap-and-trade system is 
harnessing the power of markets for environmental protection. Markets are 
traditionally thought about in economic terms. They appear to have little in 
common with the integrity and sustainability that are characteristic of 
contemporary understandings of the environment. 
 
 286 Donella Meadows defined systems as consisting of elements, interconnections, and a 
function or purpose. She gave as an example a football team which “is a system with elements 
such as players, coach, field, and ball. Its interconnections are the rules of the game . . . The 
purpose of the team is to win games”: Donella Meadows, THINKING IN SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 11 
(Earthscan 2008). 
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As mentioned, a cap-and-trade system operates by capping the GHG 
emissions of certain emitters and then permitting the trading of allowances that 
these emitters require to satisfy the cap as calculated at the end of a defined 
compliance period. The cap is gradually lowered over time; therefore, emitters 
have the option of either lowering their own emissions at a certain cost, engaging 
in offset activities to generate allowances, or purchasing allowances from other 
emitters who have surplus allowances on hand. The possibility of purchasing 
allowances in order to meet individual emitter ceilings gives rise to the idea of a 
‘market’. 
A ‘market’ for carbon emissions under the WCI requires an appreciation of 
markets themselves. Markets are a response to a very common dilemma. When 
too many actors share a single resource, the resource tends to be overused. 
Consider overfishing in the oceans or air pollution. This wasteful overuse is 
occasionally termed the “tragedy of the commons.”287 Such failures are often 
addressed by creating private property out of a common resource. Property 
“owners tend to avoid overuse because they benefit directly from conserving 
resources they control.”288 Markets are places where these private rights can be 
exchanged. Markets are usually considered to be efficient in the sense that 
transactions within them take place at a certain price, which signals the latest value 
assigned by actors to the resources involved. Markets also serve a valuable 
communication function by indicating the relative value of those rights in 
transactions and by socializing behavior so as to allow for participation in the 
market. 
The trading of emissions allowances under the WCI cap-and-trade takes place 
in a ‘market.’ However, like many markets, the market created by WCI cap-and-
trade is not unconstrained or completely free. A judicious mix of public and private 
incentives is introduced to achieve the goals of the market. First, as we will see, 
WCI partner governments introduce caps on GHG emissions which meet (or 
exceed) national commitments; they are the key to establishing what baselines 
individual emitters in a jurisdiction must meet in order to satisfy their own entity-
specific emissions requirements and broader climate goals. Second, the setting of 
caps presupposes an extensive administrative framework of governments, 
regulators and other actors (such as verification agents) that can determine 
emissions attributions and allocations as well as allowances, offsets and participant 
registration, and ensure market integrity. Third, once each WCI partner’s cap is 
established, emissions allocations have been made, and allowances, credits and 
offsets distributed or determined, trading must be facilitated. Here, governments 
play a role in helping to establish and maintain active markets for trading 
allocations among registered participants. Regulation includes the conduct of 
auctions, pricing, sales, transfer of allowances, taxation and other issues. Fourth, 
there is the issue of ‘linkage’, or the harmonization and interconnection of 
emissions trading systems among partner jurisdictions to create a consolidated 
 
 287 A term originally coined by the ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1968. See Michael Heller, 
THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, 
AND COSTS LIVES 17 (Basic Books 2008). 
 288 Id. 
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market for allowances, thereby promoting goals of transferability and efficiency. 
A substantial degree of uniformity is required in order to promote systemic 
integrity and minimize the phenomenon of ‘carbon leakage’, that is, the decision 
of emitters to conduct operations in non-WCI jurisdictions in order to circumvent 
cap-and-trade disciplines and costs in a jurisdiction covered by WCI. 
All of these incentives rely on pre-existing administrative structures that 
regulate and facilitate coordination among government and non-governmental 
actors. Hence, there is a need to explain as well as analyze the WCI and its 
components before examining the operation of the emissions trading market in 
detail. 
3.2 Legislation 
The legislative basis for cap-and-trade in each WCI jurisdiction has already 
been previewed in previous chapters. That legislative basis is essential since it 
provides the foundation upon which each cap-and-trade program is founded. It is 
doubly important in a scheme like WCI cap-and-trade since beyond certain 
technical requirements and common features, there are few higher-level norms. 
Jurisdictions commit to participating in WCI on a “best efforts” basis, but always 
maintain their own laws. There is no external set of disciplines that can be used to 
enforce, apart perhaps from the implicit threat of delinking. 
The lack of a formal framework means that from a structural point of view, 
the feature of WCI must be understood through the law of the separate jurisdictions 
in which they operate. 
California 
The legislative basis for cap-and-trade in California originates in the Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (also known as “Assembly Bill 32”). Assembly 
Bill 32 established the goal of decreasing GHG emissions in-state to 1990 levels 
by 2020, a reduction of 15%. Pursuant to Assembly Bill 32, CARB was required 
to adopt regulations to achieve maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective GHG emission reductions. Assembly Bill 32 also required CARB to 
develop ‘Scoping Plans’ which lay out California’s strategy for meeting its climate 
related goals. The Scoping Plan was required to be updated every five years. In 
December 2008, CARB approved the initial Scoping Plan, which included a suite 
of measures to cut GHG emissions substantially. One of these measures was cap-
and-trade.  
Initially, CARB was not given the authority to implement cap-and-trade 
beyond 2020. In 2016 the California Legislature enacted State Bill 32, which 
established an additional target of reducing GHG emissions by at least 40% by 
2030. Under State Bill 32, CARB was given wide discretion over how to design 
the cap-and-trade program. Subsequently, Assembly Bill 398 extended CARB’s 
authority to operate cap-and-trade from 2020 to 2030 and provided additional 
legislative direction regarding certain design features of the post-2020 program. 
Assembly Bill 398 also included new reporting and oversight requirements. 
The existing CARB Cap-and-Trade program was modified by Assembly Bill 
398 in at least six important ways. First, whereas the current regulations 
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established the number of allowances issued each year through 2030, Assembly 
Bill 398 indicated that when setting post-2020 caps, CARB was to evaluate and 
address concerns relating to a large number of pre-existing banked allowances. 
Second, the current regulations set no expiration date for allowances, whereas 
Assembly Bill 398 directs CARB to adopt banking rules that “discourage 
speculation, avoid financial windfalls, and consider impact on complying entities 
and market volatility.” Third, the current regulations set a “soft” price ceiling of 
about USD $60 per allowance in 2017 and increasing gradually in future years, 
whereas Assembly Bill 398 directs CARB to establish a “hard” price ceiling and 
consider various factors when setting that ceiling. Fourth, the current regulations 
feature no price containment points, whereas Assembly Bill 398 directs CARB to 
establish two price containment points (known as “speed bumps”) between the 
price floor and the price ceiling of emission allowances to moderate price 
increases. Fifth, current regulations establish an offset limit maximum of 8% of a 
covered entity’s emissions, whereas Assembly Bill 398 sets this maximum at 4% 
in the period 2021-2025 and 6% in the period 2026-2030, with no more than half 
coming from projects that do not provide direct environmental benefits in 
California. Sixth, current regulations set three different industry assistance factors 
(IAFs) for high-, medium-, and low-risk industries to receive free allowances in 
the period 2018-2020. Assembly Bill 398 mandates 100% IAFs from 2021-2025. 
In addition to the above amendments, California’s regulatory framework for 
GHG emissions is buttressed by the following regulations: 
 
• Regulation for the California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms, Code of California 
Regulations, Title 17, ss. 95800-96023. 
• CARB’s Regulation for the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (MMR) appearing at sections 95100-95163 of Title 17, 
California Code of Regulations. The regulation was originally 
approved in 2007 and revised in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The 
most recent amendments to MRR were approved and became 
effective on January 1, 2018. 
 
California’s emissions trading system covers approximately 85% of GHG in 
its GHG emissions inventory. The system covers carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) and other fluorinated GHGs. 
The number of liable entities in the state was estimated at 700 in 2013.289 Sectors 
 
 289 The CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report indicates that California had approximately 700 
facilities in November of 2013. A “covered entity” under the California legislation means an 
entity within California that: has one or more of the processes or operations described above; 
has a compliance obligation, as specified in subarticle 7 of the Cap-and-Trade Regulation; and 
has emitted, produced, imported, manufactured, or delivered in 2008 or any subsequent year 
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covered in the First Compliance Period (2013-2014) include those which have one 
or more of the following processes or operations: large industrial facilities 
(including cement production, glass production, hydrogen production, iron and 
steel production, lead production, lime manufacturing, nitric acid production, 
petroleum and natural gas systems, petroleum refining, pulp and paper 
manufacturing, and cogeneration facilities co-owned/operated at any of these 
facilities), electricity generation, electricity imports, other stationary combustion 
and CO2 suppliers. Sector coverage in the Second Compliance Period (2015-2017) 
and beyond was extended to suppliers of natural gas, suppliers of reformulated 
blendstock for oxygenate blending and distillation fuel oil, suppliers of liquid 
petroleum gas in California and suppliers of liquefied natural gas. The inclusion 
threshold was for facilities in the above sectors emitting 25,000t CO2 per year. 
Québec 
In June 2009, the Québec National Assembly unanimously adopted the Act to 
amend the Environment Quality Act and other legislative provisions in relation to 
climate change. This grants the Government the enabling powers to implement, by 
regulation, a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances.290 In 
November 2009, after a National Assembly committee hearing, the Government 
of Québec adopted a new greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target of 20% 
below 1990 levels by 2020, which was essential for the establishment of annual 
GHG emission caps under the cap-and-trade system. This target, adopted by 
Order-in-Council, has force of law.291 In December 2011 the Government of 
Québec adopted the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for GHG 
emission allowances. This Regulation describes the operating rules of Québec’s 
cap-and-trade system.292 In December 2012 the Government of Québec adopted 
the Regulation to amend the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for 
greenhouse gas emission allowances.293 This new regulation aimed at harmonizing 
Québec and California’s cap-and-trade systems, enabling them to be linked. It also 
introduced the operating rules of Québec’s offset credit system. Moreover in 
December 2012, the Government of Québec adopted Order-in-Council 1185-2012 
regarding the determination of the annual cap on GHG emission allowances under 
the cap-and-trade system for 2013-2020.294 The caps were set based on the most 
 
more than the applicable threshold level specified in s. 95812(a) of the Regulation: CA-QC 
Linkage Readiness Report, supra note 258, at 22. 
 290 Draft Bill 42-2009, An Act to amend the Environment Quality Act and other legislative 
provisions in relation to climate change (August 26, 2009) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 34 at 
4387. 
 291 Order in Council 1187-2009 (December 9, 2009) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 49 at 5871 
(French only). 
 292 Order in Council 1297-2011, The Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system of 
greenhouse gas emission allowances (December 16, 2011) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 50B at 
5519B, online: http://www2.publicationsduQuébec.gouv.qc.ca/
dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=3&file=/Q_2/Q2R46_1_A.HTM. 
 293 Order in Council No 1184- 2012 (December 19, 2012) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 51 
at 5480. 
 294 Order in Council No 1185-2012 (December 19, 2012) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 51at 
5613. 
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recent known GHG emission data in order to enable Québec’s GHG emissions to 
be reduced to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. 
Québec’s emissions trading system covers approximately 85% of GHG in its 
GHG emissions inventory. The system covers CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs, PFCs, 
NO3 and other fluorinated GHGs. The number of liable entities in the province 
was estimated at 132 in 2017. Sectors covered in the First Compliance Period 
(2013-2014) were electrical generation and industry emitting 25,000t CO2 per year 
or more. Sector coverage in the Second Compliance Period (2015-2017) and Third 
Compliance Period (2018-2020) included those in the First Compliance Period 
alongside the distribution and importation of fuels used for consumption in the 
transport and building sectors, as well as certain small and medium-size 
businesses. The general inclusion threshold was 25,000t CO2 per year or more. As 
of 2016, fuel distributors that had distributed 200L or more of fuel (in 2015 and 
onwards) were also subject to inclusion even if combustion of the fuel they sold 
had resulted in emissions of less than 25,000t CO2 per year. Starting in 2019, 
emitters from capped sectors that reported emissions between 10,000-25,000t CO2 
per year will be able to voluntarily register as covered entities in the system. 
Ontario 
The Ontario Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, 
S.O. 2016, c. 7, provided the legal foundation for the cap-and-trade program in the 
province. The Act was supplemented by the following four Regulations: 
Ontario’s Cap-and-trade Program Regulation (O. Reg. 144/17) took 
effect July 1, 2016. It defined the key elements (e.g., caps, allocations) 
and program rules (i.e., auctions, market requirements).* 
Ontario’s Quantification, Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Regulation (O. Reg. 143/17) took effect January 1, 2017 and 
provided for opting in, lowered the reporting threshold, and aligned with 
cap-and-trade regulation.* 
Ontario’s Offset Regulation (O. Reg. 539/17) took effect Jan. 1, 2018 
and provided for the registration of offset initiatives, Ontario offset 
credits, offset reversals, and offset reporting and verification in the 
province.* 
Ontario’s Administrative Penalties Regulation (O. Reg. 540/17) took 
effect Jan. 1, 2018 and provided for a series of administrative penalties 
to ensure compliance with the Act or its regulations. It also prevents 
individuals or entities from deriving economic benefits as a result of a 
contravention thereof. 
Starred instruments (*) were revoked July 3, 2018 due to the provincial 
government’s cancellation of cap-and-trade effective that date.295 
 
 295 Prohibition against the purchase, sale and other dealings with emission allowances and 
credits, O. Reg. 386/18 (Can.), made under the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon 
Economy Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c 17, s 2 (Can.). 
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Ontario’s emissions trading system covered approximately 82% of GHG in its 
GHG emissions inventory.296 The system covered CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs, 
PFCs, NF3. The number of liable entities in the province was estimated at 148 in 
2016.297 Sectors covered in the First Compliance Period (2017-2020) were 
industrial and large commercial operations (such as manufacturing, base metal 
processing, steel, pulp and paper, and food processing), institutions (e.g., 
universities), transportation fuel processors and distributors(including propane and 
fuel oil), businesses that generate, import (for consumption in Ontario), or 
distribute electricity, as well as natural gas generators and distributors.298 The 
inclusion threshold was 25,000t CO2 or above for mandatory participants, 200L of 
petroleum product supply for fuel distributors, and reported emissions between 
10,000-25,000t CO2 per year for voluntary participants. 
3.3 The Cap 
As mentioned, the three WCI cap-and-trade jurisdictions (California, Québec, 
Ontario) exist within national jurisdictions that have set Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) for emission reductions under the Paris Agreement. These 
NDC targets might be regarded as serving as a baseline for WCI-led reductions, 
except that WCI-led GHG reduction efforts have been in place somewhat longer 
and are, in most instances, more ambitious. Moreover, as pointed out above, a key 
factor in the decision to link WCI jurisdictions was the degree of ambition 
demonstrated by each jurisdiction’s cap. 
The following are the caps indicated for each WCI partner jurisdiction. 
California 
In California the overall GHG emissions were 440.4Mt Co2 in 2015. The 
overall California reduction target by 2020 is a return to 1990 levels, by 2030 a 
40% reduction from 1990 levels and by 2050 an 80% reduction from 1990 levels. 
Beyond 2020, compliance periods will be between two and three years long 
(2021–2022, 2023–2024, 2025–2027, 2028–2029, and 2030–31) if the EPA 
approves California’s plan for compliance with the federal Clean Power Plan by 1 
January 2019. Otherwise, the fourth compliance period will start on 1 January 
2021 and end on 31 December 2023, and each subsequent compliance period will 
be three years long.299 
 
Year Cap (in million allowances of 
CO2) 
First Compliance Period 
2013 162.8 
 
 296 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Ontario’s Climate Act From Plan to Progress: 
Annual Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2017 at 106 (2017), [hereinafter Annual Greenhouse 
Gas Progress Report, 2017]. 
 297 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-trade in Ontario: 
Appendix A to the ECO’s Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2016 at 10 (2016). 
 298 Id. at 12. 
 299 International Carbon Action Partnership, USA-California Cap-and-Trade Program 
(2018), icapcarbonaction.com. 
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2014 159.7 
Second Compliance Period 
2015 394.5 
2016 382.4 
2017 370.4 
Third Compliance Period 
2018 358.3 
2019 346.3 
2020 334.2 
After Third Compliance Period: 2021 to 2031 
2021 320.8 
2022 307.5 
2023 294.1 
2024 280.7 
2025 267.4 
2026 254.0 
2027 240.6 
2028 227.3 
2029 213.9 
2030 200.5 
2031 193.8 
 
Québec 
In Québec the overall GHG emissions were 82.1Mt Co2 in 2014. In Québec 
the overall GHG reduction target by 2020 is a 20% reduction from 1990 levels, by 
2030 a 37.5% reduction from 1990 levels, and by 2050 an 80-95% reduction from 
1990 levels. The cap projected is absolute and aims to proceed along the trajectory 
as found in the below table. After a slight increase in the cap in 2021 (due to an 
adjustment of the global warming potential of different GHGs), the cap will 
decrease by about 1.24 million allowances per year. This will result in a cap of 
44.14 million allowances in 2030.300 
 
Year Cap (in million allowances of 
CO2) 
First Compliance Period 
2013 23.20 
2014 23.20 
Second Compliance Period 
2015 65.30 
2016 63.19 
2017 61.08 
 
 300 International Carbon Action Partnership, Canada-Québec Cap-and-Trade Program 
(2018), icapcarbonaction.com. 
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Third Compliance Period 
2018 58.96 
2019 56.85 
2020 54.74 
Fourth Compliance Period 
2021 55.26 
2022 54.02 
2023 52.79 
Fifth Compliance Period 
2024 51.55 
2025 50.31 
2026 49.08 
Sixth Compliance Period 
2027 47.84 
2028 46.61 
2029 45.37 
2030 44.14 
 
Ontario 
In Ontario the overall GHG emissions were 170Mt Co2 in 2014.301 In Ontario 
the overall GHG reduction target by 2020 was a 15% reduction from 1990 levels, 
by 2030 a 37% reduction from 1990 levels, and by 2050 an 80% reduction from 
1990 levels, as provided in the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon 
Economy Act, 2016 (suspended July 3, 2018). The cap projected was absolute and 
aimed to proceed along the trajectory as outlined in the table below. 302 
 
Year Cap (allowances of CO2) 
2020 124,668,000 
2021 121,058,000 
2022 117,438,000 
2023 113,818,000 
2024 110,198,000 
2025 106,578,000 
2026 102,958,000 
2027 99,339,000 
2028 95,719,000 
2029 92,099,000 
2030 88,479,000 
 
 
 301 Environment and Climate Change Canada, National Inventory Report 1990-2014: 
Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, Part 3 at 55 (2016). 
 302 Climate Change Mitigation and Low-Carbon Economy Act, S.O. 2016, c 7 (Can.). 
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3.4 Compliance Periods 
In all three WCI jurisdictions a trading period is referred to as a “compliance 
period”. At the end of this period, covered participants must have allowances on 
hand adequate to cover their individual emission limits. Allowances are allocated 
and auctioned within calendar year vintages. Some allowances from future 
vintages are offered for sale at each auction and may be traded but not used for 
compliance until the compliance date for the vintage year.303 
California  
In California the compliance period is three years (after the initial compliance 
period in 2013-2014 of two years). Allowances for emissions of the whole 
compliance period must be surrendered by November 1st (or the first business day 
thereafter) of the year following the last year of a compliance period.304 It is 
important to note that California’s trading period is referred to as “compliance 
period”, though a portion (30%) of allowances must be submitted for each year’s 
emissions depending on the year of the trading/compliance period. 
 
First Compliance Period: 2013-2014 
Second Compliance Period: 2015-2017 
Third Compliance Period: 2018-2020 
Fourth Compliance Period and following: usually two-year periods, with one 
three-year period (either 2021-2023 or 2025-2027 depending on the EPA’s 
decision under the Clean Power Plan.305 If the EPA has not approved 
California’s plan for compliance with the Clean Power Plan by January 1, 
2019, then California’s Fourth Compliance Period will start on 1 January 2021 
and ends on 31 Dec. 2023 and each subsequent compliance period will be 
three years long).306 
Québec 
Similar to California, in Québec the compliance period is three years, and 
allowances must be surrendered by November 1st (or the first business day 
thereafter) of the year following the last year of a compliance period.307 
 
First compliance period: 2013-2014 
Second compliance period: 2015-2017 
Third compliance period: 2018-2020 
Fourth compliance period: 2021–2023 
Fifth compliance period: 2024–2026 
Sixth compliance period: 2027–2029 
 
 303 One quarter of California future vintage allowances will be auctioned three years prior to 
the vintage date: 17 C.C.R.§ 95910(c)(2)(B) 
 304 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), Emissions Trading Worldwide: Status 
Report, 2018 at 46-47 (2018) [hereinafter ICAP Status Report 2018]. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 49. 
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Ontario 
Following the same format as the other WCI jurisdictions, Ontario’s 
compliance periods were three years, and allowances had to be surrendered by 
November 1st (or the first business day thereafter) of the year following the last 
year of a compliance period.308 However, the first Ontario compliance period was 
in fact four years, allowing one year for the province to hold their own auctions 
prior to linking with the other WCI jurisdictions. 
 
First compliance period: 2017-2020 
Second compliance period: 2021-2023 
3.5 Coverage 
An emission allowance is a generic term that can represent 1) an emission 
unit, 2) an offset credit or 3) an Early Reduction Credit (ERC). An emission unit 
is an authorization to emit one tonne of GHG. The number of available GHG 
emission units is limited and the total for all emitters covered by the cap-and-trade 
system is equivalent to the annual published cap of GHG emission units set by the 
government. 
There are many different sources of GHG emissions. Under WCI cap-and-
trade as currently constituted, emissions are attributed only to certain categories of 
emitter and vary by jurisdiction. In California for example, agricultural emissions, 
high global warming potential gases and select fugitive emissions are not captured 
under current regulations. Québec has been developing offsets for methane 
produced through agricultural use. 
California 
In California, the Regulation for the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions requires annual reporting of GHGs from sources that emit greater than 
10,000t CO2, transportation and natural gas fuel suppliers, and imported 
electricity.309 In 2016 this was estimated to capture approximately 80% of GHG 
emissions included in California’s GHG inventory. If reported emissions by an 
emitter are less than 10,000t CO2 per year for three consecutive years, the covered 
operator or supplier may cease reporting after submitting an emissions data report 
for the third consecutive year of <10,000t CO2 emissions.310 
Québec 
In Québec, participants are considered emitters and therefore required to 
participate if they are a person or municipality, operate in a sector of activity 
covered by the relevant regulation, and met or exceeded certain emission 
thresholds. In practical terms this included persons and/or municipalities that 
operate any facility whose annual GHG emissions (excluding CO2 emissions 
 
 308 Id. at 51. 
 309 17 C.C.R § 95100-95157 
 310 California Environmental Protection Agency, Cessation of Reporting for California’s 
2012 Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Regulation (2013), 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/guidance/ghg-cessation.pdf. 
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related to the combustion of biomass) are greater than or equal to 25,000t. In 
addition, any person or municipality that distributes in Québec electricity produced 
outside Québec, and whose associated GHG emissions equal or exceed the annual 
threshold of 25 kt CO2eq., is also subject to the system. During the first compliance 
period these limits covered approximately 80 facilities from the industrial and 
power generation sectors. As of January 1, 2015 (i.e. the beginning of Québec’s 
second compliance period), any person or municipality that distributed in Québec 
fossil fuels whose combustion meets or exceeds the annual GHG emission 
threshold of 25,000t was also covered by the cap-and-trade system. This 
encompassed almost 85% of GHG emissions in Québec’s GHG inventory. With 
respect to initiation and cessation obligations, emitters regulated by the cap-and-
trade program are required to cover their GHG emissions until at least 2020 or 
until December 31st following their third consecutive GHG emission report when 
they fall below the 25,000t CO2 threshold. Conversely, an unregulated emitter 
becomes subject to the system on January 1st following its first annual report 
showing GHG emissions that are equal to or exceed the threshold of 25 kt CO2eq. 
Ontario 
In Ontario participants were required to participate if they were 1) an 
electricity importer, 2) a facility or natural gas distributor that emits 25,000t or 
more of GHG annually, 3) a fuel supplier that sold more than 200L of fuel 
annually. In addition, participation in the Ontario scheme was voluntary for 
facilities that generate between 10,000-25,000t of GHG emissions per year and for 
those participants which opted into the program on a voluntary basis. 
 
3.5.1 Determining Emissions Attribution 
Emissions allowances are allocated to participating entities based on the GHG 
emissions attributed to each participating entity. 
California 
California’s cap-and-trade program covers 85% of California’s total GHG 
emissions and is estimated to apply to approximately 700 entities.311 Under 
subsection 7430 of the US Code Title 42, California’s GHG emissions are 
recorded annually by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).312 The 
EPA Administrator is responsible for evaluating and improving the emissions 
estimating techniques used to record GHG emissions in the state.313 The EPA 
currently monitors the GHG emissions in six sectors: electricity, transportation, 
industry, commercial, residential, agriculture.314 Emissions in the electricity sector 
are determined by examining the fuel source used to create electricity as well as 
 
 311 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304 at 45-46. 
 312 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions 
[hereinafter EPA Sources of GHG Emissions]. 
 313 42 U.S.C. § 7430 (2012). 
 314 EPA Sources of GHG Emissions, supra note 312. 
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the amount of electricity consumed by end-use sectors.315 Transportation sector 
GHG emissions are monitored by assessing the emissions from each mode of 
transportation including cars, trucks, trains, ships, airplanes, pipelines, and 
lubricants.316 Industry sector GHG emissions are assessed by examining the 
emissions produced through industry activities such as burning fossil fuels, and 
the emissions associated with the energy used in the operation of the industrial 
buildings and equipment.317 Similarly, emissions in the commercial and residential 
sectors are assessed by determining the emissions directly produced through 
activities occurring within the commercial or residential property as well as the 
emissions attributed to the use of electricity to operate these properties.318 The 
EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) requires all facilities and 
suppliers to install and operate continuous emissions monitoring system 
(CEMS).319 A CEMS is considered the most accurate method of determining GHG 
emissions. The CEMS continuously gathers information about the quantity of 
gases being emitted.320 Emissions from fuel combustion are calculated with a 
combination of the CEMS, fuel composition data, and default emission factors321 
while process emissions are calculated with a combination of the CEMS, mass 
balance approach, site-specific or default emission factors.322 A mass balance 
approach is the difference between the carbon entering and exiting the process.323 
In the mass balance approach any unaccounted-for carbon is assumed to have been 
released as GHG emissions.324 Site-specific emission factors consists of 
performing periodic measurements of carbon emissions in feedstocks or stacks.325 
Default emission factors are based on average GHG emissions and these values 
are provided by the GHGRP.326 
Québec 
Québec’s cap-and-trade program covers 85% of Québec’s total GHG 
emissions and is estimated to apply to 132 entities.327 Québec attributes GHG 
emissions to participant entities through a self-report system. Under section 4 and 
5 of the regulation respecting mandatory reporting of certain emissions of 
 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: 
Best Available Monitoring Methods (BAMM), (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/ghgrp_bamm_factsheet.pdf. 
 320 Unites States Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: 
Emission Calculation Methodologies, (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/
ghgrp_methodology_factsheet.pdf [hereinafter EPA GHG Emission Calculation Methods]. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. 
 327 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 48-49. 
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contaminants into the atmosphere, all entities subject to the Environment Quality 
Act are required to report their annual GHG emissions using an online form that 
is submitted to the Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and 
Parks.328 The mandatory reporting requirements found in this regulation were 
amended in December 2011 and December 2012 in order to integrate Québec’s 
reporting system with the California reporting system to allow for linkage.329 
Ontario 
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program covered 80-85% of Ontario’s total GHG 
emissions and covered about 148 entities.330 Under section 72 of the Climate 
Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, the Minister of the 
Environment and Climate Change appointed a public servant as Director under the 
Act. The Director was responsible for the attribution of emissions to participating 
entities. Under section 6 of Ontario Regulation 144/16 the Director was to 
determine the attribution of GHG emissions based on four considerations 
including verification statements or reports made available to the Ministry, 
information obtained by the Director, and information obtained about similar GHG 
emitting activities.331 Upon determination of the amount of GHG emissions 
attributed to a participant entity, the Director was obligated to provide each 
participant entity with written notice.332 This written notice had to include the 
proposed amount of GHG emissions attributed to the participant along with an 
explanation detailing how the proposed amount was determined.333 
3.6 Emissions Allocation 
Under cap-and-trade schemes emission allowances are distributed either 
freely by government, are attributed through offset activities, or can be purchased 
privately on the market. 
California 
In California allowances are distributed either via auction held four times 
annually or by free allocation. Allocations differ according to sector. 
In California electrical distribution utilities and natural gas suppliers are 
utilities that receive allowances on behalf of their ratepayers (these are known as 
“consigning entities” and “consignment allowances”).334 Consigning entities are 
required to place all consignment allowances received for sale at the allowance 
 
 328 Regulation respecting mandatory reporting of certain emissions of contaminants into the 
atmosphere, Q-2 r 15, Division II at 4-5 (Que.). 
 329 Québec, Québec’s Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances: 
Technical Overview at 12, (2018) http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/
documents-spede/technical-overview.pdf. 
 330 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 50-51. 
 331 The Cap and Trade Program (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act), 
R.S.C., 2016 c. 7 § 6(1) (Can.) [hereinafter Reg 144/16]. 
 332 Id at § 6(2). 
 333 Id. 
 334 California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program Guidance for 
Allowance Consignment to Auction (Sept. 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
auction/consignment_guidance.pdf . 
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auctions.335 All natural gas and electric utilities must use the allowance value for 
ratepayer benefit and for emissions reductions. 
Industrial facilities receive allowances for transition assistance and to prevent 
carbon leakage. The amount of free allocation is determined by carbon leakage 
risk (which is measured through emissions intensity and trade exposure and is used 
to define assistance factors), sector-specific benchmarks and production volumes 
as well as a general cap-adjustment factor. In the Third Compliance Period (2018-
2020) the assistance factor is differentiated across sectors based on leakage risk. 
For the post-2020 compliance periods, assistance factors for allocation will be part 
of new rulemaking to reflect the direction provided in California Law AB 398 that 
specifies an assistance factor of 100%. 
The majority of industrial allocation is based on production benchmarks and 
is updated annually based on verified production data. There is no cap on the 
amount of industrial allocation. 
Other categories of transition assistance are provided for public wholesale 
water entities, legacy contract generators, universities, and public-service 
facilities. Remaining allowances are auctioned. In 2017 almost 70% of allowances 
were available through auction, including allowances from CARB as well as 
consignment allowances to utilities. 
Québec 
In Québec electricity and fuel distributors have to buy 100% of their 
allowances at auction (or on the market). Auctions are held quarterly. As of 
January 2018, Québec had held a total of 17 auctions, 13 jointly held with 
California. All auction revenues go to the Québec Green Fund. Unsold allowances 
in past auctions are removed and gradually released for sale at auction after two 
consecutive auctions are held in which the sale price is higher than the minimum 
price. In Québec, as of 2019, the allocation of free allowances will be made 
available to voluntary emitters in alignment with what is been established for 
regulated entities. 
In Québec a percentage of free allocation is accorded to emission intensive 
sectors subject to international competition. These include aluminum, lime, 
cement, chemical and petrochemicals, metallurgy, mining and pelletizing, pulp 
and paper, petroleum refinement and certain other sectors (manufacturing of 
glassware, electrodes, gypsum products and certain agro-foods). During Québec’s 
first compliance period (2013-2014) the historical emission intensity was adjusted 
for production level and by type of emission (100% for process emissions, 80% 
for combustion emissions and 100% for emissions from other sources). In the 
second compliance period (2015-2017) and subsequent periods allocation of free 
allowances is based on increasingly strict intensity targets (i.e. declining emissions 
intensity productivity) and on production levels. Since production volumes can 
vary, increasing intensity targets do not guarantee an absolute reduction in free 
allocation. 
 
 335 Id. 
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Ontario 
In Ontario fuel suppliers/distributors, electricity importers and most electricity 
generators needed to purchase allowances at auction or in the secondary market. 
Under the Ontario cap-and-trade legislation, participants were required to 
participate if they were 1) an electricity importer, 2) a facility or natural gas 
distributor that emitted 25,000t or more of CO2 annually, or 3) a fuel supplier that 
sold more than 200 L of fuel annually. In addition, participation in the Ontario 
scheme was voluntary for facilities that generate between 10,000-25,000t GHG 
emissions per year and for those participants who opted into the program on a 
voluntary basis. 
In Ontario’s First Compliance Period (2017-2020) eligible capped emitters 
were to receive emission allowances free of charge, but the rate of free allowances 
was expected to decrease over time. The rate of allowances being distributed free 
of charge to eligible capped emitters for the First Compliance Period was projected 
to decline over time at a rate of 4.57% per year for combustion emissions starting 
in 2018. 
3.6.1 Initiation of Activity 
An emissions allowance is an instrument created by a government and used to 
represent one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e).336 An allowance 
is distributed either by 1) initial allocation by the government, 2) through auctions 
or 3) sales. 
The government of each WCI jurisdiction has provided certain participants 
with free emission allowances. These allowances are given to large industry 
participants in an attempt to ease these participants into a market where GHG 
emissions are capped and priced. Specifically, larger participants are afforded the 
opportunity to slowly adjust to the new system by using free allowances to cover 
their GHG emissions. Participants are then able to focus on reducing their GHG 
emissions and begin transitioning to more environmentally clean technologies. 
Each WCI jurisdiction has created a set of mathematical formulas to calculate the 
initial emission allowances due to each industry participant. This reliance on 
mathematical formulas is an attempt to provide a data-driven, transparent view of 
how GHG reductions are counted towards each participant’s individual emission 
reduction target. 
California 
In California, initial emissions allocation is determined for each participant 
entity using one of the following calculation methods: (1) product-based 
allocation337, or (2) energy-based allocation.338 The government allocates a pre-
determined number of emissions allowances to participating entities free of 
charge. Entities are provided these free allowances based on the industry they are 
 
 336 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-trade in Ontario, at 4 
(2016), https://media.assets.eco.on.ca/web/2016/11/Appendix-A-Introduction-to-Cap-and-
Trade-in-Ontario.pdf. 
 337 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95891 (b) at 111 (2012). 
 338 Id. § 95891(c) . 
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part of and how efficient their facility is in comparison to the efficiency standards 
found in the rest of the industry.339 Subsection 95870 of Title 17 California Code 
of Regulations outlines the distribution of allowances under the cap-and-trade 
program.340 Entities involved in electric utilities, natural gas utilities, or industrial 
facilities are provided free allowances to meet their compliance obligations.341 
These compliance obligations are calculated using a complex formula found in 
Title 17 subsection 95852 of the California Code of Regulations.342 Based on these 
compliance obligations, emissions are allocated to electricity participant entities 
based on their long-term procurement plans343 while allowances are distributed to 
industry participants based on their GHG output in comparison to the industry 
benchmark standards for GHG emissions.344 Participant entities in the natural gas 
sector are given allowances based on their 2011 sales.345 To be eligible for direct 
allowances, industrial facilities and electrical utility participants are required to 
comply with Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulation 
(MRR) and must have received a positive verification statement under MRR the 
previous year.346 
Québec 
In Québec, participant entities required to participate in cap-and-trade may be 
eligible for free allowances. Entities identified in Table A of Part I of Appendix C 
of the Regulation Respecting a Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowances are provided with free allowances annually to meet their 
GHG reduction obligations based on their sector of work.347 These sectors include: 
aluminum, lime, cement, chemical and petrochemical industry, metallurgy, mining 
and pelletizing, pulp and paper, petroleum refining, glass containers, electrodes, 
gypsum products, and some agri-food establishments.348 Appendix C Part II of the 
same regulation dictates the calculations to be used in determining the amount of 
free allowances each participant entity shall be provided.349 On the 14th of January 
of each year the Minister will allocate 75% of the free allowances calculated to be 
provided to each entity.350 Once the annual emissions report is filed by the 
participant entity the remaining 25% of free allowances is adjusted and the 
Minister provides the participant entity with any remaining free allowances on 
September 14th of that year.351 
 
 339 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, California Cap-and-trade (2017), 
https://www.c2es.org/content/california-cap-and-trade. 
 340 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95870 (2012). 
 341 California Cap-and-trade, supra note 339. 
 342 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95852 (2012). 
 343 California Cap-and-trade, supra note 339. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. 
 346 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95890 at 136 (2012). 
 347 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances, 
Q-2 r 46.1 at 39 (Que.). 
 348 Ib. at Part II, Appendix C. 
    349  Id. at 40 and Part II, Appendix C. 
 350 Id. at 40. 
 351 Id. at 41. 
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Ontario 
Similarly, in Ontario participant entities were eligible for free allowances to 
meet their GHG emission reduction obligations. The amount of allowances to be 
distributed by the Minister each year was outlined in section 54 of Ontario 
Regulation 144/16.352 The Minister was permitted to distribute a certain 
undetermined number of these allowances to participant entities free of charge.353 
Any participant entities that were not involved in the following sectors could apply 
to receive free allowances: electricity (generation, transportation, importation), 
petroleum (production, supply), or natural gas distribution.354 The amount of free 
allowances distributed was projected to decrease each year by 4.57%, thereby 
requiring participant entities to implement new technologies to reduce their GHG 
emissions.355 
3.6.2 Permanent Cessation of Activity 
In California, when a participant entity ceases its activities permanently the 
participant must comply with subsection 95835 of the California Code of 
Regulations.356 This section describes the sequence of steps that must be followed 
in the event of a cessation of activities. First, the participant must return the total 
amount of distributed allowances to the Executive Officer of CARB by November 
1st of the year following the year in which the participant ceased activities.357 
Allowances are considered to have been returned the day after the allowances were 
removed from the compliance accounts.358 Second, the participant must ensure all 
compliance instruments have been transferred from its accounts prior to 
submitting a request that CARB close its CITSS accounts.359 After the completion 
of the previous two steps the participant’s accounts will be permanently closed.360 
In Québec, if a participant entity ceases its activities the participant must 
surrender to the Minister all free allowances received within 45 days of the last 
filed emissions report.361 
Similarly, in Ontario participants who permanently ceased activities had to 
return all allowances and credits to the Director by 8:00 p.m. November 1st of the 
year in which the last GHG report was filed.362 
 
 352 The Cap and Trade Program, supra note 331, at 54. 
 353 Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, R.S.C., 2016 c. 7 § 31(2) 
(Can.). 
 354 Ontario, Cap-and-Trade: Program Overview (Jul. 25 2018), https://www.ontario.ca/
page/cap-and-trade-program-overview#section-0. 
 355 Id. 
 356 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95835 (2012). 
 357 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95890(k) (2012). 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id. at 95835. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances, 
supra note 347, at 18. 
 362 The Cap and Trade Program, supra note 331, at 12. 
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3.7 Flexibility 
3.7.1 Banking and Borrowing of Allowances 
Banking allowances entails retaining unused emission allowances for a future 
year, while borrowing allowances consists of using allowances from a future year 
in the current year.363 The banking of allowances provides participating entities 
with greater flexibility in managing future business needs or investments by 
retaining extra unused allowances for use in future years when additional 
allowances may be required.364 While banking is common in cap-and-trade, 
borrowing is not common because it involves a deferral of emissions reductions 
which is contrary to the purpose of cap-and-trade.365 
All three WCI jurisdictions (California, Québec, Ontario) follow the same 
rules for banking and borrowing of allowances. All three jurisdictions permit the 
banking of emission allowances but restrict the emitter to a general holding limit, 
and all WCI jurisdictions do not allow borrowing.366 The holding limit for banking 
means that only a certain percentage of the total allowances can be banked.367 The 
holding limit for entities in all three WCI jurisdictions is calculated using the 
following formula368: 
Holding Limit = 0.1*Base + 0.025* (Annual Allowances Budget – Base) 
Where “base” is 25 MT of CO2e. 
Where “annual allowance budget” equals the total sum of all allowances 
issued by all WCI jurisdictions for the current year. 
It is important to note that since reserve allowances do not have a vintage year 
they cannot be banked or borrowed.369 
3.7.2 Offsets and Credits 
A carbon offset is a reduction in emissions of GHG made in order to 
compensate for or to offset an emission made elsewhere. A common project type 
generating offsets is renewable energy such as wind farms, biomass energy, or 
 
 363 International Carbon Action Partnership, Flexibility Provisions (Sept. 21, 2019), 
https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/flexibility-provisions. 
 364 Hewitt Roberts, Cap-and-Trade: The Basics, at 3-4 (2009) The Delphi Group, 
http://www.canadiancleanpowercoalition.com/files/2312/8087/6250/TR5%20-%20Cap-and-
Trade_--_the_basics.pdf . 
 365 Id. 
 366 Canada – Québec Cap-and-Trade System, supra note 300.; Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-Trade in Ontario: Appendix A to the ECO’s 
Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2016, at 14 (2016), media.assets.eco.on.ca [hereinafter ECO 
Intro to Cap-and-Trade Ontario Appendix A]. 
 367 Id. 
 368 California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program: Facts About 
Holding Limit for Linked Cap-and-Trade Programs, at 1 (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/holding_limit.pdf. 
 369 California Air Resources Board, Chapter 5: How do I Buy, Sell, and Trade Compliance 
Instruments?, at 21 (2012) https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter5.pdf. 
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hydroelectric dams. Other offset projects include energy efficiency projects, the 
destruction of industrial pollutants or agricultural byproducts, destruction of 
landfill methane, and forestry projects. 
California 
In California a quantitative limit of up to 8% of each entity’s compliance 
obligation may be made up of offsets.370 In addition, a qualitative limit is observed 
on the types of offsets that may be claimed. Currently, six offset types from the 
following offset protocols are accepted as compliance units: 371 
1) U.S. forest projects 
2) urban forest projects 
3) livestock projects (i.e. methane management) 
4) ozone-depleting substances projects 
5) mine methane capture (MMC) projects 
6) rice cultivation projects. 
According to AB 398, between 2021 and 2025 only 4% of an entity’s 
compliance obligations can be met with offsets, and the maximum portion of a 
compliance obligation that can be met using offsets will increase to no higher than 
6% thereafter. In addition, in those two intervals 50% of the offsets used to meet 
compliance obligations must be offsets that create a direct environmental benefit 
to the state of California.372 
Québec 
In Québec, a quantitative limit of up to 8% of each entity’s compliance 
obligation may be made up of offsets.373 In addition, a qualitative limit is observed 
on the types of offsets that may be claimed. Currently, the following five of types 
of offsets are accepted as compliance units originating from projects carried out 
according to five protocols adopted by the province:374 
1) CH4 destruction as part of products to cover manure storage facilities 
2) capture of gas from specified landfill sites 
 
 370 International Carbon Action Partnership, USA – California Cap-and-Trade Program, at 
3 (Mar. 9, 2018), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en
/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems[]=45. 
 371 Id. 
 372 Id. 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id. 
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3) destruction of certain ozone-depleting substances contained in 
insulating foam and of certain refrigerant gases recovered from domestic 
appliances in Canada 
4) capture and destruction of CH4 from a CH4 drainage system at an active 
underground or surface coal mine, except a mountaintop removal mine 
5) capture and destruction of CH4 from the ventilation system of an active 
underground coal mine. 
Québec is in the process of developing several new offset protocols. In 
addition to offsets developed by the province, offset protocols developed in 
jurisdictions linked with Québec will also be accepted to fulfill compliance 
obligations in Québec.375 When issuing offset credits the Minister will take 3% of 
the issued offset credits as a contingency which is then used as a reserve to keep 
the Minister’s Environmental Integrity Account filled.376 There are two situations 
in which the Minister may require a replacement of previously issued offset 
credits: (1) in the event that the documents completed for the receipt of offsets 
contain false, inaccurate, or missing information making the GHG emissions 
ineligible for the offset, or (2) the GHG emission reductions for which the offset 
application was approved are found to have been used to apply for offsets under 
another program.377 In these two situations if the offset credits cannot be recovered 
the equivalent of the unrecovered offset credits will be retired from the Minister’s 
Environmental Integrity Account. 
Ontario 
Similar to the other WCI jurisdictions, in Ontario there was a quantitative limit 
of up to 8% of each participant’s compliance obligation that could be made up of 
offsets.378 In addition, a qualitative limit was observed on the types of offsets that 
could be claimed. Three offset types were created in Ontario via the following 
offset protocols379: 
1) GHG reductions at eligible landfills 
2) GHG reductions at coal mines 
3) the collection and destruction of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). 
 
 375 Id. 
 376 Id. 
 377 Id. 
 378 Ontario offset credits (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act), 
R.S.C., 2016 c. 7 § 539/17 (Can.). 
 379 Ontario, Ontario’s carbon offsets programs (July 25, 2018), https://www.ontario.ca
/page/ontarios-carbon-offsets-programs. 
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At the time of the cancellation of Ontario’s cap-and-trade program in July 
2018 the province was working on 10 additional protocols with the goal of 
November 1, 2021 for completing these offset protocols.380 
3.7.3 Price Management 
A carbon price is a monetary cost put on the emission of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere. Because of that price, regulators need to take care in ensuring that 
the market price is not unduly high or low. Too high a price may retard growth 
and innovation whereas too low a price may discourage the attainment of climate 
change goals. 
3.7.3.1 Price Containment Reserves 
Price containment reserves act as a soft ceiling for allowance prices and are 
used to prevent spikes in allowance prices.381 Allowance price containment 
reserves refer to the setting aside of a certain percentage of allowances per year 
for use in the event that the price of allowances reaches a set price ceiling.382 Once 
set aside, these allowances are sorted into three tiers and assigned a selling price 
based on the tier. These assigned prices increase annually by five percent plus 
inflation.383 In 2018 the tiers in California were priced at USD $54.26, $61.06, and 
$67.83.384 However, as of 2021 California will no longer use price containment 
reserves as a soft ceiling but instead will implement a hard ceiling where these 
reserve allowances will be available at a maximum price.385 
3.7.3.2 Price Floors and Price Ceilings 
Price ceilings and price floors are containment mechanisms intended to limit 
prices within an emissions trading system, thereby stabilizing the market.386 A 
price ceiling “[limits] the risk that carbon prices exceed acceptable levels if 
constraining emission turns out to be more expensive than expected.”387 Price 
ceilings also provide greater cost certainty to emitters.388 A price floor sets a price 
below which carbon permits cannot be sold and therefore functions as a minimum 
 
 380 The province’s website pertaining to the canceled program noted that “Ontario is working 
with the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) to develop protocols for use in creating offset credits 
for Ontario’s carbon market. As part of that work, CAR is coordinating significant stakeholder 
consultations.” Ontario, “Ontario’s carbon offsets programs” (Jul. 25, 2018), 
www.ontario.ca/page/ontarios-carbon-offsets-programs. 
 381 Environmental Defense Fund & IETA Climate Challenges Market Solutions, California: 
An Emissions Trading Case Study, at 2-6 (Jan. 2018), https://www.ieta.org/resources/
Resources/Case_Studies_Worlds_Carbon_Markets/2018/California-Case-Study-Jan2018.pdf. 
 382 Id. at 3. 
 383 Id. 
 384 Id. 
 385 Id. 
 386 ICF Consulting Canada, Long-term Carbon Price Forecast Report, EB-2016-0359, at 10 
(July 19, 2017), https://www.oeb.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/OEB-LTCPF-Report-
20170531.pdf [hereinafter ICF Consulting Canada 2017]. 
 387 Peter John Wood & Frank Jotzo, Price Floors for Emissions Trading, 39 Energy Pol’y 
1746, 1746-1747 (2011) [hereinafter Wood and Jotzo 2011]. 
 388 Id. 
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selling price.389 A price floor also provides greater certainty and ensures that prices 
will not collapse to near zero.390 This price floor should also reflect the full costs 
imposed on society by carbon pollution.391 Overall, a combined system of price 
ceilings and price floors can reduce the risk and price volatility in carbon markets, 
which has been a point of concern in other cap-and-trade markets, specifically the 
EU ETS.392 
The WCI has implemented both a price ceiling and price floor. The price 
ceiling is created in the form of a Reserve Account. A percentage of allowances 
within each jurisdiction’s cap is placed in the Reserve Account annually where 
these allowances are given a substantially higher sale price and not available at 
auction.393 Allowances in the Reserve Account are organized into tiers with 
increasing prices.394 When the price of allowances at auction approaches that of 
the reserve price the government can decide to auction the reserve allowances at 
the stated tier reserve price, thereby flooding the market and dampening price 
increases.395 
The three WCI partner jurisdictions agreed to a soft price floor in the sale of 
allowances at auction. The agreed upon price floor started at $10 per tonne (CAD 
and USD) in 2012 and the price floor increased annually by five percent plus an 
adjustment for inflation until 2020.396 Each WCI jurisdiction was to implement 
their own hard price floors and ceilings. 
California 
In California, recent amendments to section 38562 of the California Health 
and Safety Code require the state to have a price ceiling from January 1, 2021 to 
December 31, 2030.397 The price ceiling will be the equivalent of the selling price 
for allowances in the Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) and any 
additional allowances that are sold by CARB when the APCR is exhausted.398 
California’s 2018 current auction reserve floor price was USD $14.53.399 
Québec 
In Québec, the ceiling price is created by the Minister of Sustainable 
Development who is permitted to hold a reserve sale in the event that the demand 
 
 389 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386. 
 390 Wood & Jotzo 2011, supra note 387. 
 391 Id. 
 392 Id. 
 393 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386, at 10-11. 
 394 Id. at 11. 
 395 Id. 
 396 Id.; Quebec, The Québec cap-and-trade system: Strengths and Advantages, at 6 (Jan. 21, 
2016), http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/strengths-
advantages.pdf. 
 397 HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 140, § 38562. 
 398 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, From Plan to Progress, Appendix A: Changes 
to California’s Cap-and-trade System under AB 398, at 2 (2018), http://www.eco.on.ca. 
 399 Ontario, 2018 annual auction reserve price notice (1 Dec. 2017), 
https://www.ontario.ca/page/2018-annual-auction-reserve-price-notice [hereinafter Ontario 
2018 reserve auction notice]. 
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for allowances far exceeds supply.400 Only four reserve sales may be held each 
year.401 These reserve sales are restricted to covered participants by virtue of the 
Regulation Respecting a Cap-and-Trade system for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Allowances under the Environment Quality Act.402 In order to hold a reserve sale, 
a percentage of the distributed allowances is placed in the reserve each year and is 
broken down into different tiers.403 The allowances are assigned a selling price 
based on the tier in which they are held. In 2013 the tier prices were CAD $30, 
$45, and $50.404 Since then these prices have increased annually by five percent 
plus inflation.405 In joint auctions between Québec and California, the price floor 
is to be the higher of the Québec and California price floors taking into account 
exchange rate and comparing the prices in USD.406 Québec’s 2018 current auction 
reserve floor price was CAD $14.35.407 
Ontario 
Ontario’s price floor and ceiling were consistent with the WCI approach. 
Ontario placed five percent of its total annual allowances in a Cost Containment 
Reserve where reserve prices were assigned to three tiers with prices consistent 
with the California and Québec reserve prices.408 Ontario’s reserve prices were 
significantly higher than auction prices, aligned with WCI reserve prices, and 
increased by five percent plus inflation annually.409 Similar to the other WCI 
jurisdictions, if the auction price for allowances approached the reserve price the 
Ontario government could choose to hold a reserve sale, selling allowances at the 
reserve price.410 Ontario’s 2018 current auction reserve floor price was CAD 
$14.68.411 Taking into account the exchange rate between USD and CAD, in 2018 
Ontario had the highest floor price of all three WCI jurisdictions.412 
3.8 Registration 
Registration is a key feature of emissions trading under WCI linked emission 
trading schemes. Registration helps to verify the identity of participants and instill 
security and discipline in trading arrangements. 
 
 400 Quebec, The Québec cap-and-trade system: Strengths and Advantages, at 7 (Jan. 21, 
2016) http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/strengths-
advantages.pdf. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. 
 403 Id. 
 404 Id. 
 405 Id. 
 406 Id at 6. 
 407 Ontario 2018 reserve auction notice, supra note 399. 
 408 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386, at 13. 
 409 Id. 
 410 Id. 
 411 Ontario 2018 reserve auction notice, supra note 399. 
 412 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386, at 13. 
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California 
All entities participating in the WCI cap-and-trade program are required to 
have a CITSS account in order to participate in auctions, hold or transfer 
compliance instruments. There are two steps to registration under CITSS: (1) user 
registration and (2) opening an account. To register for an account both a primary 
account representative (PAR) and an alternate account representative (AAR) must 
be registered with CITSS for an entity.413 Both of these individuals must first 
complete the user registration for CITSS by submitting an online form and 
providing hard copies of supporting documents to CITSS. The online application 
form requires the submission of general personal information such as the 
individual’s name, address, and employer. The supporting documents include the 
completion of the User Registration Checklist, User Registration Form, and Proof 
of Identity Form.414 The Proof of Identity Form must be accompanied by a 
notarized copy of a government issued identity document, proof of employment, 
and proof of having an open bank account.415 
Once both of these representatives are approved by CARB they will receive 
their User ID which allows them to complete the application for the creation of 
accounts for an entity. This application process also requires the submission of an 
electronic application form in addition to providing hard copies mailed to the 
California Registrar. The structure of the corporation will need to be disclosed 
through the completion of the Corporate Associations and Structure Form.416 
Forms must be signed by the PAR, the AAR and an officer or director of the entity 
for which the accounts are being created.417 Each person being registered for the 
CITSS program cannot have more than one role. For instance, the PAR cannot 
also be the AAR.418 
Québec 
All covered GHG emitters are required to register in CITSS as an emitter. In 
addition, any person who is domiciled or owns an establishment in Canada may 
voluntarily register as a participant in the cap-and-trade system in order to 
purchase, hold, sell or voluntarily withdraw emission allowances. 
Any emitter that owns an establishment covered by regulations in both 
jurisdictions will have to open a CITSS account in each one. It should be noted, 
however, that already-registered emitters may not also register as simple 
participants. Non-emitting participants may elect to register either in Québec or 
California in order to participate in the linked carbon market. 
 
 413 California Environmental Protection Agency, User Guide – Volume I User Registration 
and Profile Management: Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS), at 4 (Dec. 
2012), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/vol1citssguide-7-21-
16.pdf [hereinafter CEPA User Guide CITSS]. 
 414 Id at 7-8. 
 415 Id. 
 416 California Air Resources Board, Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/
markettrackingsystem.htm. 
 417 CEPA User Guide CITSS, supra note 413, at 4. 
 418 Id at 7-8. 
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Québec follows a registration process similar to that used in California. There 
are two steps to registration: (1) user registration, and (2) opening an account.419 
Each account must have both a primary account representative (PAR) and an 
additional account representative (AAR).420 These individuals must both be 
registered as users in CITSS. User registration requires the completion of an online 
application form on the CITSS website in addition to the completion of the 
following documents to be mailed to the Carbon Market Division of the Québec 
Ministry of the Environment in Québec City: user registration checklist, user 
registration form including user ID, attestation of verification of identity and 
designation.421 The attestation of verification of identity form must be notarized 
and submitted along with proof of identity and proof of a deposit bank account.422 
Once the users are registered with CITSS, one of the users may submit a 
completed account application form on behalf of the entity they are 
representing.423 This involves completing an online application form found on the 
CITSS website in addition to completing the account application checklist, and 
account application with attestations form that are both generated on CITSS. These 
forms must be signed by both the PAR, the AAR and an officer or director of the 
entity being represented.424 The structure and business relationship disclosure form 
must also be completed, signed and submitted. All documents must be mailed to 
Carbon Market Division of Québec Ministry of the Environment in Québec 
City.425 
Ontario 
In Ontario, all covered emitters had to be registered in CITSS and any entity 
with at least one facility producing 10,000 to 25,000 tonnes of GHG emissions 
annually could register as a voluntary participant.426 
The deadline for mandatory participants to register in the program in 2017 and 
onwards was set-out in the Ontario Cap-and-trade Regulation 144/16, s. 24(1).427 
Generally speaking, a person required to have a GHG report verified was required 
to register as a mandatory participant by September 1st of the year following 
specified GHG activities at a facility.428 Certain categories of mandatory 
participants, electricity importers, natural gas distributors, or petroleum product 
supply, were also subject to more detailed reporting requirements. Specifically, 
they were required to report activity prior to September 1st of the same year or 
prior to March 31st if the activity occurred after September 1st of that year.429 
 
 419 Québec, The Carbon Market: Cap-and-Trade System (C&T) Registration (2018), 
http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/inscription-spede-en.html. 
 420 Id. 
 421 Id. 
 422 Id. 
 423 Id. 
 424 Id. 
 425 Id. 
 426 Ontario, Cap-and-Trade: Register as a voluntary participant (Jul. 25, 2018) 
https://www.ontario.ca/page/cap-and-trade-register-voluntary-participant. 
 427 Reg. 144/16, supra note 331, at 21-27. 
 428 Id. 
 429 Id at 24. 
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All mandatory participants were required to have begun the registration 
process and submitted the completed hard copy of their registration for Ministry 
review prior to November 30, 2016 in order to comply with requirements for 
registration in the cap-and-trade program.430 
Voluntary participants in the Ontario cap-and-trade program had to register in 
CITSS no later than September 1st in order to become a voluntary participant for 
the following year.431 Market participants could apply any time after 2017 for 
CITSS registration.432 
All mandatory participants, voluntary participant and market participants in 
Ontario were required to register for a CITSS account in order to participate in 
auctions and the transfer of compliance instruments.433 The CITSS registration 
process in Ontario was very similar to the California and Québec CITSS 
registration processes. Ontario used the same two-step process: (1) recognition as 
an account agent (user registration) and (2) participant registration (the account 
application). Entities had to have both a primary account representative (PAR) and 
at least one alternate account representative (AAR) registered as users in CITSS 
prior to applying for participant registration.434 Recognition as an account agent 
required the completion of an online application form and the completion of the 
following forms in hard copy: recognition as an account agent registration 
checklist, recognition as an account agent registration form, proof of identity form, 
identity verification and attestation form (including two copies of government 
identification documents and a letter of attestation), a letter of attestation of 
identity from a bank.435 Once the users were approved, one user could complete 
the application for participant registration which included the completion of an 
online form as well as the completion of the following documents in hard copy: 
participant registration checklist, participant registration form, voluntary 
participant registration form, business relationship disclosure form, and a letter of 
authorization (if not submitted during user registration).436 Once the users and 
participants had their registration approved they were able to participate in WCI 
auctions and the transfer of compliance instruments. 
3.9 Reporting 
Reporting in an accurate and timely manner is required to maintain an 
effective cap-and-trade program. Reporting requirements were an important part 
of the discussions surrounding the creation of the WCI. Therefore, the reporting 
mechanisms used in all three WCI jurisdictions are very similar. 
California 
In California, participants use a web-based reporting tool known as California 
Electronic Greenhouse Gas Reporting Tool (Cal e-GGRT). This tool manages the 
 
 430 Id at 22. 
 431 Register as a voluntary participant, supra note 426. 
 432 Id. 
 433 Id. 
 434 Id. 
 435 Id. 
 436 Id. 
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reporting, certification, submission and verification of GHG emissions data. All 
emitters must register as users in this tool and create an electronic signature that 
permits them to certify and submit their emissions data without a written signature. 
The submitted emissions report is then automatically sent to the regulatory agency. 
This tool is completely secure with many firewall security systems as protection 
as well as the inability to access the information on this account without a 
registered user account. To ensure security the third-party verifier must also be 
registered in the reporting system for read-only access to the emissions data 
reports. 
California’s reporting requirements are set out in Assembly Bill 32. The 
Regulation for the mandatory reporting of GHG was updated on September 1, 
2017 and was effective beginning January 1, 2018.437 This amended regulation 
requires that all participants submit their GHG emissions reports annually no later 
than April 10th.438 However, electric supply entities have until June 1st to submit 
their GHG emission reports.439 For entities that emit less than 25,000 metric tonnes 
of CO2 emissions there is the option of completing an abbreviated GHG emission 
reporting form if they do not have a compliance obligation for the current year, are 
not subject to the reporting provisions, and they are an electric power entity.440 
Québec 
In Québec, participants use a web-based tool similar to that used in California, 
known as the Québec Air Emissions Inventory (Inventaire québécois des 
émissions atmosphériques, or IQEA). This reporting system serves the same 
function as the California system in that it manages the reporting, certification, 
submission and verification of GHG emissions data. The Québec system also 
requires participants to register as users and create their own electronic signature 
to certify and submit their emissions data. The data is then automatically sent to 
the regulatory agency. Similar to the California system, Québec has strong firewall 
features to protect the security of the reporting system as well as a requirement for 
the third-party verifier to register in the reporting system in order to have read-
only access to emissions data reports. 
Québec’s reporting requirements are set out in the Environmental Quality Act 
and specifically the Regulation respecting mandatory reporting of certain 
emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere. Reports must be completed 
annually on June 1st.441 This report must include the use of any offset protocols 
and the emitter’s total GHG emissions in metric tonnes of CO2 in accordance with 
the calculation identified in section 6.2 of the Regulation. Québec and California 
compared their regulations surrounding reporting several times to ensure 
 
 437 California Air Resources Board, Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Regulation 
(2018), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/mrr-regulation. 
 438 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95103(e) (2012). 
 439 Id. 
 440 Id. at reg 95103(a). 
 441 Quebec, Mandatory reporting of certain emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere 
(2018), http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/air/declar_contaminants/index-en.htm. 
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harmonization of the reporting requirements, with the final amended Québec 
regulations being enacted in December 2016.442 
Ontario 
Ontario’s GHG emissions reporting requirements were set out in Ontario 
Regulation 143/16; however, specific rules for reporting were identified in the 
following legislation and associated regulations: Environmental Protection Act, 
Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, Ontario Regulation 
143/16, Ontario Regulation 452/09, and the Guideline for Quantification, 
Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2017. Table 1 below 
should be used to determine which documents were to be consulted for quantifying 
the entity’s annual GHG emissions. 
A GHG report had to be submitted every year by June 1st, for the previous 
year’s reporting period. Example: June 1, 2018, for the reporting year 2017. A 
GHG emissions report had to be submitted using the Environment and Climate 
Change Canada’s Single Window System. This system allowed a user to submit, 
view and update their information using Environment and Climate Change Canada 
applications. 
In Ontario, the following entities were required to report their GHG emissions 
annually: fuel suppliers placing more than 200 L on the Ontario market, electricity 
importers, natural gas distributors emitting more than 25,000t of GHG emissions 
annually, and facilities generating 25,000t or more of GHG emissions annually.443 
 
  
 
 442 Id. 
 443 Quantification, reporting, and verification of greenhouse gas emissions (Climate Change 
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act) at Table 2, R.S.O., 2016 c. 7 § 143/16 (Ont.). 
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Table 1: Determining which documents to consult for quantifying annual 
GHG emissions. 
Ontario, Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: The rules for reporting greenhouse 
gas emissions (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-greenhouse-gas-
ghg-emissions. 
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Table 2: Which entities are required to report annual GHG emissions. 
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Ontario, “Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: The rules for reporting greenhouse 
gas emissions” (20 March 2014), online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-
greenhouse-gas-ghg-emissions>. 
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Ontario, “Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: The rules for reporting greenhouse 
gas emissions” (20 March 2014), online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-
greenhouse-gas-ghg-emissions>. 
3.10 Verification 
Third party verifiers are used by California and Québec to ensure consistent 
quality of GHG emissions reports. Operators must implement internal audit, 
quality assurance and control systems for the reporting program and the data 
reported. 
The ISO (International Organization for Standardization) provides standards 
accepted worldwide for a variety of industries. All three WCI jurisdictions require 
that the verification of GHG emission reports meet the ISO 14064 standards. ISO 
14064 is the standard for programs aimed at reducing GHG emissions and 
emissions trading. This 14064 standard consists of three verification and validation 
standards, as follows: 
 
• ISO 14064-1 are standards set for the organizational level of GHG 
emissions reporting. 
• ISO 14064-2 are standards set for the project level of GHG emissions 
reporting. 
• ISO 14064-3 are standards set for the validation and verification of 
GHG assertions. 
 
In addition, ISO 14065 compliments ISO 14064 by setting standards for the 
accreditation of recognized GHG validation and verification bodies. These ISO 
14064 standards are used by California and Québec in their verification of GHG 
reports, and these standards were intended to be used by Ontario as well until the 
cancellation of Ontario’s cap-and-trade program. 
California 
In California, the following entities are required to have their GHG emissions 
reports verified: entities emitting over 25,000 CO2e annually, electricity importers 
or exporters, entities with a compliance obligation in the current compliance 
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period, and entities that do not meet the requirements for cessation of 
verification.444 These entities are required to obtain annual verification from a 
recognized verification body and must submit this verification information to 
CARB’s Executive Officer annually prior to August 10th.445 Entities must ensure 
that they do not use the same verification body for more than six consecutive years 
beginning on the date in which the verification body was contacted for the use of 
their services.446 
Québec 
In Québec, all mandatory and voluntary emitters must obtain verification from 
an ISO 14065 accredited body and file a verification report prior to June 1st.447 
The verification process requires that the verifier or a representative for the verifier 
must visit each of the emitter’s facility at least once.448 However, for emitters that 
transport or distribute electricity or natural gas the verifier is only required to visit 
a representative sampling of their facilities.449 
Ontario 
In Ontario, GHG emission reports were required to be verified for all entities 
that emitted 25,000t or more of GHG emissions annually. Verification reports had 
to comply with ISO 14064 and 14065 and had to be submitted prior to September 
1st.450 Lists of eligible organizations that could verify emissions reports were 
available from the Standards Council of Canada (SCC) and the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI). A GHG report had to be reviewed impartially. If a 
conflict of interest existed related to the GHG report being verified a mitigation 
plan had to be submitted to the Ministry of the Environment and Climate 
Change.451 
A verification statement confirms that there is no material discrepancy in the 
completed GHG emission reports.452 The third-party verifier would evaluate 
reports to determine that any errors in emissions due to measurements or 
calculations are fewer than 5%, any errors in production data are fewer than 0.1% 
(starting in 2017), and that the report was prepared according to the rules and 
guidelines under the law.453 
An accredited verification body (“AVB”) had to provide their clients with a 
verification statement and verification report to confirm the review of the client’s 
 
 444 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95103(f), 95130 (2012). 
 445 Id. 
 446 Id. at 95130(a)(2). 
 447 International Carbon Action Partnership, Canada- Québec Cap-and-Trade System, at 4 
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/
?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=73. 
 448 Mandatory reporting of certain emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere, supra note 
441, at 6.8. 
 449 Id. 
 450 O. Reg. 143/16, supra note 443, at 27. 
 451 Id. at 31. 
 452 Id. at 32. 
 453 Id. 
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GHG report.454 To properly complete a verification statement, the applicable 
verification statement template had to be used. For the 2017 reporting year and 
onward, there were two different templates based on activity type. However, there 
was no template for the verification report. 
3.11 Monitoring 
Well-functioning markets for allowances and offset credits are fundamental to 
the implementation of a cap-and-trade program. To ensure that these markets are 
free of abuse and disruptive activity and that they appropriately reflect the supply 
and demand for compliance instruments, all three programs conduct regular 
market surveillance and analysis. In the creation of WCI, Inc., the WCI 
jurisdictions created a shared market monitoring system to be implemented by 
WCI, Inc.455 To ensure compliance with the WCI market practices and to avoid 
abuse or unlawful activities within the WCI system, Monitoring Analytics, a 
private company in Eagleville, Pennsylvania, has been retained by WCI, Inc. as 
the WCI market monitor.456 In addition, the two continuing WCI jurisdictions 
work with Monitoring Analytics to track and analyze the operation and 
transactions within the WCI allowance auctions.457 Monitoring Analytics is an 
independent third party which is responsible for reviewing auction procedures for 
fairness, auditing and monitoring auctions to ensure compliance with procedures 
and auction protocols, detecting flaws in the auction process, preparing reports on 
market trends, and advising on ways to improve the market and auctions.458 If 
manipulative or anti-competitive behavior is detected in the bidding process, 
Monitoring Analytics will communicate this concern to the relevant WCI 
jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction will be responsible for conducting a further 
investigation, as well as prosecuting the offence when required.459 The offence will 
be prosecuted in accordance with the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. 
3.12 Enforcement 
Each WCI jurisdiction has the authority to enforce compliance for any 
violations that arise within that jurisdiction. However, similar enforcement 
strategies and penalties are shared among all WCI jurisdictions. 
California 
When a participating entity does not provide sufficient compliance 
instruments to meet their compliance obligations, California imposes a three-for-
 
 454 Id. at 32-33. 
 455 Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 5. 
 456 California Air Resources Board, Market Program Monitoring (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/marketmonitoring/marketmonitoring.htm. 
 457 Id. 
 458 Air Resources Board, Cap-and-Trade: Market Oversight and Enforcement (Oct. 20, 
2011),, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/market_oversight.pdf. 
 459 “California-Québec-Ontario Joint Auction Participant Training Presentation (Ontario 
Version)”, California Air Resources Board, Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment 
and the Fight Against Climate Change, Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate 
Change (January 2018) at 91, wci-auction.org. 
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one penalty. Specifically, the participating entity must surrender four compliance 
instruments for each compliance instrument the entity failed to present at the 
required time: one of which is permanently retired, and three are made available 
at the next auction.460 There is a requirement that no more than twenty-five percent 
of the four compliance instruments surrendered can be offsets.461 
If the participating entity refuses to comply with the above three-for-one 
penalty, the next penalties imposed are set out in section 38580 of the California 
Health and Safety Code. Penalties for violation of the Health and Safety Code can 
include convictions of a misdemeanor, fines, and imprisonment. The penalties 
associated with submitting incorrect information or omitting information under the 
Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Regulation are a finding of guilt of a 
misdemeanor and a fine of no more than $75,000.462 In determining the fine to 
impose for a violation of the Health and Safety Code, CARB will consider the 
following: extent of harm, nature and continuation of the violation, duration of 
time of the violation, frequency of violations, record of maintenance, the nature of 
the equipment, actions taken to mitigate the violation, financial burden, and other 
circumstances.463 Each metric ton of carbon dioxide emitted but not reported is a 
separate violation, as is each day that a reporting violation continues.464 
CARB can impose civil or criminal penalties for manipulating the market, 
cornering the market, fraud, attempted fraud, and for false or inaccurate reports.465 
The maximum administrative civil penalties CARB can impose is up to $500 per 
violation.466 The penalty scheme for civil penalties, shown below, has an 
escalating set of steps based on intent, or lack thereof, from strict liability with the 
lowest maximum fines, to willful and intentional actions carrying the highest 
maximum fines:467 
 
Type of Violation/Level of 
Intent 
Maximum Civil Penalty 
Knowing violation of rule, law, 
permit, etc.468 
$40,000  
Knowing false statement or 
document469 
$35,000  
 
 460 International Carbon Action Partnership, Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on 
Design and Implementation 132 (2016) [hereinafter ICAP Handbook on Design]. 
 461 Id. 
 462 HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 140, § 42400.3. 
 463 Id., §42400.8. 
 464 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95107(a)-(c). 
 465 California Environmental Protection Agency, Facts About Cap-and-Trade: Market 
Oversight and Enforcement (Oct. 20 2011), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
market_oversight.pdf. 
 466 HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 140, § 42402.5. 
 467 Id. § 42402. 
 468 Id. § 42402.2(a). 
 469 Id. § 42402.4. 
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Willful and intentional 
violation470 
$75,000  
Failure to take corrective action 
after known emission471 
$40,000  
Negligent violation472 $25,000  
Strict liability violation473 $1,000 or $10,000  
 
Québec 
In Québec, when a participating entity fails to remit the adequate number of 
compliance instruments for their compliance obligation they will be notified of the 
infraction and may be subject to the three-for-one penalty.474 Similar to 
California’s three-for-one penalty, the entity will be required to surrender each 
missing compliance instrument, as well as three compliance instruments per 
missing compliance instrument.475 For example, if one compliance instrument is 
not appropriately submitted prior to the November 1st deadline, the entity will then 
be required to submit four compliance instruments according to the three-for-one 
penalty. 
In addition to the above penalty, a participant entity can be subject to a fine 
between $3,000 and $50,000 for a natural person, or $10,000 and $3,000,000 for 
corporations.476 A natural person may also be subject to a maximum of eighteen 
months in jail.477 In the event that the entity has committed a previous offence, the 
fine may be doubled, and the Minister may restrict distribution of allowances to 
that entity.478 It is important to note that the offence if committed for more than 
one day is considered a new offence each day the offence continues.479 A 
participant entity may also be suspended from participating in auctions, or have 
emission allowances distributed by the Minister either suspended, withdrawn, or 
cancelled.480 
In determining whether to impose an administrative or penal sanction, the 
Minister shall take into consideration that the intentions behind imposing such 
sanctions are to remedy the current infraction and deter future infractions.481 In 
addition, the determination of whether to impose such a sanction shall consider: 
the positions held by individuals who impose sanctions, the requirements for 
appointing such individuals, the guidance used in making the decision to impose 
 
 470 Id. § 42402.3(a). 
 471 Id. § 42402.2(a). 
 472 Id. § 42402.1(a). 
 473 Id. § 42402(a)-(b); Alison B. Torbitt, Jessica E. Intrator & Elaine Enfonde, “Now + Next: 
Nixon Peabody Environmental Law Alert” (April 15, 2014). 
 474 Environmental Quality Act, Q-2 at 115.15 [hereinafter, EQA]. 
 475 ICAP Handbook on Design, supra note 460, at 132; and ICAP Status Report 2018, supra 
note 298, at 49. 
 476 ICAP Handbook on Design, supra note 460, at 132. 
 477 Id. 
 478 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 49. 
 479 EQA, supra note 474, §115.22. 
 480 Id. § 46.12. 
 481 Id. § 115.13. 
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sanctions, priority of the circumstances, and procedures involved in imposing 
sanctions.482 When imposing a monetary sanction, the Minister shall consider the 
following criteria: consequences (real or possible), vulnerability of the location 
affected, nature of the infraction, frequency of the infraction, mitigation of 
damages, consequences to the Ministry or Government, and unacceptable conduct 
by the offender.483 
In the event that a monetary administrative penalty is imposed on a participant 
entity, the penalty may be sent for review within thirty days after the participant 
entity receives the notice of claim.484 The participant entity then has the 
opportunity to present their reasoning for appeal, and the person reviewing has the 
authority to confirm, quash, or vary the original decision.485 If the decision is 
confirmed, the participant has the right to appeal the decision to the Administrative 
Tribunal of Québec.486 
Ontario 
In Ontario, when a participant entity fails to surrender sufficient compliance 
instruments to satisfy their compliance obligation, the participant is subject to a 
three-for-one penalty.487 Similar to California and Québec, the three-for-one 
penalty in Ontario requires the participant to submit three compliance instruments 
for each compliance instrument that was not surrendered, in addition to the 
quantity of compliance instruments that were required to be surrendered. 
In addition to the three-for-one penalty, an entity that was a corporation could 
be subject to a fine between $25,000 and $6,000,000, where $25,000 would be 
fined each day the compliance instruments were missing until they were 
surrendered or the fine reached $6,000,000.488 An entity that was a natural person 
could be subject to a fine of between $5,000 and $4,000,000, as well as a maximum 
of five years imprisonment.489 When the violating entity committed previous 
offences the value of the imposed fine could be increased.490 
The gravity of the penalty in Ontario reflects the existence of aggravating 
factors and the severity of those factors. Specifically, the court was to consider the 
following: intention, recklessness, purpose of increasing revenue or decreasing 
costs, previous warnings, endeavor to hide the offence, failure to co-operate with 
the Ministry, failure to mitigate consequences or damages, action to limit the risk 
of future offences, and any other circumstances.491 Restitution orders could also 
be imposed in circumstances where harm was caused to another person.492 
 
 482 Id. 
 483 Id. § 115. 
 484 Id. § 115.17. 
 485 Id. § 115.19. 
 486 Id. § 115.20. 
 487 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 51. 
 488 Id.; Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, SO 2016, c7, s 
51(4) (2016) [hereinafter, Climate Change Act]. 
 489 Climate Change Act, supra note 488, s 51(5). 
 490 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 51. 
 491 Climate Change Act, supra note 488, § 53(1). 
 492 Id. § 54(1). 
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Administrative penalties of less than one million dollars could be imposed to 
motivate continued compliance with Ontario acts and regulations, as well as 
ensuring the individual or entity that committed the offence did not receive any 
benefit from the offence.493 If an imposed fine was not paid, the Director had the 
authority to suspend the entity’s auction account or impose other penalties.494 
Cap-and-Trade Litigation 
Since its inception, the WCI cap-and-trade program has been the subject of 
only limited litigation in WCI jurisdictions. So far, all of this litigation has arisen 
in California. The first action brought against CARB with respect to cap-and-trade 
was the matter of Association of Irritated Residents v. CARB in June 2009.495 In 
that case the Association of Irritated Residents argued that the Scoping Plan, 
outlined by CARB to reduce carbon emissions, was not strict enough and should 
be viewed merely as a minimum standard and not as a final goal. The argument 
was also made that CARB failed to consider alternatives to the cap-and-trade 
program prior to the program’s initiation. On December 6, 2011, the California 
Superior Court “approved an expanded environmental analysis of alternatives to a 
cap-and-trade program for implementing AB 32.”496 
In 2012, the matter of Coalition for a Safe Environment v. CARB was brought 
before the EPA. The dispute involved a complaint that federal civil rights 
regulations were being violated by the cap-and-trade program.497 Specifically, the 
Coalition for a Safe Environment argued that “a cap-and-trade program’s potential 
adverse co-pollutant impacts on communities constitute discrimination in 
violation of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act.”498 On July 12, 2012 the 
complaint was rejected by the EPA “as not ripe for review.”499 
In March 2012, the matter of Citizens Climate Lobby v. CARB was brought 
before the California Superior Court by two environmental groups.500 The Citizens 
Climate Lobby opposed the use of offsets in the cap-and-trade program, stating 
that offsets would not result in additional reductions of GHG emissions.501 The 
California Superior Court denied the petition, stating that “the Global Warming 
Solutions Act gave the California Air Resources Board vast discretion to develop 
 
 493 Id. §§ 57(1) and 57(8). 
 494 Id. § 57(16). 
 495 Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Lessons from the California 
Lawsuits, 10 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1 (2014) at 10 [hereinafter, Kaswan 
2014]. 
 496 Association of Irritated Residents v California Air Resources Board, Sabin Center for 
Climate Change Law (2018), http://climatecasechart.com/case/assoc-of-irritated-residents-v-
cal-air-resources-board/. 
 497 Kaswan 2014, supra note 495, at 14. 
 498 Ibid. 
 499 Coalition for a Safe Environment v California Air Resources Board, Sabin Center for 
Climate Change Law (2018), http://climatecasechart.com/case/coalition-for-a-safe-
environment-v-california-air-resources-board/. 
 500 Kaswan 2014, supra note 495, at 15. 
 501 Citizens Climate Lobby v California Air Resources Board, Sabin Center for Climate 
Change Law (2018), http://climatecasechart.com/case/citizens-climate-lobby-v-california-air-
resources-board/. 
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regulations to curb greenhouse gas emissions and that the evidence demonstrated 
that the agency’s use of the standards-based approach in developing the carbon 
offset protocol was consistent with the law.”502 
In June 2017 in Morning Star Packing Company v. California Air Resources 
Board (decided jointly with California Chamber of Commerce v. California Air 
Resources Board) the California Supreme Court upheld the cap-and-trade system 
by refusing to hear an appeal by business groups who argued the system was an 
unconstitutional tax.503 There were essentially two possible outcomes in the 
dispute: (1) “If judges view the auction revenue as a fee, the Air Resources Board 
should only be able to raise enough revenue to cover the costs of managing the 
program,”504 and (2) “If it’s a tax, Proposition 13 requires that the auctions win the 
blessing of two-thirds of the Legislature.” In response, California’s Deputy 
Attorney General argued that the cap-and-trade revenue was distinct from both a 
fee and a tax.505 These legal challenges created uncertainty in the future of the cap-
and-trade program which may have contributed to hesitation among participants 
purchasing allowances.506 However, with this legal matter now resolved in favor 
of the cap-and-trade program and the program having been extended to 2030, the 
cap-and-trade program has proven its strength and permanence in California.507 
To date, there has not been any litigation pertaining to cap-and-trade programs 
in Québec or Ontario. 
CHAPTER 4: WCI CAP-AND-TRADE: TRADING 
The preceding chapter examined the specific components of the cap-and-trade 
system. This chapter examines the trading aspect of cap-and-trade. It examines 
seven subjects: the nature of the WCI market: account types, the transfer process, 
auctions, reserve sales, secondary markets, and taxation. 
4.1 Nature of the WCI Markets 
Once participants obtain allowances through distribution, auction or sale, they 
are able to trade allowances with other participants in WCI-linked jurisdictions. 
 
 502 Id. 
 503 Dan Whitcomb, California Supreme Court upholds cap-and-trade law (Jun. 28, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-capandtrade-idUSKBN19K05D; Chris Megerian, 
California Supreme Court leaves in place decision upholding cap-and-trade system (Jun. 28, 
2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-cap-and-
trade-supreme-1498684764-htmlstory.html; Theodore McDowell, The Case for Cap-and-
Trade: California’s Battle for Market Based Environmentalism, 
http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/case-cap-trade-californias-battle-market-based-environmentalism/. 
 504 Adam Ashton, Is it a fee or a tax? California’s cap-and-trade faces tough questions (Jan. 
24, 2017), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/
article128494604.html. 
 505 Id. 
 506 Mikayla Wujec, California Cap-and-Trade: Waiting for Clarity (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://environmentaldefence.ca/2017/03/03/california-cap-trade-waiting-clarity/. 
 507 Katy Steinmetz, California Challenges President Trump With Cap-and-Trade Law: ‘We 
do not have to Wait for Washington’ (Jul. 25, 2017), http://time.com/4871996/california-cap-
trade-bill-signing-brown-schwarzenegger/. 
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Allowances can be traded through auctions or sale. The WCI uses the term 
“transfer” to refer to the movement or trading of emissions allowances. Transfers 
of emissions allowances between participant entities in any participant jurisdiction 
occur through the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (“CITSS”). 
CITSS is an online, web-based program, used to register participating entities and 
track the holding, transfer, and retirement of emissions allowances and credits.508 
All participants who want to engage in the auction or trading markets must register 
for a CITSS account. This engagement involves two steps: (1) an individual must 
submit an application to receive a CITSS user ID and Recognition as an Account 
Agent (“RAA”), and (2) the RAA must submit an application for Participant 
Registration which will allow the RAA to open an account for the entity that wants 
to participate.509 The application process includes completing an online or hard 
copy of the CITSS participant registration form, CITSS participant registration 
checklist form, and Business Relationship Disclosure Form.510 
4.2 Account Types 
There are several different types of accounts involved in the WCI cap-and-
trade program. Each account is used to facilitate the movement of allowances 
through auction, trade, and sales. California has a multitude of accounts, while 
Québec provides for only two accounts. Accounts are managed in each jurisdiction 
by a primary account representative, an alternative account representative, and 
account viewing agents. Each of these positions have similar roles and privileges 
within each jurisdiction. Further, when opening accounts, participants are 
obligated to disclose their corporate and business relationships with entities 
participating in other WCI jurisdictions. 
California 
In California there are five accounts that can be created for a registered entity. 
The CARB Executive Officer will create one of each of the following types of 
account for each entity: 
• holding account 
• limited use holding account 
• compliance account 
• annual allocation holding account 
 
 508 Ontario Climate Change Action Plan, “Ontario’s Cap-and-Trade Program How to 
Participate: Frequently Asked Questions – Recognition as an Account Agent and Participant 
Registration Process” at 3, ontario.ca/capandtrade [hereinafter Ontario Cap-and-Trade FAQ] ; 
and California Environmental Protection Agency – Air Resources Board, “Compliance 
Instrument Tracking System Service: User Reference CITSS Version 5.0” (January 2015) at 1, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/vers5_reference.pdf [hereinafter 
CEPA-ARB Version 5.0]. (not sure how to cite this) 
 509 Ontario Cap-and-Trade FAQ, supra note 508, at 3. 
 510 Id. at 12. 
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• exchange clearing holding account.511 
A holding account can be used to transfer emission allowances and credits. 
Within this category of account, there are also “limited use Holding Accounts” 
which can be used when an entity qualifies for a direct allocation.512 However, 
entities cannot transfer compliance instruments into the limited use holding 
account and can only transfer compliance instruments out of the limited use 
holding account and into an auction holding account.513 
Compliance accounts can have compliance instruments transferred into them 
by the entity for which the account was made. However, the entity cannot remove 
compliance instruments from this account. Only the CARB Executive Officer has 
the authority to transfer compliance instruments into or out of a compliance 
account for the purposes of satisfying compliance obligations or closing the 
account.514 
Exchange clearing holding accounts are used only for the purpose of 
transferring control of compliance instruments to the clearing entity. Such 
compliance instruments can only be transferred out of the exchange clearing 
holding account by the clearing entity to the specific account identified by the 
entity receiving the compliance instruments from the transaction being cleared.515 
Annual allocation holding accounts are used when an entity qualifies for direct 
allocation under sub article 9 of the California Code of Regulations section 
95831.516 Any allowances for a future vintage that are received by an entity will 
be placed by the CARB Executive Officer into the annual allocation holding 
account. Allowances in the annual allocation holding account can only be 
transferred into the entity’s compliance account, and these allowances must not 
exceed the holding limit as determined in section 95920(c) of the California Code 
of Regulations. 
In addition to the above accounts, there are seven accounts that can be created 
but remain under the control of the CARB Executive Officer. These accounts are 
described below. 
The allocation holding account is used to register the serial numbers of 
compliance instruments upon their creation.517 
Allowances are transferred into an auction holding account prior to the auction 
at which the allowances will be sold.518 These allowances for sale may be 
transferred into the auction holding account from an allocation holding account, 
holding account, limited use holding account, or compliance accounts. 
Allowances will be transferred into the retirement account for the purpose of 
retiring those allowances permanently.519 Allowances that are retired cannot be 
 
 511 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95831(a) (2012). 
 512 Id. § 95831(a)(2). 
 513 Id. § 95831(a)(3). 
 514 Id. § 95831(a)(4). 
 515 Id. § 95831(a)(5). 
 516 Id. § 95831(a)(6). 
 517 Id. § 95831(b)(1). 
 518 Id. § 95831(b)(2). 
 519 Id. § 95831(b)(3). 
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returned after retirement. All linked WCI jurisdictions are notified of all 
retirements, and all retirements will be recorded by the Executive Officer on the 
public Permanent Retirement Registry. 
An allowance price containment reserve account contains the serial numbers 
of all allowances directly placed in the allowance price containment reserve.520 
The forest buffer account contains the offset credits associated with the 
California forest buffer offset protocol, and is the account from which these offset 
credits may be retired.521 
The voluntary renewable electricity reserve account is a type of holding 
account that contains originally allocated allowances and once these allowances 
are all transferred or retired this account will be closed.522 
The external GHG program holding account processes voluntary retirements 
under the Retirement-Only Agreements in section 95943(d) of the California Code 
of Regulations. Compliance instruments are transferred into this account for 
retirement by entities that are involved in external GHG programs. CARB reviews 
transfers to this account and if the transfers are approved, the allowances will be 
transferred to the retirement account for permanent retirement.523   
Québec 
In Québec, when registration requirements are met and an entity is approved 
as an emitter, the Minister creates a general account and a compliance account for 
the emitter. The general account is used to record the transfer and trading of 
allowances, while the compliance account is use for recording emissions 
allowances.524 Upon the creation of these accounts, emitters are permitted to 
participate in WCI auctions and participate in allowances transfers between 
emitters.525 
Ontario 
Similar to Québec, in Ontario once the registration requirements were met and 
registration was approved, the Director would create a holding account and a 
compliance account for the emitter.526 The holding account was used to transfer 
compliance instruments, while the compliance account was used to record trades 
of emission allowances between jurisdictions. 
4.3 The Transfer Process 
Participants with a CITSS account can use their account to transfer emissions 
allowances in four ways: 
 
 520 Id. § 95831(b)(4). 
 521 Id. § 95831(b)(5). 
 522 Id. § 95831(b)(6). 
 523 Id. § 95831. 
 524 OC 1184-2012 (12 December 2012) GOQ II, 3485, §§ 10-14 [OC 1184-2012]. 
 525 California Environmental Protection Agency, 3.3 General Market Participant – 
Individual Account Application, Air Resources Board (December 2012),, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/vol2citssguide-12-20.pdf at 1. 
 526 O. Reg. 144/16, supra note 331, at 39. 
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(1) transfer to another registered participant’s General Holding Account; 
(2) transfer to the registered participant’s own Compliance Account; 
(3) an Exchange Agreement to an Exchange Clearing Service Provider’s 
Exchange Clearing Holding Account; 
(4) Voluntary Retirement. 
There is a three-step process when transferring to another participant entity’s 
General Holding Account: (1) propose, (2) approve, and (3) accept.527 First, the 
Primary Account Representative (“PAR”) or Alternate Account Representative 
(AAR) of the entity making the transfer must propose the transfer in CITSS by 
submitting a transfer request.528 Once submitted, all representatives for that 
transferring account will receive an email notifying them of the proposed 
transfer.529 Second, a different PAR or AAR from the transferring entity must 
approve the proposed transfer by selecting the “process transfer” option in CITSS 
prior to midnight two days after the transfer is proposed.530 Once again all 
representatives of this transferring account will receive a notification email 
detailing this action.531 Third, the receiving entity’s PAR or AAR must accept the 
transfer in CITSS by selecting “process transfer” prior to midnight of the third day 
after the transfer was proposed.532 Once complete, all representatives for both the 
transferring and receiving accounts will receive an email notification that the 
transfer is complete.533 
While the process described immediately above is the standard transfer 
process, transfers to a Compliance Account or an Exchange Agreement to an 
Exchange Clearing Service Provider’s (“ECSP”) Exchange Clearing Holding 
Account only require the completion of the first two-steps, as detailed above.534 
Transfers to a Compliance Account can only be completed by participants who 
have compliance obligations under the cap-and-trade program or a linked 
program.535 The transfer is made from a participant’s General Holding Account to 
their Compliance Account and the transfer is irreversible.536 On the other hand, an 
Exchange Agreement to an ECSP’s Exchange Clearing Holding Account is a 
transfer from a participant’s General Account to an entity registered in CITSS as 
providing clearing exchange services.537 An ECSP temporarily takes possession of 
compliance instruments that are in the process of being transferred between two 
CITSS participants.538 
 
 527 CEPA-ARB Version 5.0, supra note 508, at 2. 
 528 Id. 
 529 Id. 
 530 Id. 
 531 Id. 
 532 Id. 
 533 CEPA-ARB Version 5.0, supra note 508, at 2. 
 534 Id. at 3. 
 535 Id. at 20. 
 536 Id. 
 537 Id. at 22. 
 538 Id. 
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Compliance instruments can also be retired. To retire a compliance 
instrument, a participant registered in CITSS can voluntarily transfer the 
compliance instrument for retirement from their participant account to the 
jurisdiction’s Retirement Account.539 This process is irrevocable and requires the 
same three-step process used for transfers to another entity’s General Holding 
Account.540 However, retiring compliance instruments will not fulfill any 
compliance obligations.541 
4.4 Auctions 
4.4.1 Format 
Joint auctions are held for California and Québec, and are conducted on the 
Markit Auction and Reserve Sale Platform (“Auction Platform”).542 Auctions are 
completed with sealed bids, and only one round of bidding for participants occurs, 
where the lowest bid wins the auction. Any bid lower than the auction reserve price 
will not be considered.543 The auction reserve price will be the highest reserve 
price of the WCI jurisdictions after taking into account exchange rates.544 The 
exchange rate for CAD to USD will be as specified by the Bank of Canada and set 
at that rate the day before the auction.545 Québec participating entities have the 
option of participating in auctions using either CAD or US. However, once the 
currency is chosen, the entire auction process must be completed in the same 
currency.546 Each participant bid must include the bid price, the number of lots 
being bid on (each lot equals 1000 emission allowances), the vintage of the 
allowances being bid on, and the currency to be used for payment.547 
4.4.2 Administration and Participant Application 
Participants are required to have a CITSS account to participate in the 
auction.548 In addition to an auction application form, a bid guarantee must be 
submitted by the PAR or AAR for each participating entity, and Notice of 
Approval to Participate in the Auction must be received.549 As part of this 
application form, the entity permits the release of their contact information, their 
representative’s contact information, and their account number to the Auction 
 
 539 Id. at 26. 
 540 Id. 
 541 Id. 
 542 “Auction and Reserve Sale Platform User Guide” (August 2017) at 4, wci-auction.org 
[hereinafter Auction and Reserve User Guide]. 
 543 “California-Québec-Ontario Joint Auction Participant Training Presentation”, California 
Air Resources Board, Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and the Fight Against 
Climate Change, & Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (January 2018) 
at 12, wci-auction.org [hereinafter California-Québec-Ontario Presentation].(not sure how to 
cite this as there is no link) 
 544 Id. 
 545 Id. 
 546 Id. at 14. 
 547 Id. at 66. 
 548 Auction and Reserve User Guide, supra note 542. 
 549 Id.; California-Québec-Ontario Presentation, supra note 543, at 12. 
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Administrator for the purposes of participating in the auction.550 The Auction 
Administrator will then send an account activation email to the PAR or AAR who 
must activate the Auction Platform Account, creating a username and password as 
well as creating three security questions.551 A participant entity who has previously 
participated in auctions can simply login to their Auction Platform Account and 
update their password, if required.552 
In order to participate in auctions, participants must keep all their bidding 
information, including intent to bid, bidding strategy, and bidding price, 
completely confidential.553 In addition, all participants are required to employ a 
consultant or advisor for the bidding process.554 The participating entity must 
inform their jurisdiction and complete the appropriate forms to notify their 
jurisdiction of the appointment of a consultant or advisor.555 Further, the 
participant must inform their consultant or advisor of the confidentiality 
requirement observed in the bidding process.556 
There are three main limitations to auction bidding. First, a bid is rejected if 
the bid is greater than the bidder’s purchase limit.557 A purchase limit is the 
maximum amount of allowances the participant is permitted to purchase.558 
Second, a bid is rejected if it is greater than the purchaser’s holding limit.559 A 
holding limit is the maximum number of allowances the participant is permitted to 
hold.560 Third, a bid is rejected if the value of the bid is valued at a greater amount 
than the value of the bid guarantee made prior to the auction.561 A bid guarantee is 
an amount of money paid in advance of the auction that must cover the cost of all 
bids made during the auction.562 The bid guarantee must cover all bids made for 
both current and advance auctions.563 
It is possible that a tie arises in the auction process. A tie occurs where the 
quantity of allowances bid on exceeds the quantity of allowances available.564 
Each tied bidder receives a share of the remaining allowances based on the 
quantity of allowances that can be granted at the settlement price.565 This share is 
then multiplied by the quantity of allowances that have not yet been sold.566 The 
result is the quantity of allowances the participant receives due to the tie.567 Any 
 
 550 Auction and Reserve User Guide, supra note 542. 
 551 Id. at 4-9. 
 552 Id. at 15. 
 553 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95914(c); Ontario Climate Change and Low-Carbon 
Economy Act, SO 2016, c7, § 32. 
 554 California-Québec-Ontario Presentation, supra note 543, at 89-90. 
 555 Id. 
 556 Id. 
 557 Id. at 76. 
 558 Id. at 79. 
 559 Id. at 76. 
 560 Id. at 89. 
 561 Id. at 76. 
 562 Id. at 77. 
 563 Id. at 78. 
 564 Id. at 88. 
 565 Id. 
 566 Id. 
 567 Id. 
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allowances that remain after this tie-breaking process are randomly assigned to 
participants in the tie by randomly allocating numbers to the participants and 
distributing the remaining allowances from lowest to highest number.568 
Upon completion of the auction, a Joint Auction Summary Results Report will 
be accessible on the websites of all three jurisdiction within five business days 
after the auction.569 The report will be published in both English and French, and 
consist of the auction results and statistics.570 
4.4.3 Auction Results 
The WCI auctions have been successful thus far. One hundred and twenty 
qualified bidders submitted auction applications and bid guarantees and were 
approved by CARB, MOECC, or NDDELCC to participate in the February 21, 
2018 auction, the first auction in which all three jurisdictions participated.571 The 
auction, which cleared and complied with the regulations of each such jurisdiction, 
provided for the sale of 14,894,520 2016 vintage allowances, 83,321,400 2018 
vintage allowances (“Current Allowances”), and an advance auction of 12,427,950 
2021 vintage allowances (“Advance Allowances”).572 With an average of 1.21 bids 
per sale, qualified bidders purchased 100% of the 98,215,920 of the Current 
Allowances available, 92.1% of which were purchased by compliance entities.573 
With an average of .69 bids per sale, qualified bidders purchased 69% of the 
Advance Allowances, with compliance entities purchasing 89% of the 
allowances.574 Bidding prices for both the Current and Advance Allowances began 
at USD $14.53 (CAD $18.34). However Current Allowances sold at a mean price 
of USD $15.90 (CAD $20.07), and Advance Allowances sold at a mean price of 
USD $15.32 (CAD $19.34).575 The highest price a Current Allowance sold for was 
USD $54.27 (CAD $68.50).576 
The most recent auction with all three WCI participant jurisdictions was held 
on May 15, 2018.577 The auction consisted of the sale of 2016 and 2018 current 
auction vintage allowances, as well as the sale of 2021 advance auction vintage 
allowances.578 The Market Monitor assessed the auction and recommended the 
approval of the May 15, 2018 auction results.579 During this auction, all available 
current auction vintage allowances were sold, totalling 13,368,884 2016 vintage 
allowances and 77,218,854 2018 vintage allowances.580 In addition, 6,057,000 
2021 advance auction vintage allowances were sold out of 12,427,950 2021 
 
 568 Id. 
 569 Id. at 92. 
 570 Id. 
 571 Summary Results Report–Joint Auction #14 (February 2018) California Cap-and-Trade 
Program, Ontario Cap-and-Trade Program, & Québec Cap-and-Trade System at 1-7. 
 572 Id. at 1. 
 573 Id. at 4. 
 574 Id. at 2. 
 575 Id. at 3. 
 576 Id. 
 577 May 2018 Joint Auction #15 Summary Results Report (May 2018) at 1-2, wci-auction.org. 
 578 Id. 
 579 Id. 
 580 Id. 
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advance auction vintage allowances that were available.581 Compliance entities 
purchased the majority of the allowances, specifically 95.6% of the current auction 
vintage allowances, and 77.7% of the advance auction vintage allowances.582 
4.5 Reserve Sales 
Reserve sales refer to the sale of reserve allowances from the price 
containment reserve in order to manage prices. As previously discussed, a 
percentage of allowances are placed in the price containment reserve annually and 
divided into three tiers with increasingly high sale prices.583 These reserve tiers are 
only sold when the auction price nears the reserve price. The purpose of a reserve 
sale is to limit allowances prices in both the auction and secondary markets. 584 
California 
In California, participation in a reserve sale requires the production of all 
corporate structuring information of the participating entity, the participant to be 
registered with an approved CITSS account, and the participant have a CITSS 
representative.585 All possible dates for reserve sales from 2015 to 2031 have been 
identified in Appendix C of the California Code of Regulations.586 Pursuant to 
section 95913 of the California Code of Regulations, a reserve sale will be held 
annually in the third quarter of the year prior to November 1st. In addition, reserve 
sales will be held up to three additional times per year only when the previous 
allowance auction had a settlement price of sixty percent or more of the lowest 
reserve tier price.587 
A reserve sale notice will be posted approximately thirty days prior to the sale 
date to provide information about eligibility for participation in the sale, the sale 
format and what allowances will be for sale.588 An application for participation 
must be completed and submitted on CITSS for each participant entity.589 
Applications will only be accepted starting thirty days prior to the sale and ending 
twenty days prior to the sale.590 Once the application is submitted, the Financial 
Services Administrator will either create or verify the existence of the applicant’s 
 
 581 Id. 
 582 Id. 
 583 California Air Resources Board, Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions: 
California Cap-and-Trade Program Sale of Greenhouse Gas Allowances from the Allowance 
Price Containment Reserve (16 March 2018) at 1, arb.ca.gov. 
 584 California Air Resources Board, Chapter 5: How do I buy, sell, and trade compliance 
instruments? (Dec. 2012) at 21, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter5.pdf. 
 585 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § reg 95913(c); Detailed Reserve Sale Requirement and 
Instructions Board, “Reserve Sale Application Requirements” (March 2018) at 4, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2018_rs_requirements.pdf [hereinafter 
Reserve Sale Application Requirements]. 
 586 California Air Resources Board, Greenhouse Gas Allowance Price Containment Reserve 
Sales (2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm [hereinafter 
CARB Price Containment]. 
 587 California Air Resources Board, “Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions” 
(March 2018) at 1, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm. 
 588 CARB Price Containment, supra note 586. 
 589 Reserve Sale Application Requirements, supra note 585, at 4. 
 590 Id. at 8. 
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financial services account. The participant entity must then submit a bid guarantee 
that will cover the cost of any bids made by that entity.591 The Financial Services 
Administrator will review the bid guarantee, and once it is approved, the 
participant’s status will change from “applicant” to “qualified applicant,” meaning 
the participant is prepared for the auction.592 
At the reserve sale, each reserve tier has a different fixed price that is 
significantly higher than the allowance auction price. This difference allows the 
WCI to determine supply and demand for allowances.593 For instance, if the first 
tier of reserve allowances are purchased quickly and purchases are made for higher 
tier allowances, this pattern may indicate an imbalance requiring adjustments to 
the cap-and-trade program.594 The fixed prices are adjusted every year for 
inflation.595 In 2013, the tiers from lowest to highest had fixed prices of forty 
dollars, forty-five dollars, and fifty dollars in USD.596 Sales will begin from the 
lowest to the highest priced tier.597 The account representative or a qualified bidder 
can submit as many bids as they wish, and edit or withdraw bids at any time during 
the bidding window.598 
Allowances in a reserve tier will be sold to an entity who submits a bid for 
those allowances as long as the number of allowance bundles (1,000 allowances 
per bundle) that are bid on does not exceed the number of allowances available.599 
If there are allowances remaining in the first or second tier, the reserve sale 
administrator will assign random numbers to each bundle of allowances purchased 
by participants and the remaining allowances will be distributed to those 
participants based on the randomly allocated numbers from lowest to highest.600 If 
the number of allowances bid on exceeds the number of allowances available in a 
tier, the reserve sale administrator must comply with the procedure set out in 
section 95913(h)(5) of the California Code of Regulations in order to determine 
how allowances will be distributed.601 After confirming that the payment for 
 
 591 Detailed Reserve Sale Requirement and Instructions Board, Bid Guarantee Submittal 
Process (2018) at 12, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/
2018_rs_requirements.pdf; CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(g). 
 592 Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions Board, Receipt of Bid Guarantee 
(2018) at 19, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2018_rs_requirements.pdf. 
 593 California Air Resources Board, “Reserve Sale Information” (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm. 
 594 Allowance Price Containment Reserve – the mechanism for managing the risks of the 
California carbon market or the risk in itself?, (Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.emissions-
euets.com/component/content/article/909-california-cap-and-trade/247-allowance-price-
containment-reserve-the-mechanism-for-managing-the-risks-of-the-california-carbon-market-
or-risk-in-itself. 
 595 Id. 
 596 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(f)(3). 
 597 Id. at § 95913(h)(1). 
 598 Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions Board, Bidding in the Reserve Sale 
(2018) at 24-25, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2018_rs_requirements.pdf. 
 599 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(h)(4)(A). 
 600 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(h)(4)(B). 
 601 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(h)(5). 
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allowances have been received, the CARB Executive Officer will transfer the 
allowances purchased into each winning bidder’s Compliance Account.602 
Québec 
In Québec, reserve sales take place at most four times a year.603 In order to 
participate in reserve sales, purchasing entities must be registered in accordance 
with the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for GHG emission 
allowances. The purchasing entity must also be an emitter covered by the cap-and-
trade program in Québec. Further, the purchasing entity must not have any 
allowances in their general account that could cover their GHG emissions for the 
current compliance period.604 Participation in a reserve sale requires that all buyers 
are registered with the Minister at least thirty days prior to the reserve sale date.605 
To register, the purchasing entity must provide the Minister with their name, 
contact information, compliance account number, information for account 
representatives, and a financial guarantee in CAD.606 In addition, at least forty days 
prior to the reserve sale, all purchasing entities must provide the Minister with an 
update of the entity’s identity, ownership, corporate structure, any business 
relationships, and the entity’s holding limits.607 A purchasing entity may be 
refused participation in the reserve sale if any of the information provided to the 
Minister changes with less than thirty days prior to the reserve sale, or if false or 
misleading information is provided, information is omitted or the entity fails to 
comply with the rules of procedure.608 
At the reserve sale, emission allowances are sold in lots of 1,000 
allowances.609 There are three tiers of emission allowances (A, B, and C) with 
fixed sale prices.610 The fixed prices in 2014 were forty dollars, forty-five dollars, 
and fifty dollars CAD respectively and these prices increase by five percent plus 
inflation each year.611 There is only one bidding round and all bids are sealed.612 
Once the reserve sale is complete, the reserve allowances are distributed in the 
following order: Tier A, Tier B, Tier C.613 
When the offers made for allowances do not exceed the amount of allowances 
available for sale, the allowances will be distributed according to the offers 
received.614 Any allowances that are not sold, are retained for sale at a later date.615 
However, if the offers made exceed the amount of allowances available for sale, 
 
 602 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(i)(4). 
 603 O.C. 1297-2011, 2011 G.O. 2, 3655B at 57. 
 604 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances, 
Q-2 r 46.1 at 56. 
 605 Id. at 59. 
 606 Id. at 59. 
 607 Id. at 59. 
 608 Id. at 59, 60. 
 609 Id. at 60.1. 
 610 Id. at 58. 
 611 Id. 
 612 Id. at 60.1. 
 613 Id. at 61. 
 614 Id. 
 615 Id. at 64. 
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each purchaser’s offer will be divided by the total amount of offers made for the 
same allowances.616 This value is then multiplied by the amount of allowances 
available for purchase, rounding the value down to the nearest whole number.617 
This calculation will determine the amount of available allowances each 
purchasing entity is owed. In the event that these calculations result in extra 
unaccounted-for allowances, a random number will be assigned to each purchasing 
entity and distribute one allowance to each purchasing entity in order of lowest to 
highest number until all allowances are distributed.618 In the event that the 
purchasing entity submits bids that exceed the amount of allowances available for 
sale, exceed the entity’s holding limit, or exceed the financial guarantee submitted 
by the entity, excess allowances may be removed from a purchasing entity’s bids, 
beginning by removing the lowest bids to the highest bids.619 
Purchasing entities have seven days after the results of the reserve sale are 
released to submit full payment for their purchased allowances.620 If payment is 
not received during these seven days, the amount due will be held back by the 
Minister from the bid guarantee provided prior to the reserve sale.621 Once 
payment is received the amount of allowances purchased is recorded in the 
purchasing entity’s compliance account. All funds raised from the sale of reserve 
allowances is placed in Québec’s Green Fund, used to finance climate change 
efforts in the province.622 
Ontario 
Ontario reserve sales were very similar to Québec’s reserve sale format and 
procedure. Participation in an Ontario reserve sale required that the purchasing 
entity be a capped participant for at least forty days prior to the reserve sale, that 
the participant received permission from the Minister to bid in a sale, that financial 
assurance was provided to the Minister at least twelve days prior to the reserve 
sale, and on the reserve sale date the purchasing entity could hold any allowances 
in their holding account that could be used to meet their then-current compliance 
period obligations.623 Similar to Québec requirements, to receive permission to bid 
in a sale, Ontario entities had to update the Minister with information about any 
entity changes at least forty days prior to the sale. 
Further, at least thirty days prior to the sale, participants had to provide the 
Minister with their compliance account number, contact information and holding 
account number for the participant entity, identification numbers and names of all 
account representatives, name and contact information for any consultants used, 
social insurance number if the participant was an individual, and the type of 
financial assurance that would be provided during the sale.624 In addition, financial 
 
 616 Id. at 61. 
 617 Id. 
 618 Id. 
 619 Id. at 60.1. 
 620 Id. at 62. 
 621 Id. 
 622 Id. 
 623 O Reg 144/16, supra note 331, at §§ 76-78. 
 624 Id. at § 67(1). 
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assurance had to be provided to the Minister at least twelve days prior to the sale.625 
The Minister would refuse an application to bid in a sale or suspend a participant’s 
ability to participate in a sale if false or misleading information was provided by 
the participant, the participant refused to disclose required information, or the 
participant’s compliance account was prohibited from participating in transfers of 
compliance instruments due to the cap-and-trade regulations or an imposition from 
the Director.626 
Similar to California and Québec reserve sales, Ontario emission allowances 
were sold in lots of 1,000 allowances from the same category.627 Before accepting 
any bids, the Minister would compare the participant’s actual maximum bid value 
and the participant’s financial assurance.628 If the maximum bid value was greater 
than the participant’s financial assurance, the excess bids would be removed to 
ensure the bid value did not exceed the financial assurance provided.629 In addition, 
bids could be rejected by the Minister in order of lowest to highest bid in the event 
that allowing the bid would cause the participant to exceed their holding limit.630 
Accepted bids would be completed beginning with Tier A, followed by Tiers B 
and C.631 If the amount of allowances available was sufficient to fulfill the number 
of allowances bid on, then allowances were distributed based on the bids 
received.632 However, if the amount of allowances available was not sufficient to 
fulfill the number of allowances bid on, then the allowances were distributed 
following the same protocol used in Québec. Specifically, the number of 
allowances bid on by each participant was individually divided by the total number 
of allowances available for that category.633 This value represented that 
participant’s share of the available allowances, and this value was then multiplied 
by the total value of emission allowances available for sale.634 This value was then 
rounded down to the nearest whole number and that was the number of emissions 
allowances to be distributed to that participant.635 In the event that there were 
remaining allowances, random numbers would be assigned to each participant and 
the remaining allowances would be distributed from lowest to highest assigned 
number.636 
4.6 Secondary Markets 
In addition to auctions and reserve sales, there is the secondary market in 
which participants in California and Québec can buy or sell compliance 
 
 625 Id. at §76(1). 
 626 Id. at § 76(3). 
 627 Id. at § 79. 
 628 Id. at § 82(1). 
 629 Id. at § 83. 
 630 Holding limit in Ontario is calculated using the following formula: 𝐿𝐿 = 2,500,000 +0.025 𝑥𝑥 (𝐶𝐶 − 25,000,000): Id. at §§ 40; 81. 
 631 Id. at § 84(1). 
 632 Id. at § 84(2). 
 633 Id. at § 84(3). 
 634 Id. 
 635 Id. 
 636 Id. at § 84(3). 
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instruments from each other.637 The secondary market allows for the sale of 
emission allowances previously distributed to a capped emitter, early reduction 
and offset credits, and any derivative financial products.638 These transactions 
occur between market participants (non-capped participants) and capped 
participants. The revenue generated from secondary market sales stays with the 
seller of the compliance instruments and is not given to the government.639 All 
secondary market transactions are registered in the same CITSS system used for 
auctions.640 All prices at the secondary market are left to the discretion of the 
parties involved in the sale; therefore, compliance instruments may be sold for 
higher or lower prices than they are sold at auction.641 Compliance instruments 
may also be traded or exchanged as agreed upon by the parties.642 
California 
In California, secondary market transactions can occur through 
Intercontinental Exchange Inc., a trading corporation that lists compliance 
instruments available for trade, swap, or exchange. The Intercontinental Exchange 
Inc. is a large market that is heavily regulated by global financial standards, local 
regulations, and internal market supervision policies.643 Generally, the secondary 
market price for allowances is higher than the auction price. However, beginning 
in May 2016, the secondary market price was below the auction price, likely due 
to ongoing cap-and-trade litigation in California.644 Once the litigation was 
resolved in favor of cap-and-trade, the secondary market prices once again were 
higher than auction prices.645 The conduct required by parties in conducting any 
trade is detailed in section 95921 of the California Code of Regulations.646 In 
California, secondary market transactions only have to be reported when there is 
a change in control of the compliance instrument, meaning the compliance 
instruments are physically transferred to a new owner.647 As of August 17, 2018 
there were many California allowances and options available for trade on 
Intercontinental Exchange Inc. 
 
 637 California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program: Facts about the 
linked cap-and-trade programs (Dec. 1, 2017), arb.ca.gov. 
 638 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-trade in Ontario: 
Appendix A to the ECO’s Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2016 (2016) at 5, 
media.assets.eco.on.ca. 
 639 Id. at 15. 
 640 Id. at 14. 
 641 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Facing Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas 
Progress Report, 2016 (2016) at 69, docs.assets.eco.on.ca [hereinafter ECO Facing Climate 
Change]. 
 642 California Air Resources Board, “Chapter 5: How Do I Buy, Sell, and Trade Compliance 
Instruments?” (December 2012) at 28,, arb.ca.gov [hereinafter CARB Chapter 5]. 
 643 Intercontinental Exchange, ICE, theice.com. 
 644 ECO Facing Climate Change, supra note 641, at 72. 
 645 Chris Busch, “Oversupply Grows in the Western Climate Initiative Carbon Market: An 
adjustment for current oversupply is needed to ensure the program will achieve its 2030 target”, 
Energy Innovation (Dec. 2017) at 18, energyinnovation.org. 
 646 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95921. 
 647 CARB Chapter 5, supra note 642, at 28. 
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Québec 
In Québec, all trades involving allowances must be completed following the 
procedure set out in section 26 of the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system 
for GHG allowances.648 This includes the requirement for the seller to submit a 
transaction request to the Minister including the buyer and seller’s information, 
the type and quantity of the allowances being sold, the settlement price, the date 
of agreement, and the date of trading.649 The transaction request must be approved 
by another of the seller’s account representatives within two days after 
submission.650 The request must then be sent to the buyer’s representatives to be 
accepted within three days of the request being sent.651 Upon acceptance by the 
buyer, the request will be completed and the transfer will occur, unless the Minister 
believes an offence under the Environment Quality Act is being committed.652 As 
of August 17, 2018 there were no Québec compliance instruments available for 
trade on Intercontinental Exchange Inc. 
Ontario 
In January 2017, Intercontinental Exchange Inc. began listing Ontario 
compliance instruments as available for trade.653 During its operation, the Ontario 
secondary market was not very active. That was likely due to the novelty of the 
Ontario program and the fact that at its inauguration in 2017, linkage with 
California and Québec was not yet confirmed. As of August 17, 2018 there were 
no Ontario compliance instruments available for trade on Intercontinental 
Exchange Inc. 
4.7 Taxation 
Given the value associated with compliance instruments in the cap-and-trade 
program it is important to assess any potential tax consequences arising from the 
acquisition of compliance instruments. 
4.7.1 United States 
In the United States, there is a tax imposed on emission allowances. This tax 
is based either on the value of the emission allowances when received through 
government allocation or based on the cost paid for the allowances in a market 
transaction.654 However, emissions allowances received free of charge from the 
 
 648 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances, 
Q-2 r 46.1 at 25. 
 649 Id. 
 650 Id. at 26. 
 651 Id. 
 652 Id. 
 653 Tyson Dyck & Henry Ren, Canada: Ontario Joins Linked North American Carbon 
Market, Torys LLP (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2018/01/
ontario-joins-linked-north-american-carbon-market.. 
 654 Ernest & Young Global Limited, Tax Aspects of Cap-and-Trade System Operation, 
(2018), https://www.ey.com/us/en/industries/oil---gas/carbon-market-readiness---9---tax-
aspects-of-cap-and-trade-system-operation [hereinafter Ernest & Young]; 26 US Internal 
Revenue Code at 1012. 
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federal government are not subject to taxation.655 Emissions allowances may be 
characterized as “inventory, materials or supplies, ordinary business expenses, 
amortizable intangible property [or] intangible property with an indefinite life.”656 
Depending on the characterization, certain emission allowance taxes may be 
recoverable or deductible.657 An emission allowance becomes taxable in the tax 
year, and the emission allowance is used to meet compliance obligations, sold or 
exchanged.658 
A participant may purchase emissions allowances to meet compliance 
obligations or as an investment.659 When a participant owns allowances as 
commodities for the purpose of selling them, the tax obligations that arise would 
be characterized as ordinary gains or losses.660 However, when allowances are 
used in any way other than as a commodity, when sold the participant will have a 
capital gain or capital loss since the allowances are not depreciable property 
according to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.661 
4.7.2 Canada 
The Canadian federal government imposes a five percent value-added goods 
and services tax (“GST”). In addition, most provinces have a provincial sales tax. 
Four provinces have eliminated the provincial sales tax (“PST”) and harmonized 
it with the federal GST.662 In these provinces, this harmonized GST is known as 
the Harmonized Sales Tax (“HST”). Most property and services supplied in 
Canada or imported into Canada are subject to GST or HST.663 Ontario imposes 
an HST rate of 13%, while Québec imposes a 5% GST and a 9.975% Québec Sales 
Tax (“QST”).664 
Legislative Scheme 
Initially, Canada had no taxation scheme specific to cap-and-trade compliance 
instruments.665 The lack of a specific taxation scheme created confusion and 
 
 655 Mark Price, Hearing Before US Senate Committee on Finance on Climate Change 
Legislation: Tax Considerations, KPMG LLP (Jun. 16, 2009) at 2, finance.senate.gov. (can’t 
find link) 
 656 Ernest & Young Global Limited, supra note 654. 
 657 Id. 
 658 Id. 
 659 Id. 
 660 Ernest & Young Global Limited, supra note 654. 
 661 Id. 
 662 The provinces that impose an HST, or Harmonized Sales Tax, and their corresponding 
taxation rates are: New Brunswick (15%), Newfoundland and Labrador (15%), Nova Scotia 
(15%) and Ontario (13%). 
 663 Government of Canada, Charge the GST/HST (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/gst-hst-
businesses/charge-gst/charge-gst-hst.html. 
 664 Revenu Québec, Tables of GST and QST Rates (2018), 
https://www.revenuQuébec.ca/en/businesses/consumption-taxes/gsthst-and-qst/basic-rules-for-
applying-the-gsthst-and-qst/tables-of-gst-and-qst-rates/. 
 665 House of Commons, Department of Finance Canada, Tax Measures: Supplementary 
Information (March 2016) at 24, https://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/download-
telecharger/index-en.html [hereinafter House of Commons, “Supplementary Information”]. 
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resulted in issues of double taxation for free allowances.666 In January 2017, 
Canada’s federal Income Tax Act667 was amended to include a new taxation 
scheme governing the use and sale of emissions allowances by regulated emitters 
who are Canadian taxpayers.668 The amendments govern the acquisition of 
emissions allowances in taxation years beginning after 2016. A taxpayer can also 
elect to have this new set of rules apply to emissions allowances acquired in 
taxation years ending after 2012.669 For the purposes of taxation, Canada’s federal 
government has created definitions for emissions allowance and emissions 
obligation. An emissions allowance is “an allowance, credit or similar instrument 
that represents a unit of emissions that can be used to satisfy a requirement under 
the laws of Canada or a province governing emissions of a regulated substance, 
such as greenhouse gas emissions”670 while an emissions obligation is “an 
obligation to surrender an emissions allowance, or an obligation that can otherwise 
be satisfied through the use of an emissions allowance, under a law of Canada or 
a province governing emissions of a regulated substance.”671 
Value of Emissions Allowances 
For tax purposes, emissions allowances are treated as inventory.672 The value 
of an emissions allowance is the cost paid by the taxpayer to acquire the 
allowance.673 This cost paid valuation method is used in order to account for the 
potential volatility of emission allowance value.674 
If a registered emitter, who already holds one or more emissions allowances, 
acquires additional identical emission allowances, then the cost of each identical 
allowance is held to be the average cost of all the identical emissions allowances 
of the taxpayer.675 This averaging allows taxpayers to calculate gain on identical 
emissions allowances in a simple manner, even if particular emissions allowances 
are later disposed of.676 For tax purposes, emissions allowances are identical when 
 
 666 Id. 
 667 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) (Can.). 
 668 Id. § 27.1(1)-(6). See also: House of Commons, Department of Finance Canada, 
“Growing the Middle Class” (March 2016) at 160, 
https://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/plan/toc-tdm-en.html. 
 669 Bill C-29, A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in 
Parliament on March 22, 2016 and other measures, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, (2016), SC 2016, c 12. 
See also: Budget Implementation Act, 2016, No 2, SC 2016, c 12, s 10 [hereinafter Budget 
Implementation Act]. 
 670 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 248. 
 671 Id. 
 672 Julie D’Avignon, Federal Budget addresses the taxation of Emissions Allowances, 
Stikeman Elliott, (March 2016) stikeman.com [hereinafter D’Avignon 2016]; and Income Tax 
Act, supra note 662, at 248: “inventory means a description of property the cost or value of 
which is relevant in computing a taxpayer’s income from a business for a taxation year or would 
have been so relevant if the income from the business had not been computed in accordance 
with the cash method and includes . . . an emissions allowance”. 
 673 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(1). 
 674 D’Avignon 2016, supra note 672; Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(1). 
 675 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(2). 
 676 William Francis Morneau, Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act, Excise Tax 
Act, Excise Act, 2001 and Related Legislation, (2016) Department of Finance Canada at 
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they can be used to settle the same emissions obligation.677 For example, if one 
emissions allowance can only be used in one province and the other emissions 
allowance can only be used in another province, they are not identical. Further, for 
two emissions allowances to be considered identical, it must be possible to use 
them for the same time periods. If one can be used to settle emissions obligations 
for several years, but the other can only be used to settle emissions obligations in 
one specific year, then the two are not considered identical.678 
GST/HST Collection 
As previously discussed, there are several ways in which an emission 
allowance can be allocated. Prior to June 27, 2018, emission allowances provided 
directly from the government to participating entities were not taxable but 
secondary market acquisitions of allowances were taxable.679 However, effective 
June 27, 2018 new taxation rules were instituted in which a self-assessment of 
emission allowances purchases is required by all Canadian residents or GST 
registered entities.680 A new tax credit was also created which allow tax paying 
entities to claim back the GST/HST taxes they self-assess.681 This new taxation 
scheme applies retroactively, meaning that if GST/HST taxes have not already 
been collected for emissions allowances purchases prior to June 27, 2018 then the 
new taxation scheme will apply and the purchaser must complete a GST/HST self-
assessment.682 In the event that GST/HST had been charged but not collected prior 
to the new legislation the vendor may issue a credit under s. 232 of the Excise Tax 
Act for the tax the GST/HST charged.683 
One identified concern with the new taxation scheme is the lack of self-
reporting requirement when the vendor of emission allowances is neither a 
Canadian resident nor a GST/HST registered entity and the emissions allowances 
are used in commercial activities.684 Specifically, purchasers who exclusively use 
emissions allowances for commercial activities will be required under this new 
legislation to determine if the vendor of their purchased emissions allowances is a 
GST/HST registered entity.685 If the vendor is a registered entity a self-assessment 
of GST/HST is required by the purchaser. However, when the vendor is not a 
registered entity no such self-assessment is required.686 
 
15,,https://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/2016/ita-lir-0716-eng.asp [hereinafter Morneau 
Explanatory Notes 2016]. 
 677 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(2). 
 678 Morneau Explanatory Notes 2016, supra note 676, at 16. 
 679 Alan Kenigsberg, New GST/HST rules for carbon emission allowances, Osler Hoskin & 
Harcourt LLP (June 2018), : <https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2018/new-gst-
hst-rules-for-carbon-emission-allowances>. 
 680 Id. 
 681 Id. 
 682 Id. 
 683 Id. 
 684 Id. 
 685 Id. 
 686 Id. 
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Tax Deductions 
In certain circumstances, a registered emitter can deduct the cost of emissions 
obligations when calculating their income for a given taxation year. However, the 
total amount deductible is limited to the cost of emissions allowances that are, or 
could be, used to satisfy the outstanding emissions obligations.687 
A tax deduction is available for emission obligations but must not exceed the 
amount calculated with the following formula: A + B X C.688 In this equation, “A” 
represents the total cost of emissions allowances either used by the participant to 
fulfill their compliance obligations, or the total cost of emissions allowances held 
by the participant at the end of the year that can be used to meet that year’s 
compliance obligations.689 The value for “B” is calculated by the formula D – 
(E+F).690 In this calculation, “D” is the amount of emissions allowances required 
to fulfill the current year’s emission allowances, “E” is the amount of emissions 
allowances used by the participant to fulfill the current year’s emission allowances, 
and “F” is the amount of emissions allowances that could be used to fulfill the 
current year’s compliance obligations that are still held by the participant at the 
end of the year.691 The value for “C” is the fair market value of the emissions 
allowances that can be used for the current year’s compliance obligations 
remaining in the participant’s possession at the end of the taxation year.692 
If the taxpayer deducts an amount from their income based on an emissions 
obligation but does not settle the obligation in the taxation year that immediately 
follows, then the taxpayer must include the amount deducted in the previous year 
as business income for income tax purposes.693 
Disposal of Emissions Allowances 
If a taxpayer uses an emissions allowance to settle an emissions obligation, 
there is no income to declare for tax purposes. The proceeds of disposing the 
emissions allowance is deemed to be equal to the cost of the emissions allowance 
used to settle the obligation, so there is no net gain or loss to declare.694 
If a taxpayer sells an emissions allowance outside of an emissions allowance 
regime, then the net proceeds must be included as income for tax purposes.695 An 
emissions allowance must be valued at the lower of its cost and its fair market 
 
 687 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(3). 
 688 Id. 
 689 Id. 
 690 Id. 
 691 Id. 
 692 Id. 
 693 Id at 27.1(4); The Honourable William Francis Morneau, Explanatory Notes Relating to 
the Excise Tax Act, Department of Finance Canada (June 2018) Government of Canada, 
fin.gc.ca. (This one is weird as I can’t find the source) 
 694 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(5). Morneau Explanatory Notes 2018, supra note 
676. 
 695 Department of Finance Canada, Legislative Proposals Relating to the Excise Tax Act, 
Government of Canada (June 2018), fin.gc.ca. 
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value at the end of that year. After that time, that lower amount is deemed to be 
the cost at which the property was acquired by the taxpayer.”696 
4.8 Survey 
As part of assembling this Guide, a telephone survey was conducted in June-
August 2018 with government, regulators, and market participants as well as other 
stakeholders (ombuds, NGOs, consumers, academics and researchers) in an effort 
to elicit details about how the WCI cap-and-trade scheme actually functions. The 
original plan was to interview thirty to sixty such individuals. Initial contact was 
made with sixty-one individuals. Ultimately, four persons agreed on an 
anonymous basis to provide detailed answers to a list of questions prepared by 
researchers and approved by Western University’s Research Ethic Board (see 
4.8.1 below). The number of responses may have been low due to uncertainty 
about the scheme following the Ontario provincial election in June 2018 and the 
province’s decision to withdraw from the WCI’s cap-and-trade scheme effective 
July 3, 2018. The responses below are a synopsis of the answers received. 
4.8.1 Survey Questions 
INTRODUCTORY DESCRIPTION [to be read at the beginning of each interview]: 
This interview is being conducted as part of the First Phase (“Phase 1”) of a 
mapping of the legal framework of carbon pricing under the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI). Under a cap-and-trade system, a jurisdiction implementing a cap-
and-trade program issues “emission allowances” to meet jurisdiction-specific 
emissions goals. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is one scheme promoting 
a cap-and-trade system. 
Phase 1 of this project is being conducted by assembling material concerning 
regulatory design as well as arrangements within the three WCI Partner 
jurisdictions relevant to creation and administration of their cap-and-trade 
programs. The final work product in Phase 1 is a guide to the legal framework for 
the cap-and-trade system of emission permits created and adhered to under the 
WCI. 
Answers to the questions below will be contained in the drafting of a guide, 
to be submitted to the sponsor, the Centre for International Governance Innovation 
(CIGI), in November 2018. However, details about how the WCI cap-and-trade 
scheme actually works in practice will be elicited through telephone/Skype 
interviews conducted with government, regulators and market participants, as well 
as other stakeholders (such as ombuds, nongovernmental organizations, 
consumers, other academics and researchers) in Ontario, Québec and California, 
as well as in the northeastern United States and the European Union. 
 
Questions for Cap-and-Trade Market Participants 
 
A. Identification 
1. What entity do you work for? 
 
 696 Morneau Explanatory Notes 2018, supra note 676. 
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2. Why is your entity involved with Western Climate Initiative (WCI)? Does 
your entity trade in emission permits under the WCI? In which WCI jurisdictions? 
3. Please explain why your entity needs emission permits. 
4. When did your entity become associated with WCI? Did it formally 
register? In your view, was the registration process relatively straightforward? If 
your entity is a voluntary participant, what convinced you to join the scheme? 
5. Did your entity use any cap-and-trade consultants or advisors at any point? 
For what purposes? 
6. How many individuals oversee your accounts (i.e. account representatives 
and account viewing agents)? How did you find the process for registering agents? 
Have you had to switch agents on accounts? Was this process difficult? 
 
B. Allowances 
7. How many emission credits does your entity produce or need each year? 
Do you foresee those numbers increasing or decreasing in future? 
8. How has emission allowance pricing affected your business decisions? Has 
your business reduced emissions to avoid purchasing allowances? 
9. Has your organization been involved in the secondary market for 
allowances (i.e. buying and selling allowances outside of auctions)? 
10. Has your entity received free allowances in any WCI jurisdictions? How 
did it obtain these allowances? 
 
C. Auctions 
11. Has your entity been directly or indirectly involved in cap-and-trade 
auctions? Please explain exactly how. 
12. How easily has your entity been able to purchase allowances at WCI 
auctions? 
13. Did your entity encounter any participation restrictions or limitations in 
the auction process? 
14. [If Ontario participant:] How did linkage of the Ontario market to the 
Québec-California market impact how you approached the auctions? 
15. Have differences in compliance periods between the jurisdictions created 
any difficulties for your entity? 
16. Have you had any issues with the compliance obligations under WCI cap-
and-trade of any subsidiary or parent company that you may have? Have the rules 
surrounding corporate disclosure under legislation in your jurisdiction been clear? 
 
D. Offsets 
17. Have your entity been engaged in any offset programs to meet your 
entity’s compliance obligations? If so, please describe. 
18. Do you fully understand the offset program and what options may be 
available to your entity in this respect? 
19. If offsets were cost-comparable to purchasing allowances at auction, 
would you feel comfortable pursuing the offset option? 
 
E. Assessment 
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20. In your view, is WCI cap-and-trade i) cost-effective and ii) efficient? 
21. Does WCI cap-and-trade allow your entity to function more optimally? If 
so, how? If not, please specify. 
22. In your view, how could WCI cap-and-trade be improved in the future? 
What would you like to see? 
23. Is price volatility a concern for your entity going forward? 
24. Does your entity have a GHG reduction plan in place? If so, when was this 
initiated? 
25. Is your entity involved with any other emissions trading scheme? If so, 
which ones? Is it contemplating any such involvement in future? 
26. Is there anything else you would like to comment on about the WCI’s cap-
and-trade scheme at present? 
 
F. Background Questions that may be used to inform the above questions to 
market participants: 
1. How is the money raised from the cap-and-trade auctions divided between 
the jurisdictions and how is it being spent? 
2. What are the legal requirements for spending money raised from cap-and-
trade? Is cap-and-trade “revenue-neutral” in your jurisdiction? 
3. What are WCI jurisdictions in Canada doing to develop offset credit 
programs? 
4. How can Canadian companies be prevented from purchasing 
disproportionately more Californian offsets than vice-versa? 
5. Is there potential for a Canada-wide offset program that would counter-
balance California’s offset requirement? 
6. In your view, how might the current WCI scheme be enhanced? 
 
Questions for Regulators, Administrators and Civil Society 
1. What entity do you work for? 
2. Why is your entity involved with Western Climate Initiative (WCI)? 
3. How is the money raised from the cap-and-trade auctions divided between 
the jurisdictions and how is it being spent? 
4. What are the legal requirements for spending money raised from cap-and-
trade? Is cap-and-trade “revenue-neutral” in your jurisdiction? 
5. What are WCI jurisdictions in Canada doing to develop offset credit 
programs? 
6. How can Canadian companies be prevented from purchasing 
disproportionately more Californian offsets than vice-versa? 
7. Is there potential for a Canada-wide offset program that would counter-
balance California’s offset requirement? 
8. In your view, how might the current WCI scheme be enhanced? 
 
Background Questions that may be used to inform the above questions to 
Regulators, Administrators and Civil Society: 
 
A. Identification 
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1. Please explain why an entity might need emission permits. 
2. When did your entity become associated with WCI? Did it formally 
register? In your view, was the registration process relatively straightforward? 
Why should entities voluntarily participate in WCI cap-and-trade? 
3. Did your entity use any cap-and-trade consultants or advisors at any point? 
For what purposes? 
4. Are you familiar with the process for registering account viewing agents? 
In your view, is this process difficult? 
 
B. Allowances 
5. How many emission credits does an entity produce or need each year? Do 
you foresee those numbers increasing or decreasing in future? 
6. How has emission allowance pricing affected business decisions? Has 
business reduced emissions to avoid purchasing allowances? 
7. Are you aware of any secondary market for allowances (i.e. buying and 
selling allowances outside of auctions)? 
8. What about the receipt of free allowances in any WCI jurisdictions? In your 
view, have these free allowances distorted the market? 
 
C. Auctions 
9. Has your entity been directly or indirectly involved in cap-and-trade 
auctions? Please explain exactly how. 
10. How easily is it to purchase allowances at WCI auctions? 
11. [If Ontario regulator or administrator] In your view, how did linkage of 
the Ontario market to the Québec-California market impact how you approached 
the auctions? 
13. Have differences in compliance periods between the jurisdictions created 
any difficulties in your view? 
14. Have you noted any issues with the compliance obligations under WCI 
cap-and-trade of subsidiaries? In your view, have the rules surrounding corporate 
disclosure under legislation in your jurisdiction been clear? 
 
D. Offsets 
15. Have you been engaged in any offset programs to meet your compliance 
obligations? If so, please describe. 
16. Do you fully understand the offset program and what options may be 
available to entities in this respect? 
17. If offsets were cost-comparable to purchasing allowances at auction, 
would you feel comfortable pursuing the offset option? 
 
E. Assessment 
18. In your view, is WCI cap-and-trade i) cost-effective and ii) efficient? How 
would you assess WCI cap-and-trade versus other similar emission trading 
schemes elsewhere? 
19. Does WCI cap-and-trade allow your entity to function more optimally? If 
so, how? If not, please specify. 
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20. In your view, how could WCI cap-and-trade be improved in future? What 
would you like to see? 
21. Is price volatility of emission credits a concern going forward? 
22. Is there anything else you would like to comment on about the WCI’s cap-
and-trade scheme at present? 
4.8.2 Summary of Survey Responses 
Introduction 
What entities do you work for? 
Survey participants work for a variety of government funding organizations, 
cap-and-trade market experts, cap-and-trade participant entities, and cap-and-trade 
offset project developers. 
Why is your entity involved with the WCI? 
Participants include offset project developers working in the various WCI 
jurisdictions as well as cap-and-trade jurisdictions outside the WCI, funding 
organizations that invest in clean technology projects, and advisors in the cap-and-
trade market. One participant was a mandatory participant in the WCI cap-and-
trade program. The nature of their work is intimately connected to ETS programs 
in North America and elsewhere. 
Why do entities need emission permits? 
Most survey participants indicated that they did not need emissions permits 
since they are not emitters per se. However, their clients are emitters and so require 
emission permits to cover GHG emissions. One survey participant required 
emission permits to comply with Ontario Regulation 144/16. 
Was the registration process for the WCI relatively straightforward? 
Most survey participants indicated that they registered as market participants 
under the WCI CITSS (Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service). There 
was a difference of opinion expressed about whether the CITSS registration 
process was straightforward, but all participants agreed that it is burdensome. The 
many necessary steps and requirements to register – especially those related to the 
registration of complex corporate structures – means that CITSS registration 
becomes quite difficult for companies with many subsidiaries. One particular 
difficulty some participants have experienced is the requirement to get proof of 
identity from a bank or financial institution. The sense expressed by participants 
was that a bank is not an appropriate authority from which to get this proof and 
many banks did not understand what was required of them. 
When are cap-and-trade consultants or advisors used? 
Two participants indicated that they are cap-and-trade consultants or advisors 
themselves and therefore did not use external consultants or advisors. However, 
one participant indicated that they have internal audit requirements to consult with 
third parties for verification of their clean technology projects. Verification takes 
place to ensure the GHG reductions are related to the project under review. 
Further, market consultants are used to engage in discussions to identify changes 
in the market and their client needs in order to meet individual corporate 
compliance and GHG reduction goals. One participant used advisors to assist in 
tracking their risk position, monitoring the market, trading in secondary markets, 
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preparing bids, and informing their clients of new developments in the program 
and the USD/CAD exchange rate. 
Do you use agents to oversee their accounts? 
Most WCI cap-and-trade market participants use agents to register and 
purchase and sell allowances. While the process to register agents is clear, 
participants said they generally found the registration process to be burdensome. 
One participant has one primary account representative, and several alternate 
account representatives and account viewing agents. 
 
Allowances 
Do you anticipate your entity’s needs and/or production of surplus emission 
credits will increase or decrease in the future? 
Two survey respondents said their largest participants anticipated the volumes 
of emission credits they dealt with would increase year-to-year. However, one 
participant was less sure. While participants in this category anticipate that 
volumes will increase, much would depend on what happens to Ontario’s cap-and-
trade program and whether they are able to obtain new clients given the recent 
changes in Ontario’s cap-and-trade program. 
How has emission allowance pricing affected your business decisions? 
While emission allowance pricing does not directly affect our small sample of 
survey participants, changes in allowance pricing directly impacts their clients. 
Speaking for their clients, market experts and project developers said emission 
allowance pricing creates a real and tangible incentive for participants to reduce 
their carbon emissions outside the cap-and-trade market. Emission allowance 
pricing directly impacts the commercial attractiveness of undertaking emissions 
reduction actions. Allowance pricing also reduces the return on investments made 
with capital funds. When returns on investments are low, participants may be less 
likely to undertake further clean technology investments. Allowance pricing 
directly affects auction prices and the amount of funding the government dedicates 
to clean technology projects. Industrial emitters have begun to consider emission 
allowances as having a direct financial value which has lead companies to include 
not only environmental managers but also energy managers and financial 
departments in decisions related to emission allowances and their acquisition. 
Many larger companies are investing in energy saving projects to compensate for 
the price on carbon emissions. In reducing their own carbon emissions, companies 
are able to sell surplus allowances, which functions as an additional incentive to 
reduce their carbon emissions. 
Has your organization been involved in the secondary market for allowances? 
One survey participant has been involved in the secondary market for 
allowances, while an additional participant has been involved in the secondary 
markets for offsets. 
Has your entity received free allowances in any WCI jurisdictions? 
Three survey participants have not received free allowances since they are not 
emitters. Two of those participants support their clients in advocating for free 
allowances and in conforming with government guidelines. One participant has 
received free allowances. 
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Auctions 
Has your entity been directly or indirectly involved in cap-and-trade 
auctions? 
Two survey participants have been indirectly involved in cap-and-trade 
auctions either in a confidential advisory role or in assisting their clients with the 
initial set-up to participate in auctions. These survey participants are registered as 
participants in cap-and-trade auctions. However, they do not actively participate. 
Instead, they closely monitor the auctions and advise their clients on developing 
bidding strategies, registering for auctions and participation in auctions. 
How easy is it to purchase allowances at WCI auctions? 
Two survey participants feel that purchasing allowances at WCI auctions is 
generally straightforward. However, there is a learning curve to understanding the 
overall auction process and how it works. Becoming a qualified bidder can be a 
bureaucratic process but, once registered, it is a clear process. It is important to 
note that many participants in Ontario’s trial with WCI cap-and-trade were 
provided with free allowances. For this reason, they were not required to purchase 
allowances through auctions. These participants generally only participate in 
secondary markets and auctions for futures. One of the main criticisms of the WCI 
auctions is that too many entities were given EIGE (Emissions Intensive Trade 
Exposed Sector) status. These participants did not need to purchase allowances at 
auction, meaning that many allowances sold at auction were sold at a profit. 
Did your entity encounter any participation restrictions or limitations in the 
auction process? 
None of the survey participates or their clients experienced restrictions or 
limitations in the auction process. The one issue that did arise was the result of 
Ontario selling vintage allowances with an incorrect year. Specifically, Ontario 
had an initial compliance period of four years while the compliance period in 
California and Québec is three years. When Ontario created their auction 
documents they accidentally stated that their future vintage would be for 2020, 
only a three-year compliance period. Therefore, Ontario future vintages were 
incorrectly sold at auction for the year 2020. This mistake skewed the auction 
because many participants in the auction did not understand that an error had 
occurred. 
How did linkage of the Ontario market to the California-Québec market 
impact how your entity approached the auctions? 
The larger the cap-and-trade market is, the more concentrated the demand is 
for allowances. This is an important consideration in developing a bidding strategy 
for auctions. The linkage effected between Ontario and California-Québec in 
2017, and activated in 2018, increased the volume of allowances in auctions but 
also increased the number of sophisticated participants in auctions as well. The 
linkage meant that knowledge about cap-and-trade was diffused and there was 
greater understanding of the auctions and auction process among participants. 
Some survey participants stated that linkage could have had a significant 
impact on how entities approached auctions due to the lack of an established offset 
protocol system in Ontario. Specifically, this shortcoming left open the possibility 
for participants to buy offsets in California and Québec to meet their compliance 
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obligations and fulfill their eight percent offset maximum. Since offsets sold for 
approximately CAD $2 less per tonne than allowances, a participant’s compliance 
obligations could be met with a lower cost to the participant. However, it is 
unknown whether any participants actually took advantage of this option. 
Have differences in compliance periods between jurisdictions created any 
difficulties for your entity? 
Survey participants indicated that the only issue that seems to have arisen with 
respect to compliance periods was the first Ontario auction where vintage 
allowances where incorrectly sold with a three-year compliance period instead of 
Ontario’s four-year compliance periods. 
Have you had any issues with the compliance obligations under WCI cap-and-
trade of any subsidiary or parent company? Have the rules of corporate disclosure 
under legislation in your jurisdiction been clear? 
None of the survey participants experienced any issues with compliance 
obligations of a subsidiary or parent company. Neither did they experience any 
issues with the rules of corporate disclosure under the WCI cap-and-trade scheme. 
As a result, survey participants were of the opinion that the rules of corporate 
disclosure were clear, but at the same time very bureaucratic. For example, there 
is already significant paperwork to complete for CITSS registration. However, 
when linkage occurred between California, Québec and Ontario, every participant 
was required to adjust their CITSS account to reflect the linkage. 
 
Offsets 
Has your entity been engaged in any offset programs to meet your entity’s 
compliance obligations? 
None of the survey participants had compliance obligations requiring the use 
of offsets. However, all survey participants are heavily involved in offset programs 
through work with project sponsors, offset discussions, or stakeholder 
development. This involvement includes assessing client’s potential opportunity 
to engage in offset programs, the development of offsets, the approval of offsets, 
and the monetization of offsets in the cap-and-trade program. 
One issue with offsets that many of survey participants mentioned was the fact 
that the Ontario government did not develop its offset protocols in a timely 
manner. This delay meant that the only offsets available for purchase were those 
from California or Québec. In two years of operation, the government of Ontario 
only finalized three offset protocols (landfill gas, mine methane capture (MMC), 
and ozone depleting substances (ODS)), and there was a long list of offsets that 
had yet to be reviewed. Generally speaking, in the case of Ontario, entities were 
not aware that if they kept accurate records of their emissions as the WCI cap-and-
trade program evolved, they could have been eligible for offsets in future. This is 
because as offset protocols were finalized by the government of Ontario, new 
offset protocols could be retroactively applied through careful record keeping. 
Some survey participants also indicated that GHG-intensity was not factored 
in to the offset review and approval process in Ontario, meaning that the immediate 
benefits for climate change were delayed or lost. For example, in Ontario there 
was a protocol in review that provided offsets to corporations that capture and 
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destroy leaked refrigerant gases. These gases have substantial GHG potential. 
However, the offset would not be provided to a corporation that captured and 
recycled refrigerant gases. The recycling, as opposed to the destruction, of 
refrigerant gases would be significantly better for the environment. However, the 
recycling of refrigerant gases was not included in the proposed offset protocol. 
Therefore, a new protocol would have to be proposed for the recycling of 
refrigerant gases, which would then be placed at the end of the list of offsets to 
review. 
Do you fully understand the offset program and what options may be available 
to your entity in this respect? 
All survey participants considered themselves well versed in the offset 
program and what options are (or were) available since many are offset experts. 
However, one of the survey participants felt that most industrial participants did 
not have a good understanding of offsets and identified a misunderstanding among 
many participants with respect to the difference between offsets and allowances. 
A further common misunderstanding in the view of survey participants was about 
who owns and develops offsets. 
If offsets were cost-comparable to purchasing allowances at auction, would 
you feel comfortable pursuing the offset option? 
All survey participants agreed that offsets were only a viable option if they 
could be generated at a discount to allowances. Offsets inherently hold more risk 
associated with delivery or the lack of delivery of GHG emissions, which is why 
offsets are typically sold at a discount. In the view of survey participants, the risk 
with offsets is greater in California than in Québec and Ontario and this difference 
is due to how offsets are treated in each jurisdiction. In California there is an 
invalidation risk, where offsets can be removed from a CITSS account even after 
the participant has purchased them. In Québec and Ontario, an insurance account 
protects against potential invalidation. Therefore, the difference between 
allowances and offsets is not just due to cost but also involves the inherent 
associated regulatory risks. One participant stated that “golden offsets” (i.e. offsets 
with no invalidation risks) would be a good option regardless of the additional cost 
required to purchase them. 
 
Assessment 
In your view, is WCI cap-and-trade i) cost-effective and ii) efficient? 
All survey participants agreed that the WCI cap-and-trade system is cost-
effective and efficient. All survey participants expressed the view that a cap-and-
trade system is significantly better than a carbon tax because, notwithstanding 
popular perceptions to the contrary, there is a certain level of complexity that 
would be required in order to ensure a carbon tax is fair and not destructive to 
industry sectors. The complexity required by a carbon tax would approach the 
complexity of a cap-and-trade system. It is also important to note that cap-and-
trade programs were created in the infancy of carbon-pricing. They are by no 
means perfect programs. Cap-and-trade programs are being created by 
jurisdictions that are leaders in environmental protection and inevitably there is a 
learning curve for everyone involved. However, in the long-run, having a cap-and-
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trade program and having worked out all the preliminary issues will serve as a 
huge advantage as the world shifts its focus to carbon-pricing in the struggle 
against climate change. 
Does WCI cap-and-trade allow your entity to function more optimally? 
Three survey participants agreed that WCI cap-and-trade allows entities to 
function more optimally. Specifically, WCI cap-and-trade acts as a revenue 
engine, generating income for clean technology programs. In most instances 
private entities only have a finite amount of capital to invest in clean technology 
projects to reduce their carbon emissions. Therefore, the funding they receive from 
the cap-and-trade program allows them to continue to reinvest in clean technology 
when they might not have the capital to do so otherwise. The WCI cap-and-trade 
program reduces the cost of compliance and offsets and can create commercial 
opportunities for corporations through the revenue it generates. One participant 
stated that the cap-and-trade program does not allow their entity to function more 
optimally because they are now required to dedicate many additional resources to 
the administration of the cap-and-trade program in their entity. However, this same 
participant stated that the cap-and-trade program has promoted long-term thinking 
and an emphasis on efficiency in their entity. 
How could WCI cap-and-trade be improved in the future? 
Survey participants identified several changes they would like to see to 
improve the WCI cap-and-trade program. First, participants agreed that there 
needs to be more membership involved in cap-and-trade programs like the WCI 
and for the programs to be less dependent on politics of the partner jurisdictions. 
Second, they would like to see sufficient offsets to supply the market. Third, 
participants would like to see greater transferability of offsets among the WCI 
jurisdictions. Specifically, they would like California to change its invalidation 
approach to offsets and adopt an insurance approach similar to that used in Québec 
and Ontario. They believe that the risk in offsets should be on the project sponsor, 
as in an insurance system, and not on the buyer of the offsets, as in an invalidation 
system. Fourth, participants would like the limitations on the percentage of offsets 
that can be used to be removed and offset usage to not be arbitrarily restricted. 
Fifth, participants would like to see more education about the cap-and-trade 
program for organizations, within politics, and in schools. Overall there is the 
general consensus that “the longer the system is around, the better it will function” 
– A Participant. 
Is price volatility a concern for your entity going forward? 
Three survey participants indicated that price volatility is always a potential 
concern. However, this has generated price stability in the current market. There 
has not been much price volatility in the WCI market but there is a concern that 
Ontario’s departure from the WCI and the uncertainty with regards to the post-
2020 WCI may create more price volatility in the future. Survey participants 
indicated concern that if prices were to increase significantly over a short period, 
there is a chance that some entities might not be able to absorb the carbon price 
and the failure to absorb could promote carbon leakage. 
Does your entity have a GHG reduction plan in place? 
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Three survey participants indicated that they have a GHG reduction plan in 
place. Two of these participants, as advisors and funding organizations, have GHG 
reduction plans that involve assisting other entities in reducing their GHG 
emissions, or meeting certain funding targets in certain markets or for certain 
projects. However, the view was expressed that WCI cap-and-trade itself had 
motivated corporations to conduct internal reviews of their GHG emissions and to 
create internal plans to reduce GHG emissions. 
Is your entity involved with any other emissions trading scheme? 
Survey participants are involved in, or are working on becoming involved in, 
various other emissions trading schemes. This includes provincial and state 
schemes across Canada and the U.S., the EU ETS, China’s ETS, and Mexico’s 
ETS. 
Is there anything else you would like to comment on about the WCI’s cap-and-
trade scheme at present? 
Participants commented on the uniqueness and importance of linkage between 
markets in the WCI and the power of those linkages. These linkages create a liquid 
market which allows for a significant reduction in the compliance cost per tonne 
of GHG emissions. This is an incentive for more jurisdictions to link to the WCI 
scheme, something which would also help in standardizing the WCI scheme and 
reduce leakage. One participant mentioned the significant support of industrial 
participants for the cap-and-trade program. While large emitters seem to have a 
good understanding of the cap-and-trade program, there remains significant 
confusion in how a cap-and-trade is different from a carbon tax. One criticism is 
that there could have been better education to the participants and the public about 
what a cap-and-trade program is and what it consists of. 
The WCI cap-and-trade program provides a level of certainty for industry 
participants. Through it, participants are able to identify what they are facing in 
the world of GHG emissions and carbon pricing, while also creating plans about 
how to work with these. Without this certainty, survey participants voiced concern 
that new investments will choose other more secure jurisdictions to grow their 
business and stop or hinder their investments in jurisdictions of uncertainty. 
“The WCI is a model for the rest of the world in terms of how you link systems 
and should serve to help other jurisdictions make commitments and create linkages 
between cap-and-trade systems.” – A Participant. 
 
Background Questions that may be used to inform the above questions to 
market participants: 
How can Canadian companies be prevented from purchasing 
disproportionately more Californian offsets than vice-versa? 
Survey participants agreed that disproportionate purchases of offsets from 
outside the jurisdiction was not an issue in Ontario’s cap-and-trade program. In 
their view, this abuse was a misconception and a fear among many people that had 
so far proven to be false. In Ontario there was a limit of 8% use of offsets to meet 
compliance obligations, which raised the question of how much of an impact 
would there really be if disproportionately more offsets were bought in one 
jurisdiction when compared to another. In addition, the potential flow of money 
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from one jurisdiction to another is a risk that must be accepted when deciding to 
link with other jurisdictions. Money could flow either way so the real concern 
should be ensuring that caps and reduction levels are similar across linked 
jurisdictions and are appropriate for the industries in each jurisdiction. Regulatory 
parity will ensure additional support for local development and local industries 
and result in direct emissions reductions in each jurisdiction. Another way to 
prevent money outflows would be to have a very robust market where market 
prices closely track the value of allowances and offsets in a market. Such a market 
would assist in achieving emissions reductions locally by investing cap-and-trade 
revenue in local clean technology projects. 
Is there potential for a Canada-wide offset program that would counter-
balance California’s offset requirement? 
One survey participant asserted that there is a necessity for a federal offset 
program in Canada where offsets are approved by the federal government. This 
federal offset program would help provinces in developing their own carbon 
pricing system and specifically, the offset component of the system. There is a 
concern that if a federal offset program is created, a provincial program would be 
required in all provinces to protect against double accounting. Other survey 
participants asserted that one issue that needs attention is actually ensuring that 
Ontario has sufficient offset protocols in place so that if a federal program is 
introduced, Ontario’s experience might serve as a ‘toolkit’ or template for 
regulatory design. 
How might the current WCI scheme be enhanced? 
There was a general consensus among survey participants that the WCI cap-
and-trade program is valuable and has built off of the concerns and issues raised 
in other countries’ cap-and-trade programs. However, there is always room for 
improvement. One area of improvement would be to increase the amount of 
linkages with other jurisdictions. This could include cross-border linkages 
between Canada and the U.S. but also linkages between Canadian provinces and 
between U.S. states. In addition, increasing the membership of the WCI will assist 
in achieving the lowest possible market pricing as well as preventing leakage. 
Another way to enhance the WCI scheme would be to ensure continuity of the 
program and long-term certainty. A ‘2030 framework’, as adopted by California, 
provides more certainty than the current 3-year compliance period framework. In 
addition, a better understanding of the California offset market and modifying the 
California offset market to make it more fungible with the Québec offset market 
would assist in creating more certainty in the WCI cap-and-trade scheme. 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The chapters of this Guide reveal divergent motivations and regulatory 
environments underlying the introduction of cap-and-trade schemes within 
jurisdictions pursuant to WCI. The general experience with it has been mixed, 
although a very limited survey of market participants suggests that carbon markets 
are working well and that cap-and-trade scheme in California and Québec are 
robust and entrenched. Viable emissions trading continues and linkage must be 
acknowledged to be a success. 
129
Carmody: A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2019
 A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI 277 
Nevertheless, recent experience reveals that cap-and-trade raises sensitive 
political and legal questions. As Leah Stokes and others have pointed out, 
renewable energy policies must remain politically viable over long periods given 
the scale of transformation necessary to address climate change.697 That political 
support is not always sustainable or forthcoming. 
What are our conclusions? They are different for different actors. 
 
For Federal Governments 
For federal governments in North America, the experience of linkage under 
WCI emphasizes how, given the constitutional division of powers, subnational 
actors will continue to be important agents in policy concerning climate change. 
Federal, state, and provincial governments may not necessarily see eye-to-eye on 
environmental policy but will have to continue to work at harmonization. 
Harmonization may be achieved through alignment of federal and subnational 
standards, but it may also be achieved through mechanisms of cooperative 
federalism in both the U.S. and Canada. Federal governments also have significant 
power to encourage and shape such cooperation. 
 
For States and Provinces 
With respect to the subnational role of states and provinces, the two-step 
approach to harmonization undertaken pursuant to WCI – of separate program 
design and linkage phases – has been useful in allowing jurisdictions to 
accommodate certain necessary political realities (competitiveness, attracting 
investment, leakage etc.) in the program design phase while moving in the 
direction of deeper harmonization and integration in the linkage phase. That one 
jurisdiction has decided to withdraw illustrates that withdrawal is still possible but 
is ultimately a political question. Partner jurisdictions retain sovereignty under 
WCI. 
It is also clear to us that the linkage of cap-and-trade programs pursuant to 
WCI does not involve “plug-and-play”, that is, a simple transposition of existing 
regulation into WCI acceding jurisdictions. The research conducted here reveals 
that the initial introduction of cap-and-trade programming in a jurisdiction requires 
indigenous commitment and an authentic investment of administrative resources 
as well as difficult political choices. This is undertaken in the belief that doing 
something about climate change is worthwhile. Linkage is also a demanding 
process. It requires a shift in policy thinking and an assurance of ongoing dialogue 
with cap-and-trade partners. California, Québec, and Ontario implemented their 
programming relatively quickly and seamlessly and were able to link. This is in 
part because each worked from a common template provided by the WCI 2008 
Recommendations and the 2010 Program Design document. Another factor in 
their favor was the high degree of competence and trust among staff in all three 
jurisdictions. The same cannot be presumed of all jurisdictions that might be 
interested in participating in such a scheme in future. 
In connection with the previous observation, we note that the experience of 
harmonization and linkage pursuant to WCI is not static but dynamic and adaptive. 
 
 697 Stokes 2013, supra note 167, at 491. 
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In other words, jurisdictions do not link and then simply return to thinking about 
regulation of cap-and-trade in the narrow, parochial way they might have done 
beforehand. Jurisdictions need to be constantly aware of program requirements in 
their own domains and elsewhere. They participate and have input into the design 
of their own programming and that of others. Experience with offset design 
provides an illustrative example. In other words, linkage requires an expanded 
horizon. 
Another – and remarkable – observation with respect to the subnational role 
of states and provinces is that virtually all of the above developments have taken 
place with very little in the way of an overarching supervisory machinery, apart 
perhaps from the commitment to meet or communicate regularly and share 
information. The motivation for the ‘undertaking’ is, in a broad sense, an abstract 
one. There is a degree of idealism about the WCI scheme which sits in tension 
with the realism of unfolding events, including varying perceptions of mitigation 
and adaptation costs and who will bear them. 
 
For Producers, Regulators, Exchanges and the Public Interest 
With respect to producers, regulators, exchanges and the public interest, our 
research reveals that a market for emissions trading between subnational 
jurisdictions in two separate countries is possible and can work – and according to 
the evidence, works very well. Emissions trading pursuant to WCI is successful. 
While the presence (or absence) of a jurisdiction is relevant to the market’s 
efficiency and liquidity, too much should not be made of a single jurisdiction’s 
withdrawal. The market for emission allowances pursuant to WCI continues to 
operate successfully, largely, it appears, due to a common design framework, 
cooperation, efficient markets and similar legal, administrative and professional 
traditions. 
At the same time, although large in absolute economic terms, the market 
created by linkage pursuant to WCI is relatively small. Our research reveals that 
less than 1000 entities across North America are actively involved. The very 
limited size of our sample of responses (four individuals) suggests that the market 
is dominated by a few key players (usually agents acting for and advising 
participants). This result infers that regulators need to exercise high vigilance to 
ensure market integrity. Opportunities for market manipulation and conflict of 
interest could easily present themselves, a point already made by the California 
Legislature in its 2017 directions to CARB on regulatory design. A further 
opportunity to confirm – or deny – these preliminary findings by conducting a 
wider survey of participants would be useful. We surmise that events during the 
course of our study may have depressed sample size. 
Emissions trading market participants generally spoke favorably of the trading 
system introduced pursuant to WCI and extended through linkage. However, 
involvement requires sophistication, something not all participants (or potential 
participants) may have. Market sophistication limits participation to those with the 
resources to specialize. 
The need for market integrity under WCI is obviously linked to cap-and-
trade’s political sustainability. To the extent that the market now functions 
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effectively, allowing for emissions reductions by the most efficient emitter, then 
market behavior is to be encouraged. At the same time, since the emissions cap is 
lowered annually, the option of banking allowances gives participants an incentive 
to obtain extra allowances in the present for use prospectively because purchases 
serve as a hedge against higher prices going forward. A by-product of early 
acquisition of allowances is that a jurisdiction may be unable to meet its emissions 
targets down the road. In Ontario’s case, for example, participants’ acquisition of 
some C$2.8 billion worth of emission credits issued by the province during a time 
of free allowance distribution infers that participants were not unaware of this 
option. 
These developments suggest to us that there is a need for careful surveillance 
of emissions markets by regulators, for enforcement action in appropriate 
instances, as well as the need for reinforcement through enhanced ethical standards 
– such as proposed Code of Conduct for WCI Market Participants. The Code could 
set out ethical standards, define prohibited trading practices, required information 
disclosure and documentation, training and monitoring and investigation. Similar 
standards are already being implemented by some energy traders and suppliers.698 
 
Final Considerations 
The lessons of WCI experience for other jurisdictions are varied. As 
mentioned, an international emissions trading scheme at the subnational level can 
work well if a common design platform is adopted, if parties are prepared to work 
together closely, and if common values help achieve linkage and operational 
interchange over time. But neutral standards are also required for the sustainability 
necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. 
It is also true that WCI cap-and-trade does not regulate or eliminate all GHG 
emissions in WCI jurisdictions. Coverage stands at about eighty-five percent in 
the two continuing jurisdictions of California and Québec. As has been pointed 
out elsewhere, there remain other major sources of carbon emissions (vehicles, 
buildings etc.) and these are harder to get at than the 830 or so major emitters 
currently covered by WCI (approximately 700 in California, 130 in Québec). For 
all of the optimism about ‘decarbonizing’ the North American economy, much 
still needs to be done to successfully deal with climate change by addressing GHG 
from other sources. 
These considerations lead us to conclude that the vital thread running through 
carbon markets – and true all of all markets - is trust and fairness. There must be 
trust and fairness if carbon markets are to continue to function as intended. That 
can only be instilled if ethical standards are adhered to, if greater efforts are made 
at transparency, and the public can be made to see tangible evidence of fair and 
efficient markets contributing to climate change goals. These concerns are not 
new. They simply assume greater prominence at a time when the phenomenon of 
functioning carbon markets is a present reality. 
 
 698 See, for example, Powerex Corp. Trading Code of Conduct (Oct. 31, 2017). Powerex 
Corp. is a wholly owned energy marketing subsidiary of BC Hydro. Powerex buys and sells 
wholesale electricity, natural gas and environmental energy products and services in Western 
North America. 
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